Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 497 the usefulness of a novel method for norm elicitation by showing that the elicited social norms-when included as a component of utility in a conditional logit choice model- can account rather well for behavioral changes in experimental data.Moreover,we also show that the weights placed on money and norm compliance.in the estimated utility tant willingness to trade off roughly $5 of wealth in order to take actions that are socially appropriate. rather than socially inappropriate.The stability of these preferences thus allows a- priori predictions to be generated for new dictator-game contexts,once one obtains measures of the social appropriateness of different actions. We be defining cial no and mple utility fra ework for understanding their potential influence on choice.We then demonstrate how one can use coordination games to identify the social norms that make up one source of utility Using our utility framework,we show how the social norms we elicit from one set of individuals with the coordination games yield precise and testable predictions regarding the behavior of a new pe of particip nts,which we evaluate both with novel data from ew experi ment a d also using data from previously published experiment We find that the observed sensitivity of behavior to several surprising experimental treatments can be almost entirely explained by variations in social norms. We choose to study behavior in dictator games primarily for two reasons.First the simplicity and non- -strategic nature of the dictator game make it easy to establish altemative enviro nts in hich ca hold timportant tures of the choice faced by a decision maker(such as the set of possible payoffs and experimenta subjects'understanding of how actions map into payoffs),while varying the context in a way that is likely to influence norms.The nonstrategic nature of the dictator game also allows us to rule out the possibility that changes in behavior are due to changes in subjects'expectations about h oponents will behave.as would potentially be the case in a public goods.prisoner's dilemma,or trust games. Second,a primary motivation in our research is to provide an interpretation for several recent experiments in economics(Dana,Weber,and Kuang 2007;List 2007: Bardsley 2008:Lazear,Malmendier,and Weber 2012),all of which use variants of the dictator game.These experiments show that alternative treatments that make seemingly trivial or irrelevant ch s to the hoices ailable to a dictator evertheles surprising changes in behavior.We provide at least one possible account for these changes.Indeed,part of the value in our approach is that it can provide an explanation for why behavior changes across dictator-game variants in a manner not adequately accounted for by most current theories of social preferences.Thus,rather than adding to the literatur on social pr b ndu be differen leadin models.we puposely study simple decision contexts between whichthes oftheccount for all be variaon in bhavior acro the variants of the dictator game that we study here. Krupka and Weber Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games 497 the usefulness of a novel method for norm elicitation by showing that the elicited social norms—when included as a component of utility in a conditional logit choice model— can account rather well for behavioral changes in experimental data. Moreover, we also show that the weights placed on money and norm compliance, in the estimated utility parameters in the conditional logit model, demonstrate a fairly constant willingness to trade off roughly $5 of wealth in order to take actions that are socially appropriate, rather than socially inappropriate. The stability of these preferences thus allows a￾priori predictions to be generated for new dictator-game contexts, once one obtains measures of the social appropriateness of different actions. We begin by defining social norms and presenting a simple utility framework for understanding their potential influence on choice. We then demonstrate how one can use coordination games to identify the social norms that make up one source of utility. Using our utility framework, we show how the social norms we elicit from one set of individuals with the coordination games yield precise and testable predictions regarding the behavior of a new sample of participants, which we evaluate both with novel data from a new experiment and also using data from previously published experiments. We find that the observed sensitivity of behavior to several surprising experimental treatments can be almost entirely explained by variations in social norms. We choose to study behavior in dictator games primarily for two reasons. First, the simplicity and non-strategic nature of the dictator game make it easy to establish alternative environments in which we can hold constant important features of the choice faced by a decision maker (such as the set of possible payoffs and experimental subjects’ understanding of how actions map into payoffs), while varying the context in a way that is likely to influence norms. The nonstrategic nature of the dictator game also allows us to rule out the possibility that changes in behavior are due to changes in subjects’ expectations about how opponents will behave, as would potentially be the case in a public goods, prisoner’s dilemma, or trust games. Second, a primary motivation in our research is to provide an interpretation for several recent experiments in economics (Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007; List 2007; Bardsley 2008; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012), all of which use variants of the dictator game. These experiments show that alternative treatments that make seemingly trivial or irrelevant changes to the choices available to a dictator nevertheless produce surprising changes in behavior. We provide at least one possible account for these changes. Indeed, part of the value in our approach is that it can provide an explanation for why behavior changes across dictator-game variants in a manner not adequately accounted for by most current theories of social preferences.4 Thus, rather than adding to the literature on social preferences by conducting a “horse race” between different leading models, we purposely study simple decision contexts between which these 4. In the Online Appendix, we consider several leading models of social preferences, and show that none of them can directly account for all the variation in behavior across the variants of the dictator game that we study here