SCIENCE AND ETHICS Bertrand Russell Different philosophers have formed different conceptions of the Good. Some hold that it consists in the knowled ge and love of god: others in universal love others in the enjoyment of beauty, and yet others in pleasure. The good once defined the rest of ethics follows we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as l ittle as possible of its correlative evil. The framing of moral rules, so long as the ultimate Good is supposed known, is matter for science, For example: should capital punishment be inflicted for theft, or only for murder, or not at all? Jeremy Bentham, who considered pleasure to be the good, devoted himself to working out what criminal code would most promote pleasure, and concluded it ought to be much less severe than that prevalling in his day. All this, except the proposition that pleasure is the Good, comes within the sphere of science But when we try to be definite as to what we mean when we say that this or that is"the Good, "we find ourselves involved in very great difficulties. Bentham's creed that pleasure is the Good roused furious opposition, and was said to be a pig s philosophy. Neither he nor his opponents could advance any argument. In a scientific question, evidence can be adduced on both sides, and in the end one side is seen to have the better case-or, if this does not happen, the question is left undecided. But in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate Good there is no evidence either ay:each disputant can only appeal to his own emotions, and employ such rhetorical devices as shall rouse similar emotions in others Take, for example, a question which has come to be important in practical politics. Bentham held that one man's pleasure has the same ethical importance as another man's, provided the quantities are equal; and on this ground he was led to advocate democracy. Nietzsche, on the contrary, held that only the great man can be regarded as important on his own account, and that the bulk of mankind are only means to his well-being. He viewed ordinary men as many people view animals: he thought it justifiable to make use of them, not for their own good, but for that of the superman, and this view has since been adopted to justify the abandonment of democracy. We have here a sharp disagreement of great practical importance, but we have absolutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual kind, by which to persuade either party that the other is in the right. There are, it is true, ways of altering men's opinions on such subjects, but they are all emotional, not intellectual Questions as to"values" that is to say, as to what is good or bad on its own account, independently of its effects lie outside the domain of science, as the defenders of religion emphatically assert. I think that in this they are right, but I draw the further conclusion, which they do not draw, that questions as to"values"I wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has"value, "we are giv ing expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which
SCIENCE AND ETHICS Bertrand Russell Different philosophers have formed different conceptions of the Good. Some hold that it consists in the knowledge and love of God ; others in universal love, others in the enjoyment of beauty, and yet others in pleasure. The Good once defined, the rest of ethics follows: we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as 1ittle as possible of its correlative evil. The framing of moral ru1es, so long as the ultimate Good is supposed known, is matter for science, For example: should capital punishment be inflicted for theft, or only for murder, or not at all? Jeremy Bentham, who considered pleasure to be the Good, devoted himself to working out what criminal code would most promote pleasure, and conc1uded that it ought to be much less severe than that prevalling in his day. All this, except the proposition that pleasure is the Good, comes within the sphere of science. But when we try to be definite as to what we mean when we say that this or that is "the Good," we find ourselves involved in very great difficulties. Bentham's creed that pleasure is the Good roused furious opposition, and was said to be a pig's philosophy. Neither he nor his opponents could advance any argument. In a scientific question, evidence can be adduced on both sides, and in the end one side is seen to have the better case -- or, if this does not happen, the question is left undecided. But in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate Good, there is no evidence either way: each disputant can only appeal to his own emotions, and employ such rhetorical devices as shall rouse similar emotions in others. Take, for example, a question which has come to be important in practical politics. Bentham held that one man's pleasure has the same ethical importance as another man's, provided the quantities are equal; and on this ground he was led to advocate democracy. Nietzsche, on the contrary, held that only the great man can be regarded as important on his own account, and that the bulk of mankind are only means to his well-being. He viewed ordinary men as many people view animals: he thought it justifiable to make use of them, not for their own good, but for that of the superman, and this view has since been adopted to justify the abandonment of