《国外马克思主义 Western Marxism》阅读文献与材料：Professor Andrew Feenberg's book（new）

Realizing Philosophy: Marx, Luacs and the frankfurt school Andrew Feenberg IDraft, for discussion, must not be published or linked on the webl

Realizing Philosophy: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School Andrew Feenberg [Draft, for discussion, must not be published or linked on the web]

Table of Content Fe Preface,…n l. The Philosophy of Praxis……… 2. The Demands of reason 3. Metacritique of the Idea of Nature……47 4. Reification and Rationality 5. The Realization of Philosophy 6. The Controversy over Subject-Object Identity 7. From Lukacs to the frankfurt School 8. The Last Philosophy of Praxis. 9. Philosophy of Praxis: Summary and Significand Appendix: The Unity of Theory and Practice. 241 Notes……263

Table of Contents Foreword ..............................................................................iii Preface ................................................................................... v 1. The Philosophy of Praxis................................................... 1 2. The Demands of Reason .................................................. 23 3. Metacritique of the Idea of Nature.................................. 47 4. Reification and Rationality.............................................. 67 5. The Realization of Philosophy......................................... 99 6. The Controversy over Subject-Object Identity ............ 133 7. From Lukács to the Frankfurt School .......................... 167 8. The Last Philosophy of Praxis....................................... 195 9. Philosophy of Praxis: Summary and Significance ........ 215 Appendix: The Unity of Theory and Practice................... 241 Notes .................................................................................. 263

Foreword to show that a similar logic is at work in Manx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Like Lukacs, Marx carries out a socially based"metacri- Two powerful ideologies contend in the world today, a technocratic ide. tique of philosophy which I explain in the first two chapters of this new logy based on science and economics, and various religious fundamentalisms What separates them philosophically is their attitude toward reason. Scientific This new version differs considerably from the original. I have retained and technical advance justify confidence in reason which, furthermo the principal theoretical concepts, but I have added two entirely new chapters supports progress in democracy and human rights in the advanced societies on the Frankfurt School (chapters 7 and 8)which provide a far better accou Naturalism and liberalism complement each other. Fundamentalisms reject of the relation of Critical Theory to the philosophy of praxis than the rather the rationalist pretension to explain all of reality. These ideologies react against sketchy one of the earlier edition. Chapter 4 presents a much revised evalua- the more unpleasant side effects of a brutal and unjust modernization process. tion of Lukacs' theory of reification. The earlier version of the book emph These dire effects have begun to overtake large sectors of the advanced socie- ized the Weberian and Hegelian influences on Lukacs. My research on elves, stimulating even there movements hostile to science around Heidegger for my book on Heidegger and Marcuse made me aware also of th religion, race and nationalism. Mystery returns with dire political conse- o-Kantian roots of the critique of reified objectivism in both Heidegger and Lukacs. This was an influence I had previously under-estimated. It is impor- In this increasingly troubled context, it is necessary to rethink the claims the interpretation toward the ontological sigr of the dominant rationalistic ideology. The Marxist philosophy of praxis is meaning in the constitution of worlds. Concepts such as Heidegger's Dasein among the most important resources for such a project. It promises a more and Lukacs"identical subject-object"are not substantial things but rather democratic version of rationalism compatible with science and technology but signify meaning- generating processes. also critical of the flaws of modernity. Whether it can deliver on that promise I have also been able to update my understanding of Lukacs concept of is very much in doubt, but its argument and its vision are worthy of considera- nature from study of his recently published Defence of History and Class tion even so. Perhaps a critical appreciation of this tradition can yield elements Consciousness. This text is the background to new chapters that address of an alternative philosophy respectful of both reason and humanity. This is Lukacs' critique of science and technology much more thoroughly(Chapters se in this book. 6-9). These chapters also draw on my research in philosophy of technology This book is a thoroughly revised and rewritten version of Lukacs, Marr solve problems left in suspense in the earlier version of the book. and the Sources of Crirical Theory. The original was published over 30 yea Finally, I have condensed and placed in an appendix two chapters on his- of a doctoral dissertation on Lukacs prep torical materialism and class consciousness that interrupted the flow of the for Herbert Marcuse at the University of California, San Diego. Like the nt in the earlier version of the book. present work, that earlier one was based on insights gained while writing that Lukacs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory was my first book. Over thesis but not fully developed in its pages. I attempt to explain the underlying the years I have looked back on it with logic of Lukacs' famous reification essay in Hisrory and Class Consciousne always believed there were good things in it, and this belief is occasionally in terms of three"demands of reason"that emerge from classical German confirmed by people who recall finding it helpful in navigating the flow of philosophy. According to Lukacs these demands are fulfilled not by specula- Lukacs complicated argument. On the other hand, there are many proble tion but by revolution. This is his interpretation of the famous"realization of with this first attempt. I have often thought about how I would write such a philosophy" for which Marx calls in his early writings, and most notably in book"today, my plans changing from year to year, decade to decade.The the eleventh"Thesis on Feuerbach. Chapter 5 of this new book presents the reading of Lukacs' defense of History and Class Consciousness against ortho- I now understand it. Soon after completing the thesis I was able

