LOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding in 1690, and it became a turning point in Western thought Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solid ity, extension ( that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number.(Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc. )If we couldn't perceive objects-or if we perceivers didn't exist--these qualities would still exist in objects Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimulated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qual ities are: colors, sounds, tastes, odors, odors, weight warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this"object that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer"substance " But what is"substance"? Well, "substance"is what has shape is in motion, and is so lid That didn 't get us very far, so let's put the question d ifferently: how can we know substance"? The only way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qualities: shape, motion, solid ity, etc. But that's where we were before Locke therefore concludes that"substance"cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape"exist without a"substance"which is"shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that"substance"is merely a concept on which we hang"the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. " So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solid ity and motion and shape might exist but that"substance"might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had published is Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles(he was an Anglican clergy man, later a bishop) and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebookLOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 ,and it became a turning point in Western thought. Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solidity, extension (that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number. (Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc.) If we couldn't perceive objects--or if we perceivers didn't exist--these qualities would stil1 exist in objects. Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimu1ated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qua1ities are: colors, sounds, tastes, odors, odors, weight, warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects. But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this "object" that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer "substance." But what is "substance"? Wel1, "substance" is what has shape, is in motion, and is so1id! That didn't get us very far, so let's put the question differently: how can we know "substance"? The on1y way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qua1ities: shape, motion, solidity, etc. But that's where we were before. Locke therefore concludes that "substance" cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape" exist without a "substance" which is "shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that "substance" is merely a concept on which we "hang" the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. "So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at a1l, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities...." This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solidity and motion and shape might exist but that "substance" might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY: THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had pub1ished his Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles (he was an Anglican clergyman, later a bishop), and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced. As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas, arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebook