shows that interindustry labor mobility (ILM)levels shape the cohesiveness among labor and capital owners.Other things being equal,higher ILM level leads to more cohesive labor and less cohesive capital.Hence Left(Right)governments prefer to have high(low) ILM levels to foster support from a cohesive labor(business)constituency.Furthermore, centralization of domestic union movement moderates the effect of partisan politics. Centralized unions innately prefer high ILM and their presence conditions different partisan governments'strategy toward ILM,so that the clear partisan correspondence with labor mobility levels will be most manifest under decentralized unions. The structure of this paper is as follows.The next section develops the theory and derives a conditional hypothesis.Section three empirically tests the hypothesis.Section four discusses the potential endogeneity and the fifth section concludes. 2.A Theory of Endogenous Interindustry Labor Mobility 2.1.Partisan governments and labor mobility Modern political parties take positions in the overall policy space that reflect their general ideological preferences and the interests of their constituents.Studies on partisan politics and macroeconomic policies have found that there is a prominent Left-Right differentiation among parties,especially in advanced industrial countries.Left parties tend to be labor-oriented,working-class-based,and their main constituency would mostly include lower income individuals.Left parties and their constituents will generally favor the macroeconomic policies aimed to achieve low unemployment,high economic growth, and are more sympathetic to redistributive government policies.On the other hand,right parties tend to be business-oriented,upper-middle-class-based,and their core constituency composes mostly of wealthier individuals who usually hold financial capital.shows that interindustry labor mobility (ILM) levels shape the cohesiveness among labor and capital owners. Other things being equal, higher ILM level leads to more cohesive labor and less cohesive capital. Hence Left (Right) governments prefer to have high (low) ILM levels to foster support from a cohesive labor (business) constituency. Furthermore, centralization of domestic union movement moderates the effect of partisan politics. Centralized unions innately prefer high ILM and their presence conditions different partisan governments’ strategy toward ILM, so that the clear partisan correspondence with labor mobility levels will be most manifest under decentralized unions. The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section develops the theory and derives a conditional hypothesis. Section three empirically tests the hypothesis. Section four discusses the potential endogeneity and the fifth section concludes. 2. A Theory of Endogenous Interindustry Labor Mobility 2.1. Partisan governments and labor mobility Modern political parties take positions in the overall policy space that reflect their general ideological preferences and the interests of their constituents. Studies on partisan politics and macroeconomic policies have found that there is a prominent Left-Right differentiation among parties, especially in advanced industrial countries. Left parties tend to be labor-oriented, working-class-based, and their main constituency would mostly include lower income individuals. Left parties and their constituents will generally favor the macroeconomic policies aimed to achieve low unemployment, high economic growth, and are more sympathetic to redistributive government policies. On the other hand, right parties tend to be business-oriented, upper-middle-class-based, and their core constituency composes mostly of wealthier individuals who usually hold financial capital