Foreword Two powerful ideologies contend in the world today, a technocratic ide￾ology based on science and economics, and various religious fundamentalisms. What separates them philosophically is their attitude toward reason. Scientific and technical advance justify confidence in reason which, furthermore, supports progress in democracy and human rights in the advanced societies. Naturalism and liberalism complement each other. Fundamentalisms reject the rationalist pretension to explain all of reality. These ideologies react against the more unpleasant side effects of a brutal and unjust modernization process. These dire effects have begun to overtake large sectors of the advanced socie￾ties themselves, stimulating even there movements hostile to science around religion, race and nationalism. Mystery returns with dire political conse￾quences. In this increasingly troubled context, it is necessary to rethink the claims of the dominant rationalistic ideology. The Marxist philosophy of praxis is among the most important resources for such a project. It promises a more democratic version of rationalism compatible with science and technology but also critical of the flaws of modernity. Whether it can deliver on that promise is very much in doubt, but its argument and its vision are worthy of considera￾tion even so. Perhaps a critical appreciation of this tradition can yield elements of an alternative philosophy respectful of both reason and humanity. This is my purpose in this book. This book is a thoroughly revised and rewritten version of Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory. The original was published over 30 years ago in 1981. The book grew out of a doctoral dissertation on Lukács prepared for Herbert Marcuse at the University of California, San Diego. Like the present work, that earlier one was based on insights gained while writing that thesis but not fully developed in its pages. I attempt to explain the underlying logic of Lukács’ famous reification essay in History and Class Consciousness in terms of three “demands of reason” that emerge from classical German philosophy. According to Lukács these demands are fulfilled not by specula￾tion but by revolution. This is his interpretation of the famous “realization of philosophy” for which Marx calls in his early writings, and most notably in the eleventh “Thesis on Feuerbach.” Chapter 5 of this new book presents the argument as I now understand it. Soon after completing the thesis I was able to show that a similar logic is at work in Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Like Lukács, Marx carries out a socially based “metacri￾tique” of philosophy which I explain in the first two chapters of this new book. This new version differs considerably from the original. I have retained the principal theoretical concepts, but I have added two entirely new chapters on the Frankfurt School (chapters 7 and 8) which provide a far better account of the relation of Critical Theory to the philosophy of praxis than the rather sketchy one of the earlier edition. Chapter 4 presents a much revised evalua￾tion of Lukács’ theory of reification. The earlier version of the book empha￾sized the Weberian and Hegelian influences on Lukács. My research on Heidegger for my book on Heidegger and Marcuse made me aware also of the neo-Kantian roots of the critique of reified objectivism in both Heidegger and Lukács. This was an influence I had previously under-estimated. It is impor￾tant because it orients the interpretation toward the ontological significance of meaning in the constitution of worlds. Concepts such as Heidegger’s Dasein and Lukács’ “identical subject-object” are not substantial things but rather signify meaning-generating processes. I have also been able to update my understanding of Lukács’ concept of nature from study of his recently published Defence of History and Class Consciousness. This text is the background to new chapters that address Lukács’ critique of science and technology much more thoroughly (Chapters 6-9). These chapters also draw on my research in philosophy of technology to solve problems left in suspense in the earlier version of the book. Finally, I have condensed and placed in an appendix two chapters on his￾torical materialism and class consciousness that interrupted the flow of the main argument in the earlier version of the book. Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory was my first book. Over the years I have looked back on it with a mixture of pride and dismay. I have always believed there were good things in it, and this belief is occasionally confirmed by people who recall finding it helpful in navigating the flow of Lukács’ complicated argument. On the other hand, there are many problems with this first attempt. I have often thought about how I would write such a book “today,” my plans changing from year to year, decade to decade. The reading of Lukács’ defense of History and Class Consciousness against ortho-

dox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation of my own interpretations. overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis book was important to me for another reason: the From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of oncept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, "Commu- technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in nism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which precisely Lukacs sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they from premises now in existence. "Marx contrasts the common sense notion of are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They mor communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an nearly resemble on than mathematics or science. And like legislar ongoing pre hey are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious he basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they of the nature of the technical"laws"under which they live, they can judge and function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the hange them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this time,they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of pra process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger's phrase, " ontic technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of ontological, at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as his change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project of its powers, responsibilities, and risks is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such in- account of the social world. sights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective move he Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno's concept of the "non-identical ments hange. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompas philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse's"second dimension ing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without under ing of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate randing the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into An unde of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as argue, in Marcuse 's late work. The critical theory of technology I have devel- characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the oped starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it contin- philosophers initiated. ues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspective t If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of gles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a diale ctical inter. of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are in- pretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambigu creasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of it sibjec objecaascepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukacs"identical ous. Such cond pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profit

