knoWing unKnoWing Hames L. Christian EPISTEMIC LONELINESS I At about this point, a feeling of loneliness may begin to overtake usan epistemic loneliness. "For the egocentric predicament is really an epistcmolog ical cond ition: isolation within a world of our own making. We live in a shell, so to speak a private, personal shell inside which takes place an immense variety of experiences, all ours. And when we try to break out of our shells to make contact with the world and other creatures, we only rediscover the depth of our predicament We live in an epistemological shell with no doors. None may enter and none may share 2 Since certain aspects of our epistemological cond ition appear to be inescapable, we must learn to live with them (1) The fallacy ofobjectfication is an everpresent danger Our experiencing system conspires to make us think that a variety of private experiences are in some way real that they are events occurring in the real world of objects/events. ( The tragic consequences of this fallacy will be felt especially when we try to untangle our value--experiences. (2)Accordingly we have all lived(unwittingly) in a state of confusion regarding the location of the occurrence of events. Our subjective and objective worlds are interwoven: events we thought to be private may turn out to be objective while many supposedly objective events often prove to be experiences only ()We are restless with our evolutionary limitation and deceptions. While we can be grateful that sensory and information_processing systems have rendered our physical environment meaningful, we have reached a point in our quest for reality when we want to go beyond our limitations and to know what the world is really like. We want to make whatever corrections are necessary in our universe and its principles of operation 3 From this vantage point, the central problem of Western epistemology may be more intelligible. If we know only our experiences, how can we be sure that we know anything about the real world? More precisely, if objective physical phenomena are all converted before we can experience them into different kinds of energy, how can we know anything about the original phenomena? Can we even know what those phenomena are? If we experience only the subjective side of our interface with reality, can we ever know anything about the objective side of that interface--boundary? It will be helpful at this point to take time for historical sidetrip. Almost four centuries of epistemological analysis has engaged some of the greatest minds the West has produced. Without feeling any obligation to believe all they say, let's listen to three philosophers, briefly
KNOWING & UNKNOWING Hames L. Christian EPISTEMIC LONELINESS I At about this point, a feeling of loneliness may begin to overtake us__ an "epistemic loneliness." For the egocentric predicament is really an epistcmologica1 condition: isolation within a world of our own making. We live in a shell, so to speak, a private, personal shell inside which takes place an immense variety of experiences, all ours. And when we try to break out of our shells to make contact with the world and other creatures, we only rediscover the depth of our predicament. We 1ive in an epistemological shel1 with no doors. None may enter and none may share. 2 Since certain aspects of our epistemological condition appear to be inescapable, we must learn to live with them. (1 ) The fallacy of objectfication is an everpresent danger. Our experiencing system conspires to make us think that a variety of private experiences are in some way real, that they are events occurring in the real world of objects/events. (The tragic consequences of this fallacy will be felt especially when we try to untangle our value--experiences.) (2) Accordingly we have all lived (unwittingly) in a state of confusion regarding the location of the occurrence of events. Our subjective and objective worlds are interwoven: events we thought to be private may turn out to be objective, while many supposedly objective events often prove to be experiences only. (3)We are restless with our evolutionary limitation and deceptions. While we can be grateful that sensory and information _processing systems have rendered our physical environment meaningful, we have reached a point in our quest for reality when we want to go beyond our limitations and to know what the world is really like .We want to make whatever corrections are necessary in our universe and its principles of operation. 3 From this vantage point, the central problem of Western epistemology may be more intelligible. If we know only our experiences, how can we be sure that we know anything about the real world? More precisely, if objective physical phenomena are all converted before we can experience them into different kinds of energy, how can we know anything about the original phenomena? Can we even know what those phenomena are? If we experience only the subjective side of our interface with reality, can we ever know anything about the objective side of that interface--boundary? It will be helpful at this point to take time for historical sidetrip. Almost four centuries of epistemological analysis has engaged some of the greatest minds the West has produced. Without feeling any obligation to believe all they say, let’s listen to three philosophers, briefly.
LOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding in 1690, and it became a turning point in Western thought Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solid ity, extension ( that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number.(Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc. )If we couldn't perceive objects-or if we perceivers didn't exist--these qualities would still exist in objects Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimulated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qual ities are: colors, sounds, tastes, odors, odors, weight warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this"object that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer"substance " But what is"substance"? Well, "substance"is what has shape is in motion, and is so lid That didn 't get us very far, so let's put the question d ifferently: how can we know substance"? The only way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qualities: shape, motion, solid ity, etc. But that's where we were before Locke therefore concludes that"substance"cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape"exist without a"substance"which is"shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that"substance"is merely a concept on which we hang"the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. " So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solid ity and motion and shape might exist but that"substance"might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had published is Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles(he was an Anglican clergy man, later a bishop) and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebook
LOCKE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 4 John Locke published his ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 ,and it became a turning point in Western thought. Locke made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, he held, are to be considered as belonging to physical objects themselves, they inhere in the real object. Primary qualities are such thing as solidity, extension (that is, volume, the occupation of space), shape, motion/rest, and number. (Today, still thinking in Locke's terms, we might wish to add such qualities as mass, atomic structure, radioactivity, magnetism, etc.) If we couldn't perceive objects--or if we perceivers didn't exist--these qualities would stil1 exist in objects. Secondary qualities are experiences only, stimu1ated in us by the powers residing in real objects, and these qua1ities are: colors, sounds, tastes, odors, odors, weight, warmth, etc. Secondary qualities are our subjective human responses to the objective primary qualities. Clearly, we could not have our perceptions unless they are caused by real objects. But those primary qualities--what do they really belong to? What is, this "object" that has shape or is in motion or is solid? Locke had to answer "substance." But what is "substance"? Wel1, "substance" is what has shape, is in motion, and is so1id! That didn't get us very far, so let's put the question differently: how can we know "substance"? The on1y way we can know substance, Locke answered, is to observe the primary qua1ities: shape, motion, solidity, etc. But that's where we were before. Locke therefore concludes that "substance" cannot be known directly at all, but is rather an assumption which we are forced to make. After all, how can "shape" exist without a "substance" which is "shaped"? Locke had to admit, therefore, that "substance" is merely a concept on which we "hang" the primary and secondary qualities, which we can indeed experience. "So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of substances in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at a1l, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities...." This was not a satisfying conclusion, but Locke felt it was both good logic and common sense. After all, who in his right mind could possibly conclude that solidity and motion and shape might exist but that "substance" might not? The answer to that question is: George Berkeley. BERKELEY: THE LOGOC OF IMMATERIALISM 5 By the time he was twenty-five years old, George Berkeley had pub1ished his Principles of Human Knowledge, had stirred up international controversy in philosophical and theological circles (he was an Anglican clergyman, later a bishop), and was regarded as one of the most logical, eloquent, and charming philosophers the English-speaking world had produced. As early as the age of twenty, Berkeley developed the habit of jotting down ideas, arguments, and reflections in notebooks. These autobiographical notes were unknown until they were discovered and published in 1871 and given the title of Commonplace Book. In 1706, when Berkeley was twenty-one, he wrote a paragraph in his notebook
