496 Journal of the European Economic Association otherwise difficult to explain (Fehr and Gachter 2000:Ostrom 2000),and they are tified primarily by r eoretically related to the norm (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004:Camerer and Fehr 2004).Because norms are usually studied indirectly in economics,they are rarely used to form precise predictions about behavior I In this paper,we aim to put the horse (norm)before the cart(behavior),by introd ed method for identifyings ial behavior separately use this method to measure social norms in several economi choice contexts,and then use these elicited norms to predict behavior a priori.We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in variants of the "dictator game",where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and outcomes.We show that such changes in behavior are ent ly cons sistent with varying social norms and with a stabl preference for complying with social norms Rather than attempting to develop a theory of norm compliance based on underlying preferences,as in prior research.3 we start with the assumption that individuals care about behaving in a manner consistent with social norms.More precisely,we assum ion makers'utility is ha ased on the mo they obtain an on the degree to which their actions comply with social nomms,in the form of taking actions generally viewed as socially appropriate and avoiding those viewed as socially inappropriate.We then show that these two considerations-combined with a novel. incentivized method for identifying social norms that uses coordination games explain significant beha iation in dictator g contribut games.Thus our primary the cal,one We present and sulting changes in behavior that are consistent with the apreference for complying alizin m such labora t leas tiall or com orm ior in and to ryin For the labora s are identi he reason why ome e might sh are in one dictator e nt but not i e same as why one tips at a cof shop but not at a f d restauran Fot examnle Andreoni and Bemnheim (2009) plore situations in which one individual unilaterally avior that Csntstromindividualscarigaboutom 15 ously defined al c(r). n which there is im plicitly a ent that it is the edge that x ma that norms change ac ss contexts.and ount for changes in behavior.496 Journal of the European Economic Association otherwise difficult to explain (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Ostrom 2000), and they are ¨ identified primarily by measuring behaviors that are theoretically related to the norm (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Camerer and Fehr 2004). Because norms are usually studied indirectly in economics, they are rarely used to form precise predictions about behavior.1 In this paper, we aim to put the horse (norm) before the cart (behavior), by introducing a novel incentivized method for identifying social norms separately from behavior. We use this method to measure social norms in several economic choice contexts, and then use these elicited norms to predict behavior a priori. We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in variants of the “dictator game”, where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and outcomes.2 We show that such changes in behavior are entirely consistent with varying social norms and with a stable preference for complying with social norms. Rather than attempting to develop a theory of norm compliance based on underlying preferences, as in prior research,3 we start with the assumption that individuals care about behaving in a manner consistent with social norms. More precisely, we assume decision makers’ utility is based on the money they obtain and on the degree to which their actions comply with social norms, in the form of taking actions generally viewed as socially appropriate and avoiding those viewed as socially inappropriate. We then show that these two considerations—combined with a novel, incentivized method for identifying social norms that uses coordination games— can explain significant behavioral variation in dictator games. Thus, our primary contribution is an empirical, rather than theoretical, one. We present and demonstrate 1. A few experimental studies manipulate the likely presence or strength of a social norm by varying features of a choice context (Krupka and Weber 2009; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) and demonstrate resulting changes in behavior that are consistent with the influence of a norm or a preference for complying with a norm. 2. This apparent “instability” in behavior has led some researchers to question the value of generalizing from such laboratory experiments to the field (Levitt and List 2007). Our work at least partially addresses this concern by demonstrating how such behavior corresponds to varying and identifiable social norms. The sensitivity of behavior in the laboratory to the context of the experiment can be interpreted in a manner similar to how behavior in the field is sensitive to context and to varying social norms. For the laboratory data analyzed in this paper, we demonstrate that such sensitivity may be explained once varying social norms are identified. Therefore, the reason why someone might share in one dictator experiment but not in another very similar one might be the same as why one tips at a coffee shop but not at a fast-food restaurant, or in the United States but not in Europe. 3. For example, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) explore situations in which one individual unilaterally shares wealth with another, and model a norm as the behavior that results from individuals caring about own wealth, intrinsically about fairness, and about how others perceive their concern for fairness. Their paper assumes an exogenously defined alternative (xF), on which there is implicitly agreement that it is the “fair” action for the decision maker to take, and they follow prior research in assuming that the equal (50–50) division of wealth is a natural reference point. They then show why pooling may occur at this alternative (as well as at other alternatives, under changing conditions). Andreoni and Bernheim acknowledge that xF may differ across contexts, and may thus account for varying behavior. This is similar to our main argument, that norms change across contexts, and can therefore account for changes in behavior, and suggests that our identification of what actions people agree upon as “appropriate” or “inappropriate” might provide an empirical basis for something like xF in their model