dox Marxist critics finally encouraged me to set to work by confirming many of my own interpretations. Revising this early book was important to me for another reason: the concept of reification is the key to all my later work on the critical theory of technology. The usual technocratic understanding of technology is reified in precisely Lukács’ sense of the term. Technologies are supposed to be products of scientific knowledge, morally neutral tools beneficial to humanity when properly used. But in reality technologies are more than scientific tools; they are also social products that shape the behavior of their users. They more nearly resemble legislation than mathematics or science. And like legislation, they are either good or bad, never neutral. When societies become conscious of the nature of the technical “laws” under which they live, they can judge and change them. In recent years we have seen new technology emerge from this process as movements engaging the environment and the Internet refute old technocratic arguments for the neutrality of technology. Critical theory of technology offers a framework for understanding the possibilities opened by this change. The theory identifies harbingers of a technological age fully aware of its powers, responsibilities, and risks. The philosophers discussed in this book stood on the verge of such in￾sights but did not quite manage to develop a theory of technical politics, no doubt because technology had not yet become an object of effective move￾ments for change. This lacuna is of great significance. As the reader will discover, they are continually brought up against the problem of the status of science, technology and nature in their attempts to develop an all encompass￾ing philosophy of praxis. No adequate resolution is possible without under￾standing the ways in which technology both mediates the human relation to nature and is itself politically and socially mediated. Progress in insight into technology can be traced in the history of philosophy of praxis culminating, I argue, in Marcuse’s late work. The critical theory of technology I have devel￾oped starts where he left off and attempts to complete the project these philosophers initiated. If I were to summarize as briefly as possible the essential innovation of this new version of my book, it would be the emphasis on a dialectical inter￾pretation of philosophy of praxis. The basic concepts of Marxism are ambigu￾ous. Such concepts as the proletariat and communism, like Lukács’ “identical subject-object” are commonly dismissed as metaphysical fantasies. They seem to name substantial entities with quasi-magical powers. This interpretation overlooks the Hegelian influence that is decisive for philosophy of praxis. From a dialectical standpoint, the Marxist concepts refer to processes of historical mediation, not to things or ideals. Hence Marx writes, “Commu￾nism is for us not a state of affairs still to be established, not an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs. The conditions of this movement result from premises now in existence.”1 Marx contrasts the common sense notion of communism as an ideal with an alternative notion of communism as an ongoing process. The basic Marxist concepts do not transcend the world in which they function but rather, they are moments in its developmental dynamic. At the same time, they have an ontological significance in the philosophy of praxis that I endeavor to explain. They are, in Heidegger’s phrase, “ontic￾ontological,” at once objects in the world and foundations of worlds. The ontological project consists in the attempt to account for nature as well as history on the basis of the dialectic of historical praxis. This ambitious project is dropped in the mature Marx, but he never abandons his early dialectical account of the social world. The same dialectical approach clarifies the nature of critical standards in the Frankfurt School. For example, Adorno’s concept of the “non-identical” does not refer to a higher value, but to the mediated structure of reality which is occluded by instrumental reason and accessible only indirectly through philosophical reflection and art. And Marcuse’s “second dimension,” consist￾ing of historical potentialities, is not a Platonic ideal but the determinate negation of the existing world, immanent in its developmental process. An understanding of the dialectical character of the basic concepts of the philosophy of praxis is essential for avoiding crude interpretive errors such as characterize much of the critical literature. I have tried to re-establish the original complexity of this tradition. It is as dialectical thought that it contin￾ues to be of interest. As such it opens new perspectives on the existing strug￾gles in contemporary capitalist societies. With the decline of traditional forms of working class revolutionary struggle, these new forms of struggle are in￾creasingly focused on the irrationality of capitalism, the absurdity of its pretension to organize and control all of social life through the market, and the catastrophic environmental consequences of its frenetic pursuit of profit

The philosophy of praxis placed questions of rationality and irrationality at the center of its political vision. In this respect it still has something to teach February 2012

The philosophy of praxis placed questions of rationality and irrationality at the center of its political vision. In this respect it still has something to teach us. Vancouver, February 2012

Consciousness, left to what Engels once called"the nibbling of the mice, "can Preface be explained by their transitional position in the intellectual biographies of their authors. Both were trained as philosophers and steeped in romantic It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Marx and Lukacs volutionism. Their early works were written at similar turning points in failed to appreciate the significance of their own early works. Marx's Manu- their authors spiritual trajectories, at times when they felt the need to move scripts were written in 1844 but had to wait nearly 100 years to see the light beyond these intellectual origins and believed they could do so without violent of day. Since its publication this unfinished early work has come to rival rupture through a dialectical transcendence. Later, they judged this transcen- Capital as the text of reference for Marxists and others interested in Marxism. dence inadequate, still internal to positions they uncompromisingly rejected in During the first half century after the publication of History and Class Con- elaborating their mature outlook. There is little doubt that after the break sciousness, Lukacs book became an underground classic, rejected by its author their judgment on their early work was too harsh, that it contains more of nd known only to a few European scholars, among them the philosophers of value and had more impact on the later work than the authors were willing to the frankfurt School admit Marx and Lukacs' self-interpretation is only partially warranted. It is true The romantic influence is undoubtedly present in these early writings By that their early works reflect a"messianic moment"to which they responded romanticism is usually meant that trend in modern culture which exalts with an implausible revolutionary eschatology. But the authority of their self- subjectivity against objectivity, life against rationality, concreteness against nterpretation has misled commentators into projecting far too much unity abstraction, traditional values against capitalist mercantilism. Certainly these d consistency on the early works philosophers antagonism toward the oppressive formalism of capitalist social The theoretical resources deployed by these philosophers are not entire life, analyzed and condemned in parallel critiques of"alienation"and"reifica- congruent with their political program. Philosophy resembles art in that the tion, "is to some degree tributary of that trend. And yet it would grossly tools and materials have their own logic. The interpreter must uncover the distort the theories of alienation and reification to reduce them to a romantic tensions between the creator's ends and means, not simply assume the ends to reason as is frequently suggested by contemporal be realized in the work. This is especially true of Lukacs, whose text is full of While Marx and Lukacs were influenced by the romantic critique of c contradictions between his Hegelian framework and his politics. In Marxs talism, they were still more profoundly influenced by the Hegelian critique of case the consequences appear later in his suppression of his own most interest- that critique. For Hegel, as for a number of other major figures in modern ng philosophical writings, the Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, thought, romanticism has the value of a transcended moment. It plays ong after his death. Thus arose a whole tradition of interpretation according propaedeutic role in the development of a rational outlook on the world that to which the later Marx abandoned philosophy as a youthful error is not merely philistine and complacent but critical and rich in inwardness. It The seminal importance of the early works was not widely recognized un- was Hegel who first systematically elaborated this"post-romantic"reconcilia til the 1960s and 1970s. At that time the influence of thinkers associated with tion with rational necessity and human finitude. Frankfurt School contributed significantly to the receptiveness of a youth Marx and Lukacs aimed to preserve the moment of revolt in romanticism ful audience to what might be called"early Marxism. "Marcuse, in particular, ithout recapitulating the subjectivist errors so effectively criticized by Hegel. lived through a second messianic moment in old age in response to the New I will show that they are only partially successful in this task, but also that th Left. In his case too there is a tensions between his theoretical resources and task itself was well chosen and indeed still relevant to critical theory and his politics. Nevertheless, his writings from Eros and Civilization on excited practice. They approached this task with a similar method, which I will call precedented interest in philosophy of praxis. cultural"because of its orientation toward the most general patterns The long eclipse of Marx's Manuscripts and Lukacs' History and Class

Preface It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Marx and Lukács failed to appreciate the significance of their own early works. Marx's Manu￾scripts were written in 1844 but had to wait nearly 100 years to see the light of day. Since its publication this unfinished early work has come to rival Capital as the text of reference for Marxists and others interested in Marxism. During the first half century after the publication of History and Class Con￾sciousness, Lukács’ book became an underground classic, rejected by its author and known only to a few European scholars, among them the philosophers of the Frankfurt School. Marx and Lukács’ self-interpretation is only partially warranted. It is true that their early works reflect a “messianic moment” to which they responded with an implausible revolutionary eschatology. But the authority of their self￾interpretation has misled commentators into projecting far too much unity and consistency on the early works. The theoretical resources deployed by these philosophers are not entirely congruent with their political program. Philosophy resembles art in that the tools and materials have their own logic. The interpreter must uncover the tensions between the creator’s ends and means, not simply assume the ends to be realized in the work. This is especially true of Lukács, whose text is full of contradictions between his Hegelian framework and his politics. In Marx’s case the consequences appear later in his suppression of his own most interest￾ing philosophical writings, the Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, published long after his death. Thus arose a whole tradition of interpretation according to which the later Marx abandoned philosophy as a youthful error. The seminal importance of the early works was not widely recognized un￾til the 1960s and 1970s. At that time the influence of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School contributed significantly to the receptiveness of a youth￾ful audience to what might be called “early Marxism.” Marcuse, in particular, lived through a second messianic moment in old age in response to the New Left. In his case too there is a tensions between his theoretical resources and his politics. Nevertheless, his writings from Eros and Civilization on excited unprecedented interest in philosophy of praxis. The long eclipse of Marx's Manuscripts and Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, left to what Engels once called "the nibbling of the mice," can be explained by their transitional position in the intellectual biographies of their authors. Both were trained as philosophers and steeped in romantic revolutionism. Their early works were written at similar turning points in their authors' spiritual trajectories, at times when they felt the need to move beyond these intellectual origins and believed they could do so without violent rupture through a dialectical transcendence. Later, they judged this transcen￾dence inadequate, still internal to positions they uncompromisingly rejected in elaborating their mature outlook. There is little doubt that after the break their judgment on their early work was too harsh, that it contains more of value and had more impact on the later work than the authors were willing to admit. The romantic influence is undoubtedly present in these early writings. By romanticism is usually meant that trend in modern culture which exalts subjectivity against objectivity, life against rationality, concreteness against abstraction, traditional values against capitalist mercantilism. Certainly these philosophers’ antagonism toward the oppressive formalism of capitalist social life, analyzed and condemned in parallel critiques of "alienation" and "reifica￾tion," is to some degree tributary of that trend. And yet it would grossly distort the theories of alienation and reification to reduce them to a romantic protest against reason as is frequently suggested by contemporary critics. While Marx and Lukács were influenced by the romantic critique of capi￾talism, they were still more profoundly influenced by the Hegelian critique of that critique. For Hegel, as for a number of other major figures in modern thought, romanticism has the value of a transcended moment. It plays a propaedeutic role in the development of a rational outlook on the world that is not merely philistine and complacent but critical and rich in inwardness. It was Hegel who first systematically elaborated this "post-romantic" reconcilia￾tion with rational necessity and human finitude. Marx and Lukács aimed to preserve the moment of revolt in romanticism without recapitulating the subjectivist errors so effectively criticized by Hegel. I will show that they are only partially successful in this task, but also that the task itself was well chosen and indeed still relevant to critical theory and practice.2 They approached this task with a similar method, which I will call "cultural" because of its orientation toward the most general patterns of meaning and practice, institutions and artifacts, of entire societies. Just such a