which pointed the direction his philosophy would take He wrote that the concept of materialism or"substance"had always been "the main pillar and support of skepticism"on which have been founded all the impious schemes of atheism and irrelig ion... How great a friend material ubstance hath been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate. When this cornerstone is once removed the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground Berkeley began with Locke 's conclusions and went on to prove that substance really doesn t exist 6 How did the lrish philosopher manage it? He did by agreeing with Locke that the idea of substance(or matter)is merely assumption on our part; we can never perceive substance directly. What we experience and the only things we experience are colors, tastes, odors, etc, that is, the secondary qualities But what about the primary qual ities--shape, solid ity, motion/rest, etc.--how do we know about these? We only infer those too, said Berkeley. How do you know the shape of a seashell? You run your fingers over the surface and feel it. Not exactly, Berkeley reminds us; we don't feel it. We only feel our sensations and proceed to assume that matter exists in " seashell" form and that the matter is the cause of our sensations. We further assume that the matter possesses certain (primary )qual ities which we cannot experience d irectly So far, Berkeley seems to agree with Locke. But where Locke never doubts the existence of matter(he merely says we can never know it ), Berkeley asks: If substance is merely an assumption, then could that assumption be wrong? Suppose the world of material objects doesn 't really exist. How could we account for the supposed objects which cause our perceptions? Berkeley concluded that there alternative assumption, just as logical as"substance, and far preferable Assume that God exists, and that he places in our minds all the perceptions which we experience. If we are making assumptions about reality to account for our perceptions, why is the assumption of the matter a more reasonable assumption than the existence of God? And if one is a Christian philosopher, doesn' t the assumption of a God-source become a more likely assumption than a matter-source? This is Berkeley's"immaterial ism--matter does not exist It is merely a fiction we thought we needed. The universe is composed of interacting minds only, and Go is the source of all our perceptions. All the world is merely an interplay of mental images and images and ideas, grandly provided and coord inated by god Therefore, reasoned Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived"--esse est percipi. There are no"real"clouds, rocks, oceans, stars, penguins, or seashells. Such items are but mind-inlages derived from God. Nothing exists, therefore, except when it is being perceived How can we be sure the persistent objects of experience---our homes, friends, the familiar belongings--will"be there"when we want to perceive them? Does the seashell-image flicker off and on, in and out of existence every time we look at it or turn away from it. No, says Berkeley. God is the eternal perceiver, and all images
which pointed the direction his philosophy would take. He wrote that the concept of materialism or "substance" had always been "the main pillar and support of skepticism" on which have been founded “all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion ......How great a friend material substance hath been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate....When this cornerstone is once removed .the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground ..." Berkeley began with Locke 's conclusions and went on to prove that substance really doesn't exist! 6 How did the Irish philosopher manage it? He did by agreeing with Locke that the idea of substance (or matter) is merely an assumption on our part; we can never perceive substance directly. What we experience _and the only things we experience _are colors ,tastes ,odors ,etc., that is ,the secondary qualities But what about the primary qua1ities--shape, solidity, motion/rest, etc.--how do we know about these? We only infer those too, said Berkeley. How do you know the shape of a seashell? You run your fingers over the surface and feel it. Not exactly, Berkeley reminds us; we don't feel it. We only feel our sensations and proceed to assume that matter exists in "seashell" form and that the matter is the cause of our sensations. We further assume that the matter possesses certain (primary ) qua1ities which we cannot experience directly. So far, Berkeley seems to agree with Locke. But where Locke never doubts the existence of matter (he merely says we can never know it), Berkeley asks: If substance is merely an assumption, then could that assumption be wrong? Suppose the world of material objects doesn't really exist. How could we account for the supposed objects which cause our perceptions? Berkeley concluded that there is an alternative assumption, just as logical as "substance," and far preferable. Assume that God exists, and that he places in our minds all the perceptions which we experience. lf we are making assumptions about reality to account for our perceptions, why is the assumption of the matter a more reasonable assumption than the existence of God? And if one is a Christian phi1osopher, doesn't the assumption of a God-source become a more 1ike1y assumption than a matter-source? This is Berkeley's "immaterialism"--matter does not exist .It is merely a fiction we thought we needed. The universe is composed of interacting minds only, and God is the source of all our perceptions. All the world is merely an interplay of mental images and images and ideas , grandly provided and coordinated by God. Therefore, reasoned Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived "--esse est percipi. There are no "real" clouds, rocks, oceans, stars, penguins, or seashells. Such items are but mind-in1ages derived from God. Nothing exists, therefore, except when it is being perceived. How can we be sure the persistent objects of experience---our homes, friends, the familiar belongings--wi11 "be there" when we want to perceive them? Does the seashel1-image flicker off and on, in and out of existence every time we look at it or turn away from it. No, says Berkeley. God is the eternal perceiver, and a1l images
