War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 175 176 Charles Tilly Eventually,European governments reduced their reliance on indirect markets at less than the 15-pound shares paid by the merchant's foreign rule by means of two expensive but effective strategies:(a)extending their competitors to their princes,the merchant also gained a protection rent of officialdom to the local community and (b)encouraging the creation of (15-10 =)5 pounds by virtue of his prince's greater efficiency.That rea- police forces that were subordinate to the government rather than to soning differs only in degree and in scale from the reasoning of violence- individual patrons,distinct from war-making forces,and therefore less wielding criminals and their clients.Labor racketeering (in which,for ex- useful as the tools of dissident magnates.In between,however,the ample,a ship owner holds off trouble from longshoremen by means of a builders of national power all played a mixed strategy:eliminating, timely payment to the local union boss)works on exactly the same princi- subjugating,dividing,conquering,cajoling,buying as the occasions ple:The union boss receives tribute for his no-strike pressure on the long- presented themselves.The buying manifested itself in exemptions from shoremen,while the ship owner avoids the strikes and slowdowns long- taxation,creations of honorific offices,the establishment of claims on the shoremen impose on his competitors. national treasury,and a variety of other devices that made a magnate's Lane pointed out the different behavior we might expect of the welfare dependent on the maintenance of the existing structure of power. managers of a protection-providing government owned by In the long run,it all came down to massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion. 1.Citizens in general 2.A single self-interested monarch Protection as Business 3.The managers themselves In retrospect,the pacification,cooptation,or elimination of fractious rivals to the sovereign seems an awesome,noble,prescient enterprise,destined If citizens in general exercised effective ownership of the government-O to bring peace to a people;yet it followed almost ineluctably from the logic distant ideal!-we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs of expanding power.If a power holder was to gain from the provision of and tribute,thus maximizing protection rent.A single self-interested mon- protection,his competitors had to yield.As economic historian Frederic arch.in contrast.would maximize tribute.set costs so as to accomplish Lane put it twenty-five years ago,governments are in the business of sell- that maximization of tribute,and be indifferent to the level of protection ing protection...whether people want it or not.Lane argued that the very rent.If the managers owned the government,they would tend to keep activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly,because costs high by maximizing their own wages,to maximize tribute over and competition within that realm generally raised costs,instead of lowering above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects,and them.The production of violence,he suggested,enjoyed large economies likewise to be indifferent to the level of protection rent.The first model of scale. approximates a Jeffersonian democracy.the second a petty despotism. Working from there,Lane distinguished between (a)the monopoly and the third a military junta. profit.or tribute.coming to owners of the means of producing violence as Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner:a dominant a result of the difference between production costs and the price exacted class.If he had,his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical cri- from "customers"and(b)the protection rent accruing to those customers teria for evaluating claims that a given government was "relatively auton- for example,merchants-who drew effective protection against outside omous"or strictly subordinate to the interests of a dominant class.Pre- competitors.Lane,a superbly attentive historian of Venice,allowed sumably,a subordinate government would tend to maximize monopoly specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for profits-returns to the dominant class resulting from the difference be- its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors.In their tween the costs of protection and the price received for it-as well as adaptation of Lane's scheme,furthermore,Edward Ames and Richard tuning protection rents nicely to the economic interests of the dominant Rapp substitute the apt word "extortion"for Lane's "tribute."In this model, class.An autonomous government,in contrast,would tend to maximize predation,coercion,piracy,banditry,and racketeering share a home with managers'wages and its own size as well and would be indifferent to pro- their upright cousins in responsible government. tection rents.Lane's analysis immediately suggests fresh propositions and This is how Lane's model worked:If a prince could create a sufficient ways of testing them. armed force to hold off his and his subjects'external enemies and to keep Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four the subjects in line for 50 megapounds but was able to extract 75 mega- successive stages in the general history of capitalism: pounds in taxes from those subjects for that purpose,he gained a tribute of(75-50=)25 megapounds.If the 10-pound share of those taxes paid by 1.A period of anarchy and plunder 2.A stage in which tribute takers attracted customers and established one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave hire assured access to world their monopolies by struggling to create exclusive,substantial