pattern is signified by the concepts of alienation and reification which they definition and it is inescapably earth-bound. The objectivity of the social employ to analyze capitalist society. At the same time, these concepts are subject situates it squarely within the real world. derived from reflection on the philosophical tradition and function in the Both common sense and the philosophical tradition would therefore ar- context of the authors' discussion of philosophical problems. This unity of gue that social subjects, should they exist at all, have no onto cultural, philosophical and political concerns is the distinctive trait of their cance. They are simply contingent assemblages of separate individuals with early method. political powers and rights, perhaps, but no fundamental reality. If they had They consider philosophy to be the discipline in which the operative ho- accepted this view, Marx and Lukacs would have made a contribution to izon of everyday life is raised to consciousness and subjected to rational political philosophy but beyond that they would have had to rely on one o criticism. On this basis they argue that the conceptual dilemmas or antino- another traditional philosophical approach. But neither Marx nor Lukacs did mies"of philosophy are symptomatic of deep contradictions in social the social subject must take over all the same Their most challenging conclusion is the demand for a"transcendence"of powers that individual subjects enjoyed in the old philosophy. Somehow philosophy as such through the practical resolution of these contradictions. reality is to be understood in essential relation to a subject situated within it This is perhaps the least well understood aspect of the early philosophy of and dependent on it. Is this not a vicious circle? Why choose such an improb- axis of Marx and Lukacs, and the study of it will be a major theme uniting able position? the various investigations making up this book. ill argue that they brave the paradoxes that result from that Despite their critical relation to the philosophical tradition, both the early of fidelity to the ambition of traditional philosophy to explain being starting Marx and Lukacs adhere to the fundamental Enlightenment values, freedom out from human being, for example, from innate ideas, sensation, or the forms and equality. They depart from the tradition in arguing that under capitalism, and categories of transcendental subjectivity. These traditional explanator these values cannot be achieved by isolated individuals subject to the laws of schemes depend on an individual contemplative subject. But Marx and Lukacs he market. This argument is the bridge between philosophy and social theory argue that the individual is derivative of one or another community in which for, once the agency of the individual is dismissed, subjectivity can no longer ily has its roots. The individual subject is an abstraction from be identified with a version of the Cartesian cogito or transcendental subject social being that grounds it. It cannot therefore resolve the ultimate problem Only a collective, social subject can realize the values of philosophy, but a of philosophy and the attempt to do so results in speculative myths. Only a social subject is an object in the world, a phenomenon among others. And social subject can provide the key to a resolution of the antinomies in practical Marx and Lukacs are still bound to the philosophical tradition by basic aspects life and philosophical theory. of its logical structure, which they rethink in social terms. The fact that Marx and Lukacs share this conclusion, is all the more re- This hybrid approach leads to complications. The abstract individual markable since Lukacs was unaware of the existence of Marx,'s Manuscrip ubject of pure knowledge transcends nature and need. The freedom of a when he wrote Hisrory and Class Consciousness. Lukacs found in The german social subject is limited by both these determinations. The transcendental Ideology and Capiral traces of Marx's early philosophy of praxis. This suggests subject is purified of its materiality and enabled thereby to know the truth and a theory of the continuity of Marx's intellectual development which I elabo- even,in an idealistic framework, to constitute reality. But such a transcend rate in a Lukacsian interpretation of the early Marx. Lukacs himself developed dence is unthinkable for a social group. A social subject cannot be purified of the most complex version of the philosophy of praxis. In his writings the materiality since it is only through material ties of one sort or another that it structure of this figure of thoughr becomes clear. The identification of such n form from out of the relations of the individuals who make it up. Abstra gures, which ultimately are defined in ideal-types such as"empiric from geography, race, language, and technical networks and nothing remains "idealism, "is an important contribution of philosophy to the history of ideas. to hold the individuals together in a group. But include those factors in its The articulation of its logic is essential to understanding the later trans-

pattern is signified by the concepts of alienation and reification which they employ to analyze capitalist society. At the same time, these concepts are derived from reflection on the philosophical tradition and function in the context of the authors' discussion of philosophical problems. This unity of cultural, philosophical and political concerns is the distinctive trait of their early method. They consider philosophy to be the discipline in which the operative ho￾rizon of everyday life is raised to consciousness and subjected to rational criticism. On this basis they argue that the conceptual dilemmas or "antino￾mies" of philosophy are symptomatic of deep contradictions in social life. Their most challenging conclusion is the demand for a "transcendence" of philosophy as such through the practical resolution of these contradictions. This is perhaps the least well understood aspect of the early philosophy of praxis of Marx and Lukács, and the study of it will be a major theme uniting the various investigations making up this book. Despite their critical relation to the philosophical tradition, both the early Marx and Lukács adhere to the fundamental Enlightenment values, freedom and equality. They depart from the tradition in arguing that under capitalism, these values cannot be achieved by isolated individuals subject to the laws of the market. This argument is the bridge between philosophy and social theory for, once the agency of the individual is dismissed, subjectivity can no longer be identified with a version of the Cartesian cogito or transcendental subject. Only a collective, social subject can realize the values of philosophy, but a social subject is an object in the world, a phenomenon among others. And yet, Marx and Lukács are still bound to the philosophical tradition by basic aspects of its logical structure, which they rethink in social terms. This hybrid approach leads to complications. The abstract individual subject of pure knowledge transcends nature and need. The freedom of a social subject is limited by both these determinations. The transcendental subject is purified of its materiality and enabled thereby to know the truth and even, in an idealistic framework, to constitute reality. But such a transcen￾dence is unthinkable for a social group. A social subject cannot be purified of materiality since it is only through material ties of one sort or another that it can form from out of the relations of the individuals who make it up. Abstract from geography, race, language, and technical networks and nothing remains to hold the individuals together in a group. But include those factors in its definition and it is inescapably earth-bound. The objectivity of the social subject situates it squarely within the real world. Both common sense and the philosophical tradition would therefore ar￾gue that social subjects, should they exist at all, have no ontological signifi￾cance. They are simply contingent assemblages of separate individuals with political powers and rights, perhaps, but no fundamental reality. If they had accepted this view, Marx and Lukács would have made a contribution to political philosophy but beyond that they would have had to rely on one or another traditional philosophical approach. But neither Marx nor Lukács did accept this. Rather, they argue, the social subject must take over all the same powers that individual subjects enjoyed in the old philosophy. Somehow reality is to be understood in essential relation to a subject situated within it and dependent on it. Is this not a vicious circle? Why choose such an improb￾able position? I will argue that they brave the paradoxes that result from that move out of fidelity to the ambition of traditional philosophy to explain being starting out from human being, for example, from innate ideas, sensation, or the forms and categories of transcendental subjectivity. These traditional explanatory schemes depend on an individual contemplative subject. But Marx and Lukács argue that the individual is derivative of one or another community in which it necessarily has its roots. The individual subject is an abstraction from the social being that grounds it. It cannot therefore resolve the ultimate problems of philosophy and the attempt to do so results in speculative myths. Only a social subject can provide the key to a resolution of the antinomies in practical life and philosophical theory. The fact that Marx and Lukács share this conclusion, is all the more re￾markable since Lukács was unaware of the existence of Marx's Manuscripts when he wrote History and Class Consciousness. Lukács found in The German Ideology and Capital traces of Marx’s early philosophy of praxis. This suggests a theory of the continuity of Marx's intellectual development which I elabo￾rate in a Lukácsian interpretation of the early Marx. Lukács himself developed the most complex version of the philosophy of praxis. In his writings the structure of this figure of thought becomes clear. The identification of such figures, which ultimately are defined in ideal-types such as “empiricism” or “idealism,” is an important contribution of philosophy to the history of ideas. The articulation of its logic is essential to understanding the later trans-