continue to exist in the mind of God. They are always avail able to us for the asking to be experienced as we would. Indeed, comments Will Durant, "no one since Plato had written nonsense so charmingly. 7 Everyone discussed Berkeley's log ical attempt to annihilate matter among others, the lexicographer Samuel Johnson rejected the system, as Boswell reports After we came out of church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered striking his foot with a mighty force against a large stone till he rebounded from it "I refute it thus But what had Johnson really proved by kicking the rock? He had merely illustrated and confirmed Berkeley's argument. For al JOhnson"knew"was the sharp pain in his toe, perhaps a numb feeling in his foot, and the sensation of a sudden stop which gave his leg a jar. All he had proven by kicking the rock was that he was capable of feel ing a variety of subjective sensations. All he knew was his own experience, and that, after all, was the point Berkeley was making. So Samuel Johnson had merely added his considerable support to the " philosophy of immaterialism. 8 What else is this. however but " charming non sense " Most of us are convinced(we think) that physical matter exists. It seems to us that Berkeley made a simple mistake, a non sequitur: just because we cannot experience physical matter directly, it does not necessarily follow that matter doesn ' t exist But did berkeley really go wrong? (1) Berkeley emphasizes the fact that we are limited absolutely to our own perceptions and cannot experience any"real"world On this point he seems to be correct. (2)He is therefore repeating Locke's point that nhy ption which we think to be logical necessity. On this point also, he is correct Whether you will go further with Berkeley and accept that his alternat ive assumption--God as the source of experience--is a better one will depend somewhat on personal preference and theological belief. Most of us remain convinced that the reality of matter is a better assumption, but perhaps that's only because we have lived uncritical lly with it most of our lives. We must face honestly, however, berkeley singular challenge: Prove, if you can, that any material object exists apart from your perception of it. If you can, then Berkeley is wrong. If you can't, then you will have to concede berkeley would insist)that the world is merely your idea 9 If you enjoy science fiction, speculate on the following scene(which may or may not be from the realm of SF) We curvolounges fashioned to fit from heliostyrene. Over each of our heads is fitted tantalum--crystal hel met, finely wired with thousands of microelectrodes which have been surgically embedded in the sensory centers of our brain s outer layer, the cortex All senseq ("sensory--sequence") programs originate from, and are coordinated by, PROSELEC (Program Central for Sensory-sequence Selection). The electrical
continue to exist in the mind of God. They are always avai1able to us for the asking, to be experienced as we would. Indeed, comments Will Durant, "no one since Plato had written nonsense so charmingly." 7 Everyone discussed Berkeley's logica1 attempt to annihilate matter among others, the 1exicographer Samuel Johnson rejected the system, as Boswell reports: “ After we came out of church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berke1ey's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with a mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus!" But what had Johnson really proved by kicking the rock? He had merely illustrated and confirmed Berkeley's argument. For a1lJohnson "knew" was the sharp pain in his toe, perhaps a numb feeling in his foot, and the sensation of a sudden stop which gave his leg a jar. All he had proven by kicking the rock was that he was capable of fee1ing a variety of subjective sensations. All he knew was his own experience, and that, after all, was the point Berkeley was making. So Samuel Johnson had merely added his considerable support to the " philosophy of immaterialism." 8 What e1se is this, however, but "charming nonsense"? Most of us are convinced (we think) that physical matter exists. It seems to us that Berkeley made a simple mistake, a non sequitur: just because we cannot experience physical matter directly, it does not necessarily follow that matter doesn't exist. But did Berkeley really go wrong? (1 ) Berkeley emphasizes the fact that we are 1imited absolutely to our own perceptions and cannot experience any "real" world. On this point he seems to be correct. (2)He is therefore repeating Locke's point that physical matter (or substance) is only a mental assumption which we think to be a 1ogical necessity. On this point also, he is correct. Whether you will go further with Berkeley and accept that his alternative assumption--God as the source of experience--is a better one will depend somewhat on personal preference and theological belief. Most of us remain convinced that the reality of matter is a better assumption, but perhaps that's only because we have lived uncritica1ly with it most of our lives. We must face honestly, however, Berkeley's singular challenge: Prove, if you can, that any material object exists apart from your perception of it. If you can, then Berkeley is wrong. If you can't , then you will have to concede (Berkeley would insist) that the wor1d is mere1y your idea. 9 If you enjoy science fiction, speculate on the following scene (which may or may not be from the realm of SF). We are alone, each of us, in a sma1l white cubic1e, floating restfully in curvolounges fashioned to fit from heliostyrene. Over each of our heads is fitted a tantalum--crystal he1met, finely wired with thousands of microelectrodes which have been surgically embedded in the sensory centers of our brain's outer 1ayer, the cortex All senseq ("sensory--sequence") programs originate from, and are coordinated by, PROSELEC (Program Centra1 for Sensory-sequence Selection). The electrical
