dox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation of my own interpretations. overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis book was important to me for another reason: the From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of oncept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, "Commu- technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in nism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which precisely Lukacs sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they from premises now in existence. "Marx contrasts the common sense notion of are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They mor communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an nearly resemble on than mathematics or science. And like legislar ongoing pre hey are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious he basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they of the nature of the technical"laws"under which they live, they can judge and function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the hange them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this time,they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of pra process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger's phrase, " ontic technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of ontological, at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as his change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project of its powers, responsibilities, and risks is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such in- account of the social world. sights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective move he Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno's concept of the "non-identical ments hange. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompas philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse's"second dimension ing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without under ing of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate randing the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into An unde of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as argue, in Marcuse 's late work. The critical theory of technology I have devel- characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the oped starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it contin- philosophers initiated. ues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspective t If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of gles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a diale ctical inter. of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are in- pretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambigu creasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of it sibjec objecaascepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukacs"identical ous. Such cond pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profitdox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many of my own interpretations. Revising this early book was important to me for another reason: the concept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in precisely Lukács’ sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They more nearly resemble legislation than mathematics or science. And like legislation, they are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious of the nature of the technical “laws” under which they live, they can judge and change them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by this change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware of its powers, responsibilities, and risks. The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such in￾sights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective move￾ments for change. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompass￾ing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without under￾standing the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I argue, in Marcuse’s late work. The critical theory of technology I have devel￾oped starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these philosophers initiated. If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of this new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a dialectical inter￾pretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambigu￾ous. Such concepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukács’ “identical subject-object” are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis. From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, “Commu￾nism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result from premises now in existence.”1 Marx contrasts the common sense notion of communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an ongoing process. The basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the same time, they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of praxis that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger’s phrase, “ontic￾ontological,” at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical account of the social world. The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in the Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno’s concept of the “non-identical” does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse’s “second dimension,” consist￾ing of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. An understanding of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the philosophy of praxis is essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it contin￾ues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspectives on the existing strug￾gles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are in￾creasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of its pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profit