formation of the philosophy of praxis in the Frankfurt School. Adorno, As noted above, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were deeply influ- Horkheimer and Marcuse are influenced by Marx and Lukacs philosophy of enced by Lukacs' version of the philosophy of praxis. They seized on his ith which they were familiar quite early. However, there is a deeper concept of reification which, in combination with other sources, became the connection; even where they write without reference to these sources, they basis of their critique of positivism and their dialectical reformulation of operate within the logic of the philosophy of praxis. That logic requires that Marxist theory. Somewhat later, in the period after World War II, French philosophical abstractions be traced back to their roots in concrete social Marxism came under the influence of the early Lukacs as a whole generati conditions. And once those conditions have been identified, the hypothetical of social theorists sought radical alternatives to the dominant Stalinist ortho- construction of their revolutionary transformation rebounds back on the loxy. The most famous text of this trend is Maurice Merleau-Ponry's Adven- philosophical concepts and shows how their contradictions can be resolved tures of the Dialecti, which first introduced the term "Western Marxism"to But the transcendence of describe the tradition stemming from History and Class Consciousness. The by the historical situation of the Frankfurt School which is very different from French were primarily interested in Lukacs' concept of praxis and his theory of the revolutionary context that forms the background of Lukacs formulations. class consciousness. They saw in these ideas an alternative to the official Although the Frankfurt School works in a period of revolutionary decline and Marxist dogma of the party as surrogate subject of the revolution. With reaction, it remains bound by the demands of philosophy of praxis. Its focus Lukacs they reaffirmed the primacy of working class praxis, articulated ideo- shifts from the specific consequences of capitalism toward the more general gically by the party but not replaced by it. problem of the domination of nature and the structure of modern experience, I had the good fortune to study with representatives of both these schools d to be the source of the failure of the revolut of thought, with Herbert Marcuse and Lucien Goldmann. Starting out from There are two possible outcomes: either the resolution of the antinomies the disparate traditions and emphases they represent, I pro a new interpre- through social transformation is treated as a utopian demand, devaluing social tation designed to reestablish the unity of Lukacs' early Marxism. This back- reality by contrast, or a new agent of revolution is discovered able to carry ground may help to explain the difference between my approach to Lukacs through the project of social transformation. These alternatives correspond and that of scholars widely read in the English speaking world such as Leszek roughly to the difference between Adorno and Marcuse's late work In Adorno Kolakowski, Gareth Stedman Jones and George Lichtheim, who condemn the historical thesis of the philosophy of praxis serves primarily to provide an theory of reification as irrationalist and the theory of class consciousness independent point of view for social critique. Marcuse eventually finds hope Stalinist. These very negative evaluations square neither with the content no ful signs in the New Left. He sees the social movements of the 1960s and70s he intellectual impact of Lukacs text. ot as a new agent of revolution but as prefiguring an emancipatory mode of When Lukacs is compared, not with Bergson or Stalin, but with Marx's perience. Revolution in an advanced society is at least possible in principle I works and the Frankfurt School, a very different picture on the basis of a generalization of this new way of experiencing the world. emerges. Like the early Marx, the early Marxist Lukacs is a critic of the"alien- This is sufficient for Marcuse to construct a final version of the philosophy of ation of reason"in modern capitalist society. But that critique is by no means praxis in which the transformation of technology plays a central role. Their irrationalist; rather, it aims at the establishment of a dialectical paradigm of versions of philosophy of praxis are discussed in the concluding chapters of rationality suited to the task of social self-understanding and human libera- his book. tion. Such a dialectical rationality can be of no service to authoritarian re- gimes, but only to a socialist culture of self-rule. Not the least important dimension of these philosophers of praxis is the contribution they make to defining the broad outlines of such a culture