impulses which the electrodes generate in the cortex prov ide a variety of real --l ife experiences. Selection keys on the curvolounge's arm allow one to select from mill ions of stored progr There are five categories of sense programs available to the average customer. Real-time senseqs(R)are identical to living space-time experiences, like strolling along the beach. Special senses (S)are plot-programs, like old-fashioned novies or Triv dramas(these are mostly for old-timers, and sent imental ists). Extra senses(E)are specific experiences, like visiting a friend or eating abalone almandine Cosmic senseqs (C)are ecstasy-meditations during which one can experience a joyful union with Cosmic Reality. And lastly, dream senses(D) provide REM-sleep and are to be used for rest periods a minimum of four hours during any twenty--hour od of sense ex There is one other kind of sense. Occasionally PROselEC preempts private time to channel what are considered especially beneficial programs. Some educational experience is essential; after all, if left to themselves al most everyone would choose only fun-and-games senseqs (except for a masochistic 6 percent who persist in selecting self destructive senses). It is also to be noted that many senses in the R, s, and e classes are rated"X"; if a prohibited senseq is selected by a nonqualified customer, a mild impulse is channeled to the gland--control centers which in turn release chemicals which induce(for a seven-minute period only )strong guilt feelings The senseq impulses sent to the brain centers are identical in every to the electrochemical impulses which the(now-vestigial body-senses used to send to the cortex. The resulting sense--experiences, therefore, are identical(but superior, of course, in qual ity and variety to real- life experiences of the kind known before the advent of PROSElEC Question: For anyone tuned in to PROSELEC, does the real world exist? How could he possibly know, whether or not it exists? Would this PrOselEC world differ significantly from Berkeley's immaterial cosmos(with the possible exception of the X"ratings, Berkeley's Eternal Perceiver seemed little concerned with censorship) Question: What would constitute reality for a PROSELEC customer? Question: What constitutes reality for you and me? 10 His logic is brill iant and he almost succeeds. " His arguments are, strictly speaking, unanswerable, "wrote Lord Chesterfield, and Boswell duly noted that although we are convinced that his doctrine is false, "it is impossible to refute it David Hume agreed Berkeley's arguments "admit of no answer and produce no conviction Because of George Berkeley, writes Durant, "European philosophy has not quite made up its mind that the external world exists. Until it reconciles itself to the extreme probability of it, and faces the problems of life and death, the world will pass it by 11 Berkeley's system is the most extreme philosophical idealism"the Western world has produced. There is but one epistemological position--solipsism-- which is more extreme If it is a fact that we know nothing of the external world, and if Berkeley could conclude from this that the external world of matter doesn't exist, then the solipsist
impulses which the electrodes generate in the cortex provide a variety of real--1ife experiences. Selection keys on the curvolounge's arm allow one to select from mi11ions of stored program/experiences. There are five categories of senseq programs available to the average customer. Real--time senseqs (R) are identical to living space-time experiences, like strolling along the beach. Special senseqs (S) are plot-programs, like old--fashioned movies or TriV dramas (these are mostly for old-timers, and sentimenta1ists). Extra senseqs (E) are specific experiences, like visiting a friend or eating abalone almondine. Cosmic senseqs (C) are ecstasy-meditations during which one can experience a joyful union with Cosmic Reality. And lastly, dream senseqs (D) provide REM-sleep and are to be used for rest periods a minimum of four hours during any twenty--hour period of senseq experience. There is one other kind of senseq. Occasionally PROSELEC preempts private time to channel what are considered especially beneficial programs. Some educational experience is essential; after al1, if left to themselves almost everyone would choose on1y fun-and-games senseqs (except for a masochistic 6 percent who persist in selecting self destructive senseqs). It is also to be noted that many senseqs in the R, S, and E classes are rated "X" ; if a prohibited senseq is selected by a nonqualified customer, a mild impulse is channeled to the gland--control centers which in turn release chemicals which induce (for a seven-minute period only) strong guilt feelings. The senseq impulses sent to the brain centers are identica1 in every way to the electrochemical impulses which the (now-vestigial) body-senses