498 Journal of the European Economic Association models often fail to discriminate,and show that empirically-measured differences in social norms across these co By applying our norm elicitation method to our own and others'dictator game data,we offer a unified interpretation of the behavioral changes observed across several experiments while simultaneously demonstrating the usefulness of the elicitation technique that we introduce.We also highlight the benefits of re-examining data from test novel the and interpreta as opposed to uniquely cons ering novel data generated solely for the purposes of a current test. We should also note that,while this paper is the first to introduce the coordination game-based elicitation method for identifying social norms,the approach has already been used in other papers.For example,Burks and Krupka(2012)ap ply the method in a real firm,to study social norms regarding behavior tow ard cli sers an es in perceived socia norms correlate with job dissatisfaction.In another example,Gachter,Nosenzo,and Sefton (2012)use our method to elicit social norms in a setting where two workers provide costly effort to a firm,in a "gift-exchange"setting.They elicit norms to demonstrate that it is more socially ap ropriate to work hard when the other worker exerts high effort,and compare the predictive ability of social norms to othe social preferences. The next section presents our method for identifying social norms.Sections 3-5 demonstrate the usefulness of this method for predicting and explaining behavior in nonstrategic choice environments.Finally.in the conclusion.we discuss related work that validates the orm elicitation method. 2.Defining and Identifying Social Norms Following Elster(1989),we note two important features of social norms.First,socia norms generally prescribe or proscribe behaviors or actions,rather than outcomes As Elster notes,"The simplest social norms are of the type:Do X,or:Don't do X.' (p.99).Allowing norms to govern actions.rather than outcomes.suggests that two actions that produce the same outcome,but differ in other respects,may be governed cial econd,the cial" element of no orms req t they be jointly recognized,or collectively perceived,by members of a population.These two features of social norms -that they apply to actions rather than outcomes and that they irical input that can imp ofsoarTm omo to provide a basis for While singl data is valuable for the purpos498 Journal of the European Economic Association models often fail to discriminate, and show that empirically-measured differences in social norms across these contexts correspond to observed differences in behavior.5 By applying our norm elicitation method to our own and others’ dictator game data, we offer a unified interpretation of the behavioral changes observed across several experiments while simultaneously demonstrating the usefulness of the elicitation technique that we introduce. We also highlight the benefits of re-examining data from prior experiments to test novel theories and interpretations, as opposed to uniquely considering novel data generated solely for the purposes of a current test.6 We should also note that, while this paper is the first to introduce the coordination game-based elicitation method for identifying social norms, the approach has already been used in other papers. For example, Burks and Krupka (2012) apply the method in a real firm, to study how social norms regarding behavior toward clients differ between financial advisers and their supervisors, and show that mismatches in perceived social norms correlate with job dissatisfaction. In another example, Gachter, Nosenzo, and ¨ Sefton (2012) use our method to elicit social norms in a setting where two workers provide costly effort to a firm, in a “gift-exchange” setting. They elicit norms to demonstrate that it is more socially appropriate to work hard when the other worker also exerts high effort, and compare the predictive ability of social norms to other social preferences. The next section presents our method for identifying social norms. Sections 3–5 demonstrate the usefulness of this method for predicting and explaining behavior in nonstrategic choice environments. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss related work that validates the norm elicitation method. 2. Defining and Identifying Social Norms Following Elster (1989), we note two important features of social norms. First, social norms generally prescribe or proscribe behaviors or actions, rather than outcomes. As Elster notes, “The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don’t do X.” (p. 99). Allowing norms to govern actions, rather than outcomes, suggests that two actions that produce the same outcome, but differ in other respects, may be governed by different social norms. Second, the “social” element of norms requires that they be jointly recognized, or collectively perceived, by members of a population. These two features of social norms—that they apply to actions rather than outcomes and that they 5. Our approach might also serve as a valuable complement to existing theoretical approaches, providing a useful empirical input that can improve their ability to distinguish between environments that differ in social norms. For example, the norms that we empirically elicit could be incorporated into existing models of social norms, such as those by Lopez-Perez (2008) or Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) to provide a basis for why certain actions are considered “fair” or “compliant” with a norm, or to provide a basis for expectations in non-strategic settings (Battigali and Dufwenberg 2007). 6. While most experimental studies in economics (and psychology) limit their attention to a single dataset (usually generated by the authors), using additional, pre-existing data is valuable for the purposes of demonstrating robustness and generalizing findings beyond a particular experimental study. For other papers that employ this approach, see Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) and Hyndman et al. (2012)