Rafael Ch et al. TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. N Panel A:Outcomes. Tax revenues per capita Log property tax revenues per capita 1997-2002 2.32 1.08 1108 Log property tax revenues per capita 2003-2006 2.70 1.00 0 6 1107 Log property tax revenues per capita 2007-2010 2.82 1.06 6 1111 ///.sdy Log property tax revenues per capita 2011-2013 2.94 1.11 0 1111 Cadastral performance Per capita land value 2003-2006 4.60 5.79 0 7 974 Cadastral update lag 2003-2006 6.82 3.87 50 892 Num.cadastral updates 2003-2006 1.49 0.67 0 4 979 Land ownership Land informality rate 2003-2006 0.20 0.23 0 954 Electoral outcomes Uribe+Conservative party coalition 1997 mayor election 0.28 0.45 00 986 Uribe+Conservative party coalition 2000 mayor election 0.26 0.44 955 Uribe+Conservative party coalition 1997 and 2000 mayor elections 0.32 0.46 0 1182 Uribe Conservative party coalition 2003 mayor election 0.23 0.42 0 908 Uribe Conservative party coalition 2007 mayor election 0.60 0.49 0 1106 Uribe Conservative party coalition 2003 and 2007 mayor elections 0.61 0.49 0 A 1182 Uribe+Conservative party coalition 2011 mayor election 0.43 0.50 0 1040 Panel B:Violence. Log guerrilla attacks per capita,1988-1996 -35.42 31.30 -115 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita,1988-1996 -35.87 31.53 -105 0 1182 'asn Log guerrilla attacks per capita,1997-2002 -29.38 19.80 82 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita,1997-2002 -30.02 20.04 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita,2003-2006 -18.12 12.67 53 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita,2003-2006 -19.61 14.10 53 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita,2007-2010 -13.94 13.07 48 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita,2007-2010 -16.49 15.73 5 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita,2003-2010 -32.06 23.73 -101 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita,2003-2010 -36.10 27.71 -108 0 1182 Notes:All data sources are described in Appendix A. 235.5010 contrast,the correlation with cumulative guerrilla large set of potential municipal-level confounders,in- attacks is 0.02,and not significant.25 cluding natural resource royalties and transfer pay- Similar to the case of tax revenues,attacks by guer- ments,vote share by political party for mayors'elec- rilla fronts and paramilitary blocks are highly skewed, tions,the location of military bases,a dummy of especially in the 1988-2010 period(see also Figure 4). peaceful"municipalities (those without attacks dur- The most violent municipalities had attacks over eight ing our entire sample period),the number of people standard deviations above the mean.We thus normal- displaced due to the armed conflict,coca production, ize attacks by population so as to capture violence in- and municipal geographic characteristics.We also con- tensity,and use logged values in the regressions(since trol for a resources-endowment additive index.that in normalized variables remain highly skewed).26 cludes the production of gold,silver,platinum,nickel, Appendix A provides a detailed description of both and iron.27 the main and all the additional variables(summarized in Table 1A).All of our specifications control for a Estimation 25 For all the above reasons,we believe that violence is an imper- Because the modern internal conflict in Colombia had fect but valid proxy of armed influence.But even if it was not,the four distinguishable periods with their own intensity strong relationship of violence to changes in local fiscal institutions and dynamics,as summarized in the subsection on that we document in this paper is an important fact that has not been Civil War Dynamics and Capture in Colombia,we previously documented,and that should inform our thinking on how memneam of the ecomes weaker test how violence-related capture during each specific when using a log-linear model with unlogged violence per capita. with t-statistics in the 1.3-1.6 range.though all results retain the same 27 Note that some of these variables are potentially bad controls as sign.This means that the results are surely not driven by outliers in they can respond to cumulative past violence.In the Additional Ro- attacks,as logging the per capita attack variable effectively attenu- bustness Checks subsection,we discuss this issue and show that our ates those observations'influence on the estimates. results are not affected by posttreatment bias. 1004Rafael Ch et al. TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Panel A: Outcomes. Tax revenues per capita Log property tax revenues per