used to send to the cortex. The resulting sense--experiences, therefore, are identical (but superior, of course, in quality and variety) to real-life experiences of the kind known before the advent of PROSELEC. Question: For anyone tuned in to PROSELEC, does the real world exist? How could he possibly know, whether or not it exists? Would this PROSELEC world differ significantly from Berkeley's immaterial cosmos (with the possible exception of the "X" ratings; Berkeley's Eternal Perceiver seemed 1ittle concerned with censorship)? Question: What wou1d constitute reality for a PROSELEC customer? Question: What constitutes reality for you and me? 10 His logic is bril1iant and he almost succeeds. "His arguments are, strictly speaking, unanswerable," wrote Lord Chesterfield, and Boswe11 duly noted that although we are convinced that his doctrine is false, "it is impossible to refute it." David Hume agreed' Berke1ey's arguments "admit of no answer and produce no conviction." Because of George Berkeley, writes Durant, "European philosophy has not quite made up its mind that the external world exists. Until it reconciles itself to the extreme probability of it, and faces the problems of life and death, the world will pass it by." 11 Berkeley's system is the most extreme philosophical idealism" the Western world has produced. There is but one epistemological position--solipsism-- which is more extreme. If it is a fact that we know nothing of the external world, and if Berkeley could conclude from this that the external world of matter doesn't exist, then the solipsist
will take the next step and conclude that only he himself exists. "I know only myself, he might say(to himself; of course)."The world is the fabrication of my imagination. Therefore, only I exist. Such a solipsistic position has been held by few thinkers and by no major philosophers. (It was a solipsist, we are told, who, in deep anger, once said to a companion, "I'm going to kill you! "Whereupon he thrust a dagger into his own heart, and the other man ceased to exist.) HUME: WE MUST ALL BE SKEPTICS 12 To be is to be perceived"--esse est percipi--Berkeley contended How can we know anything exists if we can't perceive it? The world of real objects is beyond perception; they exist only as images in our minds, and these images might just as well derive from a Divine Mind as from some hypothetica substance"we conjure up in our fantasy That's where we stood with berkeley. Now David Hume sets his incisive intellect to work. First, Hume pointed out the obvious: the idea of God, like"matter, "is merely assumption. The one is no more known to us than the other. We know only our experiences, and it follows that we know nothing of God or matter. If matter is "make-believe" then so is god Berkeley never escaped Hume's net. God was the preferable assumption for the Irish cleric, but philosophers, Hume would contend, cannot live by assumptions alone. He accords with Locke and berkeley that we do not experience matter directly Therefore, Hume--with a passion for accuracy--never denies the existence of the real world (how could you deny the existence of something you can' t know? ) He remains in a suspended state of agnosticism. We can t know the real world, and there's no more to be said about it Next, Hume takes the heart out of science by undermining our belief in causality We never observe "causes. " Our concept of causality results from a habit of association. When events occur together repeatedly, we learn to assoc iate them; then we fabricate the"belief"that there is a necessary connection between events. But Hume points out, we observe neither cause nor necessity. " All our reasonings concerning cause and effect are derived from nothing but custom. "Causality has no objective status, so far as we know, it is only a mental habit without logical support Then Hume wonders about"mind What we call the"mind"is merely "a bundle or collection of different perceptions. It is a mov ie screen on which the senses, our jectors, project their pictures But there is no entity such as"mind", for when the projections are turned off there is nothing.(This does seem to happen when we turn off all our sense-projectors and sleep, during periods of deep, dreamless sleep our sense of"self"or"identity ceases to ex In his quest for logical consistency, Hume becomes our most extreme skeptic Where, then, do our sense experiences come from? In truth, we cannot know Their ultimate cause is perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill be impossible to decide with certainty whether they exist immediately from the object or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being What can we know for sure? Nothing. David hume makes mincemeat of
