The macroeconomic policies favored by right parties and their supporters will likely be characterized by low inflation,moderate growth,and they are much more averse to redistributive policies.There is a large literature on partisan politics and the Left/Right correspondence with the labor/business classes (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995;Alesina et al.1997:Hibbs 1977,1987,1994:Iversen 2006;Przeworski and Sprague 1986).Dutt and Mitra wrote that"it is fairly standard in the political economy literature to use left-wing (right-wing)and pro-labor(pro-capital)interchangeably when describing political parties"(Dutt and Mitra 2005). Once in power,partisan differentiation in macroeconomic performances and in policy preferences tend to manifest itself (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989,1995;Boix 1997; Garrett 1998;Milner and Judkins 2004).Hibbs wrote that"...[T]he interests and preferences of core party constituencies predispose Left governments to pursue relatively expansive policies intended to raise growth and lower unemployment and Right governments to pursue relatively restrictive policies designed to contain inflation"(Hibbs 2006).In this paper,we assume that partisan governments will implement policies that primarily reflect the preferences of the dominant parties within the governments,and the dominant parties are either pro-labor or pro-capital depending on their main constituency bases. It is justifiable to stress parties'policy concern.Muller and Strom argued that political parties and their leaders in particular are most frequently engaged in hard struggles to find the proper balance among three distinct goals:office,policy,or votes (Muller and Strom 1999).Once in government,however,parties will likely be preoccupied with whether they could implement their preferred policies or whether theyThe macroeconomic policies favored by right parties and their supporters will likely be characterized by low inflation, moderate growth, and they are much more averse to redistributive policies. There is a large literature on partisan politics and the Left/Right correspondence with the labor/business classes (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Alesina et al. 1997; Hibbs 1977, 1987, 1994; Iversen 2006; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Dutt and Mitra wrote that “it is fairly standard in the political economy literature to use left-wing (right-wing) and pro-labor (pro-capital) interchangeably when describing political parties” (Dutt and Mitra 2005). Once in power, partisan differentiation in macroeconomic performances and in policy preferences tend to manifest itself (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995; Boix 1997; Garrett 1998; Milner and Judkins 2004). Hibbs wrote that “…[T]he interests and preferences of core party constituencies predispose Left governments to pursue relatively expansive policies intended to raise growth and lower unemployment and Right governments to pursue relatively restrictive policies designed to contain inflation” (Hibbs 2006). In this paper, we assume that partisan governments will implement policies that primarily reflect the preferences of the dominant parties within the governments, and the dominant parties are either pro-labor or pro-capital depending on their main constituency bases. It is justifiable to stress parties’ policy concern. Muller and Strom argued that political parties and their leaders in particular are most frequently engaged in hard struggles to find the proper balance among three distinct goals: office, policy, or votes (Muller and Strom 1999). Once in government, however, parties will likely be preoccupied with whether they could implement their preferred policies or whether they