War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 173 174 Charles Tilly tween "legitimate"and "illegitimate"force credible.Eventually,the personnel tics but also the quality of daily life.There occurred a change in English of states purveyed violence on a larger scale,more effectively,more habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in the efficiently,with wider assent from their subject populations,and with readier nineteenth century,when the growth of a police force finally consolidated collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other the monopoly and made it effective in the greatest cities and the smallest organizations.But it took a long time for that series of distinctions to become villages. established.Early in the state-making process,many parties shared the right Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary cam- to use violence,the practice of using it routinely to accomplish their ends,or paigns:eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers,razing their both at once.The continuum ran from bandits and pirates to kings via tax fortresses,taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of collectors,regional power holders,and professional soldiers. disputes,and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. The uncertain,elastic line between "legitimate"and "illegitimate"vio- In the Marches of England and Scotland,the task was more delicate.for the lence appeared in the upper reaches of power.Early in the state-making Percys and Dacres,who kept armies and castles along the border,threatened process,many parties shared the right to use violence,its actual employ- the Crown but also provided a buffer against Scottish invaders.Yet they,too, ment,or both at once.The long love-hate affair between aspiring state eventually fell into line. makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division."Behind piracy or the In France.Richelieu began the great disarmament in the 1620s.With seas acted cities and city-states,"writes Femand Braudel of the sixteenth Richelieu's advice,Louis XIll systematically destroyed the castles of the great century."Behind banditry,that terrestrial piracy,appeared the continual aid rebel lords,Protestant and Catholic,against whom his forces battled of lords."2 In times of war,indeed,the managers of full-fledged states often incessantly.He began to condemn dueling.the carrying of lethal weapons, commissioned privateers,hired sometime bandits to raid them enemies,and and the maintenance of private armies.By the later 1620s,Richelieu was encouraged their regular troops to take booty.In royal service,soldiers and declaring the royal monopoly of force as doctrine.The doctrine took another sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the half-century to become effective: civilian population:commandeering,raping,looting,taking prizes.When demobilized,they commonly continued the same practices,but without the Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had witnessed armies assembled by the same royal protection;demobilized ships became pirate vessels, "grands."Only the last of the regencies,the one after the death of Louis XIV. demobilized troops bandits. did not lead to armed uprisings.By that time Richelieu's principle had become It also worked the other way:A king's best source of armed a reality.Likewise in the Empire after the Thirty Years'War only the territorial supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws.Robin Hood's conversion to princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses.... royal archer may be a myth,but the myth records a practice.The distinctions Everywhere the razing of castles,the high cost of artillery,the attraction of between "legitimate"and "illegitimate"users of violence came clear only very court life,and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in this slowly,in the process during which the states armed forces became development. relatively unified and permanent. Up to that point,as Braudel says,maritime cities and terrestrial lords By the later eighteenth century,through most of Europe,monarchs controlled commonly offered protection,or even sponsorship,to freebooters.Man+ permanent,professional military forces that rivaled those of their neighbors lords who did not pretend to be kings,furthermore,successfully claimed the and far exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. right to levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers.Without calling The state's monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality on some of those lords to bring their armies with them,no king could fight a The elimination of local rivals,however,posed a serious problem.Beyond war;yet the same armed lords constituted the king's rival and opponents,his the scale of a small city-state,no monarch could govern a population with his enemies'potential allies.For that reason,before the seventeenth century, armed force alone,nor could any monarch afford to create a professional staff regencies for child sovereigns reliably produced civil wars.For the same large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen.Before quite reason,disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be recently,no European government approached the completeness of state maker. articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China.Even the Roman The Tudors,for example,accomplished that agenda through most Empire did not come close.In one way or another,every European England."The greatest triumph of the Tudors,"writes Lawrence Stone, government before the French Revolution relied on indirect rule via local magnates.The magnates collaborated with the government without becoming was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both officials in any strong sense of the term,had some access to govemment- public and private,an achievement which profoundly altered not only the backed force,and exercised wide discretion within their own territories: nature of poli- junkers,justices of the peace,lords.Yet the same magnates were potential rivals,possible allies of a rebellious people.War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 173 tween "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force credible. Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other organizations. But it took a long time for that series of distinctions to become established. Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right to use violence, the practice of using it routinely to accomplish their ends, or both at once. The continuum ran from bandits and pirates to kings via tax collectors, regional power holders, and professional soldiers. The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" vio￾lence appeared in the upper reaches of power. Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right to use violence, its actual employ￾ment, or both at once. The long love-hate affair between aspiring state makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division. "Behind piracy or the seas acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand Braudel of the sixteenth century. "Behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual aid of lords."2 In times of war, indeed, the managers of full-fledged states often commissioned privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid them enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits. It also worked the other way: A king's best source of armed supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws. Robin Hood's conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice. The distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" users of violence came clear only very slowly, in the process during which the states armed forces became relatively unified and permanent. Up to that point, as Braudel says, maritime cities and terrestrial lords commonly offered protection, or even sponsorship, to freebooters. Man+ lords who did not pretend to be kings, furthermore, successfully claimed the right to levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers. Without calling on some of those lords to bring their armies with them, no king could fight a war; yet the same armed lords constituted the king's rival and opponents, his enemies' potential allies. For that reason, before the seventeenth century, regencies for child sovereigns reliably produced civil wars. For the same reason, disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be state maker. The Tudors, for example, accomplished that agenda through most England. "The greatest triumph of the Tudors," writes Lawrence Stone, was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both public and private, an achievement which profoundly altered not only the nature of poli- 174 Charles Tilly tics but also the quality of daily life. There occurred a change in English habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in the nineteenth century, when the growth of a police force finally consolidated the monopoly and made it effective in the greatest cities and the smallest villages.3 Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary cam￾paigns: eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers, razing their fortresses, taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of disputes, and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. In the Marches of England and Scotland, the task was more delicate, for the Percys and Dacres, who kept armies and castles along the border, threatened the Crown but also provided a buffer against Scottish invaders. Yet they, too, eventually fell into line. In France, Richelieu began the great disarmament in the 1620s. With Richelieu's advice, Louis XIII systematically destroyed the castles of the great rebel lords, Protestant and Catholic, against whom his forces battled incessantly. He began to condemn dueling, the carrying of lethal weapons, and the maintenance of private armies. By the later 1620s, Richelieu was declaring the royal monopoly of force as doctrine. The doctrine took another half-century to become effective: Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had witnessed armies assembled by the "grands." Only the last of the regencies, the one after the death of Louis XIV, did not lead to armed uprisings. By that time Richelieu's principle had become a reality. Likewise in the Empire after the Thirty Years' War only the territorial princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses.... Everywhere the razing of castles, the high cost of artillery, the attraction of court life, and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in this development.4 By the later eighteenth century, through most of Europe, monarchs controlled permanent, professional military forces that rivaled those of their neighbors and far exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. The state's monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality. The elimination of local rivals, however, posed a serious problem. Beyond the scale of a small city-state, no monarch could govern a population with his armed force alone, nor could any monarch afford to create a professional staff large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen. Before quite recently, no European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close. In one way or another, every European government before the French Revolution relied on indirect rule via local magnates. The magnates collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, had some access to government￾backed force, and exercised wide discretion within their own territories: junkers, justices of the peace, lords. Yet the same magnates were potential rivals, possible allies of a rebellious people