will take the next step and conclude that only he himself exists. "I know only myse1f," he might say (to himself; of course). "The wor1d is the fabrication of my imagination. Therefore, only I exist." Such a solipsistic position has been held by few thinkers and by no major philosophers. (It was a solipsist, we are told, who, in deep anger, once said to a companion, "I'm going to kill you!" Whereupon he thrust a dagger into his own heart, and the other man ceased to exist... ) HUME :WE MUST ALL BE SKEPTICS l2 "To be is to be perceived"--esse est percipi--Berkeley contended How can we know anything exists if we can't perceive it? The world of real objects is beyond perception; they exist only as images in our minds, and these images might just as wel1 derive from a Divine Mind as from some hypothetica1 "substance" we conjure up in our fantasy. That's where we stood with Berkeley. Now David Hume sets his incisive intellect to work. First, Hume pointed out the obvious: the idea of God, like "matter," is merely assumption. The one is no more known to us than the other. We know only our experiences, and it follows that we know nothing of God or matter. If matter is "make--believe" then so is God. Berkeley never escaped Hume's net. God was the preferab1e assumption for the Irish c1eric, but philosophers, Hume would contend, cannot 1ive by assumptions alone. He accords with Locke and Berkeley that we do not experience matter directly. Therefore, Hume--with a passion for accuracy—never denies the existence of the real world (how could you deny the existence of something you can't know?). He remains in a suspended state of agnosticism. We can't know the real world, and there's no more to be said about it. Next, Hume takes the heart out of science by undermining our belief in causality. We never observe "causes." Our concept of causality resu1ts from a habit of association. When events occur together repeatedly, we learn to associate them; then we fabricate the "belief" that there is a necessary connection between events. But, Hume points out, we observe neither cause nor necessity. "All our reasonings concerning cause and effect are derived from nothing but custom." Causality has no objective status, so far as we know; it is only a mental habit without logical support. Then Hume wonders about "mind." What we call the "mind" is merely "a bundle or collection of different perceptions." It is a movie screen on which the senses, our image-projectors, project their pictures. But there is no entity such as "mind"; for when the projections are turned off there is nothing. (This does seem to happen when we turn off all our sense--projectors and sleep, during periods of deep, dreamless sleep our sense of "self" or "identity" ceases to exist.) In his quest for logical consistency, Hume becomes our most extreme skeptic. Where, then, do our sense experiences come from? In truth, we cannot know. “Their ultimate cause is perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill be impossib1e to decide with certainty whether they exist immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being. What can we know for sure? Nothing. David Hume makes mincemeat of
our every attempt to convince ourselves that certainty is possible. No one in two thousand years of Western philosophy--no one since Gorgias the Sophist"--has made it quite so difficult for us RSVP George Berkeley's philo sophy of immaterialism has been happily summarized in a limerick There was a young man who said, God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there 's no one about in the ouad Reply Dear sir Your astonishment's odd I am always about in the Quad And that' s why the tree Will continue to be Since observed by Yours faithfully Attributed to RONALd KNOX THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF KNOWING 13 In a moment of refreshing honesty, David Hume composed a confession which speaks for many great thinkers, from Socrates to the seventies, whose lifeblood is spent wrestling with abstract and unobservable entities, but who still possess the great gift of keeping their philosophical reflections in perspective. Hume wrote Should it be asked me whether I sincerely assent to this argument which I have been to such pains to inculcate, and whether i be really one of those skeptics who hold that all is uncertain,.I should reply. that neither I nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion.. I dine, I play backgammon, I converse and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four hours amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold and strained and ridiculous that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further.. Thus the skeptic still continues to reason and believe, though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason,and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy, to maintain its veracity 14 Let's take seriously what David Hume implies in this moment of truth. Here is our Scottish skeptic whose reason tells him one set of facts(we know nothing certain of the real world), but whose experience seems to contradict his reason("I dine, I play backgammon, I converse. " ) When such conflict exists between theory and experience, then a solution must be sought.(Remember that infamous bumblebee
our every attempt to convince ourselves that certainty is possible. No one in two thousand years of Western philosophy--no one since Gorgias the Sophist"--has made it quite so difficult for us. RSVP, George Berkeley's philosophy of immaterialism has been happily summarized in a 1imerick: There was a young man who said, "God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there's no one about in the Quad." Reply Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd. I am always about in the Quad. And that's why the tree Wi1l continue to be, Since observed by Yours faithfully, God. ◼ Attributed to RONALD KNOX THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF KNOWING 13 In a moment of refreshing honesty, David Hume composed a confession which speaks for many great thinkers, from Socrates to the seventies, whose lifeblood is spent wrestling with abstract and unobservable entities, but who still possess the great gift of keeping their philosophical reflections in perspective. Hume wrote: “Should it be asked me whether I sincerely assent to this argument which I have been to such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those skeptics who hold that all is uncertain,... I should reply... that neither I nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion.... I dine, I play backgammon, I converse and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold and strained and ridiculous that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any further.... Thus the skeptic still continues to reason and believe, though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend, by any arguments of philosophy, to maintain its veracity.” 