formation of the philosophy of praxis in the Frankfurt School. Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse are influenced by Marx and Lukács’ philosophy of praxis with which they were familiar quite early. However, there is a deeper connection; even where they write without reference to these sources, they operate within the logic of the philosophy of praxis. That logic requires that philosophical abstractions be traced back to their roots in concrete social conditions. And once those conditions have been identified, the hypothetical construction of their revolutionary transformation rebounds back on the philosophical concepts and shows how their contradictions can be resolved. But the transcendence of philosophy through social practice is frustrated by the historical situation of the Frankfurt School which is very different from the revolutionary context that forms the background of Lukács’ formulations. Although the Frankfurt School works in a period of revolutionary decline and reaction, it remains bound by the demands of philosophy of praxis. Its focus shifts from the specific consequences of capitalism toward the more general problem of the domination of nature and the structure of modern experience, presumed to be the source of the failure of the revolution. There are two possible outcomes: either the resolution of the antinomies through social transformation is treated as a utopian demand, devaluing social reality by contrast, or a new agent of revolution is discovered able to carry through the project of social transformation. These alternatives correspond roughly to the difference between Adorno and Marcuse’s late work. In Adorno the historical thesis of the philosophy of praxis serves primarily to provide an independent point of view for social critique. Marcuse eventually finds hope￾ful signs in the New Left. He sees the social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s not as a new agent of revolution but as prefiguring an emancipatory mode of experience. Revolution in an advanced society is at least possible in principle on the basis of a generalization of this new way of experiencing the world. This is sufficient for Marcuse to construct a final version of the philosophy of praxis in which the transformation of technology plays a central role. Their versions of philosophy of praxis are discussed in the concluding chapters of this book. *** As noted above, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were deeply influ￾enced by Lukács’ version of the philosophy of praxis. They seized on his concept of reification which, in combination with other sources, became the basis of their critique of positivism and their dialectical reformulation of Marxist theory. Somewhat later, in the period after World War II, French Marxism came under the influence of the early Lukács as a whole generation of social theorists sought radical alternatives to the dominant Stalinist ortho￾doxy. The most famous text of this trend is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Adven￾tures of the Dialectic, which first introduced the term "Western Marxism" to describe the tradition stemming from History and Class Consciousness. The French were primarily interested in Lukács’ concept of praxis and his theory of class consciousness. They saw in these ideas an alternative to the official Marxist dogma of the party as surrogate subject of the revolution. With Lukács they reaffirmed the primacy of working class praxis, articulated ideo￾logically by the party but not replaced by it. I had the good fortune to study with representatives of both these schools of thought, with Herbert Marcuse and Lucien Goldmann. Starting out from the disparate traditions and emphases they represent, I propose a new interpre￾tation designed to reestablish the unity of Lukács’ early Marxism. This back￾ground may help to explain the difference between my approach to Lukács and that of scholars widely read in the English speaking world such as Leszek Kolakowski, Gareth Stedman Jones and George Lichtheim, who condemn the theory of reification as irrationalist and the theory of class consciousness as Stalinist. These very negative evaluations square neither with the content nor the intellectual impact of Lukács’ text. When Lukács is compared, not with Bergson or Stalin, but with Marx's early philosophical works and the Frankfurt School, a very different picture emerges. Like the early Marx, the early Marxist Lukács is a critic of the "alien￾ation of reason" in modern capitalist society. But that critique is by no means irrationalist; rather, it aims at the establishment of a dialectical paradigm of rationality suited to the task of social self-understanding and human libera￾tion. Such a dialectical rationality can be of no service to authoritarian re￾gimes, but only to a socialist culture of self-rule. Not the least important dimension of these philosophers of praxis is the contribution they make to defining the broad outlines of such a culture

The writing of this book has placed me in the debt of many people. Lucien Goldmann and Herbert Marcuse introduced me to Marxist philoso- phy and to the work of Lukacs. My wife, Anne-Marie Feenberg, and Jerry Doppelt read chapter after chapter and frequently convinced me to make changes for the better. Many others read portions of the manuscript and offered criticism and encouragement. I recall with pleasure fruitful exchang ith Al Gouldner, Stanley Aronowitz, Doug Kellner, Bill Leiss, Stanle Rosen, Mark Poster, Steven Vogel, Deborah Cook, Stephen Crowell, Richard Westerman, Timothy Hall, Robert Pi Stefano Giachetti, Shane Gunster, Hans Radder, Allen Wood, Woody Sayre, Michael Lowy and william Rasch. We did not always reach agreement but I always learned something from our discussions

* * * The writing of this book has placed me in the debt of many people. Lucien Goldmann and Herbert Marcuse introduced me to Marxist philoso￾phy and to the work of Lukács. My wife, Anne-Marie Feenberg, and Jerry Doppelt read chapter after chapter and frequently convinced me to make changes for the better. Many others read portions of the manuscript and offered criticism and encouragement. I recall with pleasure fruitful exchanges with Al Gouldner, Stanley Aronowitz, Doug Kellner, Bill Leiss, Stanley Rosen, Mark Poster, Steven Vogel, Deborah Cook, Stephen Crowell, Richard Westerman, Timothy Hall, Robert Pippin, Ian Angus, Samir Gandesha, Stefano Giachetti, Shane Gunster, Hans Radder, Allen Wood, Woody Sayre, Michael Löwy and William Rasch. We did not always reach agreement but I always learned something from our discussions