capita 1997–2002 2.32 1.08 0 6 1108 Log property tax revenues per capita 2003–2006 2.70 1.00 0 6 1107 Log property tax revenues per capita 2007–2010 2.82 1.06 0 6 1111 Log property tax revenues per capita 2011–2013 2.94 1.11 0 7 1111 Cadastral performance Per capita land value 2003–2006 4.60 5.79 0 79 974 Cadastral update lag 2003–2006 6.82 3.87 0 50 892 Num. cadastral updates 2003–2006 1.49 0.67 0 4 979 Land ownership Land informality rate 2003–2006 0.20 0.23 0 1 954 Electoral outcomes Uribe + Conservative party coalition 1997 mayor election 0.28 0.45 0 1 986 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 2000 mayor election 0.26 0.44 0 1 955 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 1997 and 2000 mayor elections 0.32 0.46 0 1 1182 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 2003 mayor election 0.23 0.42 0 1 908 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 2007 mayor election 0.60 0.49 0 1 1106 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 2003 and 2007 mayor elections 0.61 0.49 0 1 1182 Uribe + Conservative party coalition 2011 mayor election 0.43 0.50 0 1 1040 Panel B: Violence. Log guerrilla attacks per capita, 1988–1996 − 35.42 31.30 −115 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita, 1988–1996 − 35.87 31.53 −105 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita, 1997–2002 − 29.38 19.80 −82 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita, 1997–2002 − 30.02 20.04 −74 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita, 2003–2006 − 18.12 12.67 −53 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita, 2003–2006 − 19.61 14.10 −53 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita, 2007–2010 − 13.94 13.07 −48 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita, 2007–2010 − 16.49 15.73 −55 0 1182 Log guerrilla attacks per capita, 2003–2010 − 32.06 23.73 −101 0 1182 Log paramilitary attacks per capita, 2003–2010 − 36.10 27.71 −108 0 1182 Notes: All data sources are described in Appendix A. contrast, the correlation with cumulative guerrilla attacks is 0.02, and not significant.25 Similar to the case of tax revenues, attacks by guer￾rilla fronts and paramilitary blocks are highly skewed, especially in the 1988–2010 period (see also Figure 4). The most violent municipalities had attacks over eight standard deviations above the mean. We thus normal￾ize attacks by population so as to capture violence in￾tensity, and use logged values in the regressions (since normalized variables remain highly skewed).26 Appendix A provides a detailed description of both the main and all the additional variables (summarized in Table 1A). All of our specifications control for a 25 For all the above reasons, we believe that violence is an imper￾fect but valid proxy of armed influence. But even if it was not, the strong relationship of violence to changes in local fiscal institutions that we document in this paper is an important fact that has not been previously documented, and that should inform our thinking on how conflict influences state-building and development. 26 The statistical significance of the results below becomes weaker when using a log-linear model with unlogged violence per capita, with t-statistics in the 1.3–1.6 range, though all results retain the same sign. This means that the results are surely not driven by outliers in attacks, as logging the per capita attack variable effectively attenu￾ates those observations’ influence on the estimates. large set of potential municipal-level confounders, in￾cluding natural resource royalties and transfer pay￾ments, vote share by political party for mayors’ elec￾tions, the location of military bases, a dummy of “peaceful” municipalities (those without attacks dur￾ing our entire sample period), the number of people displaced due to the armed conflict, coca production, and municipal geographic characteristics. We also con￾trol for a resources-endowment additive index, that in￾cludes the production of gold, silver, platinum, nickel, and iron.27 Estimation Because the modern internal conflict in Colombia had four distinguishable periods with their own intensity and dynamics, as summarized in the subsection on Civil War Dynamics and Capture in Colombia, we test how violence-related capture during each specific 27 Note that some of these variables are potentially bad controls as they can respond to cumulative past violence. In the Additional Ro￾bustness Checks subsection, we discuss this issue and show that our results are not affected by posttreatment bias. 1004 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000333