14 Let's take seriously what David Hume implies in this moment of truth. Here is our Scottish skeptic whose reason tel1s him one set of facts (we know nothing certain of the real world), but whose experience seems to contradict his reason ("I dine, I play backgammon, I converse..."). When such conflict exists between theory and experience, then a solution must be sought. (Remember that infamous bumblebee
which, according to aerodynamics, can't fly--but does?) What Hume implies is: (1)it is very impracticable not to assume that the real world exists,and(2) day-to-day living is very difficult if one tries to operate on the assumption that he knows nothing about the real world There are few philosophers of the modern world who would not question, to some extent, the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume. After more than two centuries of debate, we now have adequate reason to assume()that the real world exists and(2) that we have at least a working knowledge of that world. It is the nature of that working know ledge which is still cause for concern 15 If these conclusions are comforting, our philosophers have made three points which may seem less so. The following arguments seem basically sound and still and today as starting points for an understand ing of the nature of knowledge () We know only our subjective experience, which begin with sensory reaction and ends with the fabrication of knowledge. This appears to be an inescapable limitation (2)Accordingly, we cannot experience directly the real world of objects /events Neither matter nor the principles of motion are directly perceivable ()Our knowledge of the real world consists solely, therefore, of inferences which we make on the basis of our experience 16 In summary, what is the nature of our knowledge about the real world of objects/events? Our knowledge of reality is composed of ideas our minds have created on the basis of our sensory experience. It is a fabric of knowledge woven by the mind Knowledge is not given to the mind; nothing is "poured"into it. Rather, the mind manufactures perceptions, concepts, ideas, beliefs, etc, and holds them as working hypotheses about external real ity. Every idea is a(subjective)working model which enables us to handle real objects/events with some degree of efficiency. But ideas in our heads are not realities; they are but tools which enable us to deal with reality It is as though we drew nond imensional maps to help us understand four-dimensional territory. The semanticists have long reminded us to beware about confusing any sort of map with the real landscape The map is not the territory
which, according to aerodynamics, can't fly---but does?) What Hume implies is: (1) it is very impracticable not to assume that the rea1 wor1d exists, and (2) day-to--day living is very difficult if one tries to operate on the assumption that he knows nothing about the real world. There are few philosophers of the modern world who would not question, to some extent, the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume. After more than two centuries of debate, we now have adequate reason to assume (l) that the real world exists and (2) that we have at least a working knowledge of that world. It is the nature of that working know1edge which is still cause for concern. 15 If these conclusions are comforting, our phi1osophers have made three points which may seem less so. The following arguments seem basically sound and still stand today as starting points for an understanding of the nature of knowledge. (l) We know only our subjective experience, which begin with sensory reaction and ends with the fabrication of knowledge. This appears to be an inescapable limitation. (2) Accordingly, we cannot experience directly the real world of objects /events. Neither matter nor the principles of motion are directly perceivable. (3) Our knowledge of the real world consists solely, therefore, of inferences which we make on the basis of our experience. 16 In summary, what is the nature of our knowledge about the real world of objects/events? Our knowledge of reality is composed of ideas our minds have created on the basis of our sensory experience. It is a fabric of knowledge woven by the mind. Knowledge is not given to the mind; nothing is "poured" into it. Rather, the mind manufactures perceptions, concepts, ideas ,beliefs, etc., and holds them as working hypotheses about external reality. Every idea is a (subjective) working model which enables us to handle rea1 objects/events with some degree of efficiency." But ideas in our heads are not realities; they are but tools which enable us to deal with reality It is as though we drew nondimensional maps to help us understand four-dimensional territory. The semanticists have long reminded us to beware about confusing any sort of map with the real landscape. "The map is not the territory