Chapter 1 Included in this deduction is the concept of revolution, which plays a pivotal The Philosophy of praxis methodologicalrole in their philosophies In interpreting Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis, I have been obliged to choose positions in some of the Marx and Lukacs umerous debates over this early work. It will be useful at the outset to make kacsian perspective, as a background to the exposition of LukiG.a Lu. these positions explicit by situating this interpretation with respect to some In this chapter, I discuss the philosophy of the early Marx from others. I will not review the enormous literature on the Manuscripts only parallel attempt to resolve the problems first posed by Marx. There are, of two facets of it are relevant here, the debates over the ontological and the ourse, considerable differences between these thinkers, and there is always normative character of social categories in the Manuscripts. Ar Is more the risk that in comparing them in this manner the identity of one will be than a matter of textual exegesis. The larger question concerns whether the ubmerged in that of the other. I will do my best to avoid an artificial Manuscripts are a philosophy of praxis, as I am engaged in defining it, or, on identification of the two positions where they do actually differ; however, I the contrary, a far less ambitious ethical complement ill argue that in spite of real differences we are dealing here with a specific within the framework of a traditional concept of theory hilosophical doctrine, which might be called philosophy of praxis, and I show the former, that Marx founds a new concept of reason in revolu- hich is shared by a number of thinkers tion through an ontological treatment of social categories. This approach While writing his notebooks in prison, Gramsci used the phrase"phi brings to the fore all that links the project of the early Marx to that of Hegel. losophy of praxis"ambiguously to signify Marxism in general and his own In 1923 Lukacs was of course unaware of the existence of Marx's Manu- interpretation of Marxism. In essence Gramsci argues that all knowledge is scripts, which had not yet been published when he wrote History and cla situated in a cultural context, itself based on a class specific worldview. No Consciousness In fact, Capital is the primary basis of Lukacs'Marxism domain of knowledge and no corresponding domain of being is independen rather than Marx's early work. of society. That interpretation, which he called"absolute historicism Now, Capita/ is self-consciously unphilosophical, in spite of Marx's resembles in broad outline the Hegelian Marxism of Lukacs, Korsch, prefatory acknowledgment of Hegel's influence. In it Marx is careful to Marcuse and the early work of Marx himself.' It seems appropriate therefore minimize the use of philosophical terminology and to avoid the exploration to call this whole trend "philosophy of praxis, "not as a euphemism for of philosophical problems. Yet we now know on the basis of extensive Marxism but rather to distinguish a particular radical philosophical version textual evidence just how complex were the philosophical considerations f Marxism from other interpretation behind Capital The link between the Manuscripts and the published The early method of Marx and Lukacs is very different from the"scien- writings of Marx's maturity is supplied by his own draft of Capital but the tific socialism"erected later on the basis of historical obseryation and eco- blication of this text, the Grundrisse, was delayed until the beginning of nomic theory. In 1843 and 1844 Marx developed a philosophy of revolution the Second World War. These textual absences, combined with the image which he seems to have intended as a foundation for economic studies Marx wished to project of his work in Capital seemed to authorize a scien- From 1918 to 1923 Lukacs elaborated a philosophy of revolution supple- tistic interpretation of Marx's later doctrine Lukacs first challenged from a menting Marxist economics. For both the early Marx and Lukacs, such dialectical perspective. central Marxist concepts as the proletariat and socialism were not first Lukacs made the connection between Marxism and philosophy (that is developed through empirical research. Instead, as philosophers they set out between Marx and Hegel), primarily through a reflection on Marx's meth- a critical discussion of the philosophical tradition in the course of odology in his economic writings, and only secondarily on the basis of those they deduced the characteristic historical concepts of Marxism f Marx's comments on philosophical

1 Chapter 1 2 Chapter 1 The Philosophy of Praxis Marx and Lukács In this chapter, I discuss the philosophy of the early Marx from a Lu￾kácsian perspective, as a background to the exposition of Lukács’ own parallel attempt to resolve the problems first posed by Marx. There are, of course, considerable differences between these thinkers, and there is always the risk that in comparing them in this manner the identity of one will be submerged in that of the other. I will do my best to avoid an artificial identification of the two positions where they do actually differ; however, I will argue that in spite of real differences we are dealing here with a specific philosophical doctrine, which might be called "philosophy of praxis," and which is shared by a number of thinkers. While writing his notebooks in prison, Gramsci used the phrase “phi￾losophy of praxis” ambiguously to signify Marxism in general and his own interpretation of Marxism. In essence Gramsci argues that all knowledge is situated in a cultural context, itself based on a class specific worldview. No domain of knowledge and no corresponding domain of being is independent of society. That interpretation, which he called “absolute historicism,” resembles in broad outline the Hegelian Marxism of Lukács, Korsch, Marcuse and the early work of Marx himself.1 It seems appropriate therefore to call this whole trend “philosophy of praxis,” not as a euphemism for Marxism but rather to distinguish a particular radical philosophical version of Marxism from other interpretations. The early method of Marx and Lukács is very different from the "scien￾tific socialism" erected later on the basis of historical observation and eco￾nomic theory. In 1843 and 1844 Marx developed a philosophy of revolution which he seems to have intended as a foundation for economic studies. From 1918 to 1923 Lukács elaborated a philosophy of revolution supple￾menting Marxist economics. For both the early Marx and Lukács, such central Marxist concepts as the proletariat and socialism were not first developed through empirical research. Instead, as philosophers they set out from a critical discussion of the philosophical tradition in the course of which they deduced the characteristic historical concepts of Marxism. Included in this deduction is the concept of revolution, which plays a pivotal methodological role in their philosophies. In interpreting Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis, I have been obliged to choose positions in some of the numerous debates over this early work. It will be useful at the outset to make these positions explicit by situating this interpretation with respect to some others. I will not review the enormous literature on the Manuscripts; only two facets of it are relevant here, the debates over the ontological and the normative character of social categories in the Manuscripts. 2 At issue is more than a matter of textual exegesis. The larger question concerns whether the Manuscripts are a philosophy of praxis, as I am engaged in defining it, or, on the contrary, a far less ambitious ethical complement to economic research within the framework of a traditional concept of theory. I show the former, that Marx founds a new concept of reason in revolu￾tion through an ontological treatment of social categories. This approach brings to the fore all that links the project of the early Marx to that of Hegel. In 1923 Lukács was of course unaware of the existence of Marx's Manu￾scripts, which had not yet been published when he wrote History and Class Consciousness. In fact, Capital is the primary basis of Lukács’ Marxism rather than Marx’s early work. Now, Capital is self-consciously unphilosophical, in spite of Marx's prefatory acknowledgment of Hegel's influence. In it Marx is careful to minimize the use of philosophical terminology and to avoid the exploration of philosophical problems. Yet we now know on the basis of extensive textual evidence just how complex were the philosophical considerations behind Capital. The link between the Manuscripts and the published writings of Marx's maturity is supplied by his own draft of Capital; but the publication of this text, the Grundrisse, was delayed until the beginning of the Second World War.3 These textual absences, combined with the image Marx wished to project of his work in Capital, seemed to authorize a scien￾tistic interpretation of Marx's later doctrine Lukács first challenged from a dialectical perspective. Lukács made the connection between Marxism and philosophy (that is, between Marx and Hegel), primarily through a reflection on Marx's meth￾odology in his economic writings, and only secondarily on the basis of those of Marx's comments on philosophical matters with which he was ac-