that reserve the access to public service to those of noble birth,and limited access to credit where lending depends on the identity of the lenders and the borrowers,not on the merits of a project(Przeworski 2007).Przeworski argues that such barriers to factor mobility may result in mismatching skills and opportunities and the overall productivity could be lower as a result(Przeworski 2007). From these discussions we can see a common acknowledgement that the degree of factor mobility can fundamentally shape an economy.What is surprising,and given its foundational role,however,is that most political economy studies remove politics from factor mobility,and simply assume that interindustry factor mobility of a country is exogenous to the domestic political economy in question(Frieden 1991;Grossman and Helpman 1994;Hiscox 2002a,2002b;Mukherjee et al.2007;Rickard 2005;Rogowski 1989),with few exceptions.This paper confronts the conventional assumption of exogenous factor mobility head on,and focuses on interindustry labor mobility (ILM)in specific.2 It argues that in the short-term,ILM can be shaped by domestic political processes,due primarily to the logic of partisan politics. The argument is the following.Observing that politics in almost all advanced industrial countries is dominated by partisan politics along a Left-Right dimension,we argue that both Left and Right governments will prefer a cohesive core constituent base in order to implement their preferred partisan policies.A general equilibrium model Alt and Gilligan argued that factor owners can invest more(less)in the industries where assets are highly specific to commit themselves to certain political course of protectionism (liberalization)and sway the government's political decisions(Alt and Gilligan 1994).Mark Brawley suggested that for those governments whose electoral fortunes depend heavily on the dominant trade cleavages,they may engage in interventions aimed at shifting the dominant cleavage, targeting especially the swing groups(Brawley 2006).In so doing,he no longer treated societal cleavages (which can be regarded as the direct consequences of levels of interindustry factor mobility)as exogenously given,but rather argued that they are susceptible to political manipulations.And Michael Hiscox argued that in the long run,domestic factor mobility may be affected by government policy and regulation.Though he maintained the most important source of changes in factor mobility comes from technological changes(Hiscox 2002b). 2ILM is workers'ability to move across industries,which is defined as"the elasticity of substitution along the transformation curve that maps the conversion of a factor located in one industry for use in another industry at increasing opportunity costs"(Hiscox 2002b).that reserve the access to public service to those of noble birth, and limited access to credit where lending depends on the identity of the lenders and the borrowers, not on the merits of a project (Przeworski 2007). Przeworski argues that such barriers to factor mobility may result in mismatching skills and opportunities and the overall productivity could be lower as a result (Przeworski 2007). From these discussions we can see a common acknowledgement that the degree of factor mobility can fundamentally shape an economy. What is surprising, and given its foundational role, however, is that most political economy studies remove politics from factor mobility, and simply assume that interindustry factor mobility of a country is exogenous to the domestic political economy in question (Frieden 1991; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Hiscox 2002a, 2002b; Mukherjee et al. 2007; Rickard 2005; Rogowski 1989), with few exceptions. 1 This paper confronts the conventional assumption of exogenous factor mobility head on, and focuses on interindustry labor mobility (ILM) in specific. 2 It argues that in the short-term, ILM can be shaped by domestic political processes, due primarily to the logic of partisan politics. The argument is the following. Observing that politics in almost all advanced industrial countries is dominated by partisan politics along a Left-Right dimension, we argue that both Left and Right governments will prefer a cohesive core constituent base in order to implement their preferred partisan policies. A general equilibrium model 1 Alt and Gilligan argued that factor owners can invest more (less) in the industries where assets are highly specific to commit themselves to certain political course of protectionism (liberalization) and sway the government's political decisions (Alt and Gilligan 1994). Mark Brawley suggested that for those governments whose electoral fortunes depend heavily on the dominant trade cleavages, they may engage in interventions aimed at shifting the dominant cleavage, targeting especially the swing groups (Brawley 2006). In so doing, he no longer treated societal cleavages (which can be regarded as the direct consequences of levels of interindustry factor mobility) as exogenously given, but rather argued that they are susceptible to political manipulations. And Michael Hiscox argued that in the long run, domestic factor mobility may be affected by government policy and regulation. Though he maintained the most important source of changes in factor mobility comes from technological changes (Hiscox 2002b). 2 ILM is workers’ ability to move across industries, which is defined as “the elasticity of substitution along the transformation curve that maps the conversion of a factor located in one industry for use in another industry at increasing opportunity costs” (Hiscox 2002b)