statesWar Making and State Making as Organized Crime 175 Eventually, European governments reduced their reliance on indirect rule by means of two expensive but effective strategies: (a) extending their officialdom to the local community and (b) encouraging the creation of police forces that were subordinate to the government rather than to individual patrons, distinct from war-making forces, and therefore less useful as the tools of dissident magnates. In between, however, the builders of national power all played a mixed strategy: eliminating, subjugating, dividing, conquering, cajoling, buying as the occasions presented themselves. The buying manifested itself in exemptions from taxation, creations of honorific offices, the establishment of claims on the national treasury, and a variety of other devices that made a magnate's welfare dependent on the maintenance of the existing structure of power. In the long run, it all came down to massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion. Protection as Business In retrospect, the pacification, cooptation, or elimination of fractious rivals to the sovereign seems an awesome, noble, prescient enterprise, destined to bring peace to a people; yet it followed almost ineluctably from the logic of expanding power. If a power holder was to gain from the provision of protection, his competitors had to yield. As economic historian Frederic Lane put it twenty-five years ago, governments are in the business of sell￾ing protection ... whether people want it or not. Lane argued that the very activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly, because competition within that realm generally raised costs, instead of lowering them. The production of violence, he suggested, enjoyed large economies of scale. Working from there, Lane distinguished between (a) the monopoly profit, or tribute, coming to owners of the means of producing violence as a result of the difference between production costs and the price exacted from "customers" and (b) the protection rent accruing to those customers – for example, merchants – who drew effective protection against outside competitors. Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors. In their adaptation of Lane's scheme, furthermore, Edward Ames and Richard Rapp substitute the apt word "extortion" for Lane's "tribute." In this model, predation, coercion, piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with their upright cousins in responsible government. This is how Lane's model worked: If a prince could create a sufficient armed force to hold off his and his subjects' external enemies and to keep the subjects in line for 50 megapounds but was able to extract 75 mega￾pounds in taxes from those subjects for that purpose, he gained a tribute of (75-50=) 25 megapounds. If the 10-pound share of those taxes paid by one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave hire assured access to world 176 Charles Tilly markets at less than the 15-pound shares paid by the merchant's foreign competitors to their princes, the merchant also gained a protection rent of (15 -10 =) 5 pounds by virtue of his prince's greater efficiency. That rea￾soning differs only in degree and in scale from the reasoning of violence-- wielding criminals and their clients. Labor racketeering (in which, for ex￾ample, a ship owner holds off trouble from longshoremen by means of a timely payment to the local union boss) works on exactly the same princi￾ple: The union boss receives tribute for his no-strike pressure on the long￾shoremen, while the ship owner avoids the strikes and slowdowns long￾shoremen impose on his competitors. Lane pointed out the different behavior we might expect of the managers of a protection-providing government owned by 1. Citizens in general 2. A single self-interested monarch 3. The managers themselves If citizens in general exercised effective ownership of the government – O distant ideal! – we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs and tribute, thus maximizing protection rent. A single self-interested mon￾arch, in contrast, would maximize tribute, set costs so as to accomplish that maximization of tribute, and be indifferent to the level of protection rent. If the managers owned the government, they would tend to keep costs high by maximizing their own wages, to maximize tribute over and above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects, and likewise to be indifferent to the level of protection rent. The first model approximates a Jeffersonian democracy, the second a petty despotism, and the third a military junta. Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner: a dominant class. If he had, his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical cri￾teria for evaluating claims that a given government was "relatively auton￾omous" or strictly subordinate to the interests of a dominant class. Pre￾sumably, a subordinate government would tend to maximize monopoly profits – returns to the dominant class resulting from the difference be￾tween the costs of protection and the price received for it – as well as tuning protection rents nicely to the economic interests of the dominant class. An autonomous government, in contrast, would tend to maximize managers' wages and its own size as well and would be indifferent to pro￾tection rents. Lane's analysis immediately suggests fresh propositions and ways of testing them. Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four successive stages in the general history of capitalism: 1. A period of anarchy and plunder 2. A stage in which tribute takers attracted customers and established their monopolies by struggling to create exclusive, substantial states