democracy. We have here a sharp disagreement of great practical importance, but we have absolutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual kind, by which to persuade either party that the other is in the right. There are, it is true, ways of altering men's opinions on such subjects, but they are all emotional, not intellectual. Questions as to "values" __ that is to say, as to what is good or bad on its own account, independently of its effects __lie outside the domain of science, as the defenders of religion emphatically assert. I think that in this they are right, but I draw the further conclusion, which they do not draw, that questions as to "values" lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say, when we assert that this or that has "value," we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which
would still be true if our personal feelings were different, To make this clear, we must try to analyze the conception of the good It is obvious, to begin with, that the whole idea of good and bad has connection with desire. Prima facie, anything that we all desire is " good anything that we all dread is"bad. "If we all agreed in our desires, the matter could be left there, but unfortunately our desires conflict. If I say what I want is good, "my neighbour will say "No, what I want. "Ethics is an attempt though not, I think, a successful one to escape from this subjectivity. I shall naturally try to show, in my dispute with my neighbour, that my desires have some quality which makes them more worthy of respect than his. If I want to preserve a right of way, I shall appeal to the landless inhabitants of the district; but he, on his side, will appeal to the landowners. I shall say: What use is the beauty of the countryside if no one sees it! He will retort: What beauty will be left if trippers are allowed to spread devastation? Each tries to enlist all ies by showing that his own desires harmonize with those of other people. When this is obv iously impossible, as in the case of a burglar, the man is condemned by public opinion, and his ethical status is that of a sinner. Ethics is thus closely related to politics; it is an attempt to bring the collective desires of a group to bear upon individuals, or, conversely, it is an attempt by an individual to cause his desires to become those of his group. This latter is, of course, only possible if his desires are not too obviously opposed to the general interest: the burglar will hardly attempt to persuade people that he is doing them good, though plutocrats make similar attempts, and often succeed When our desires are for things which can enjoy in common, it seems not unreasonable to hope that others may concur; thus the philosopher who values Truth Goodness and Beauty seems, to himself to be not merely express ing his own desires, but pointing the way to the welfare of all mankind. Unlike the burglar, he is able to believe that his desires are for something that has value in an impersonal sense Ethics is an attempt to give universal, and not merely personal, importance to certain of our desires. I say"certain"of our desires, because in regard to some of them this is obviously impossible, as we saw in the case of the burglar. The man who makes money on the Stock Exchange by means of some secret knowledge does not wish others to be equally well informed Truth(in so far as he values it)is for him a private possession, not the general human good that it is for the philosopher. The philosophe may, it is true, sink to the level of the stockjobber, as when he claims priority for a discovery. But this is a lapse: in his purely philosophic capacity, he wants only to enjoy the contemplation of Truth, in doing which he in no way interferes with others who wish to do likewise (from Religion and Science
would still be true if our personal feelings were different, To make this clear, we must try to analyze the conception of the Good. It is obvious, to begin with, that the whole idea of good and bad has some connection with desire. Prima facie, anything that we all desire is "good," and anything that we all dread is' "bad." If we all agreed in our desires, the matter could be left there, but unfortunately our desires conflict. If I say "what I want is good," my neighbour will say "No, what I want." Ethics is an attempt__ though not, I think, a successful one __ to escape from this subjectivity. I shall naturally try to show, in my dispute with my neighbour, that my desires have some quality which makes them more worthy of respect than his. If l want to preserve a right of way, I shall appeal to the landless inhabitants of the district; but he, on his side, will appeal to the landowners. I shall say: "What use is the beauty of the countryside if no one sees it!'' He will retort: "What beauty will be left if trippers are allowed to spread devastation?" Each tries to enlist allies by showing that his own desires harmonize with those of other people. When this is obviously impossible, as in the case of a burglar, the man is condemned by public opinion, and his ethica1 status is that of a sinner. Ethics is thus closely related to politics; it is an attempt to bring the collective desires of a group to bear upon individuals; or, conversely, it is an attempt by an individual to cause his desires to become those of his group. This latter is, of course, only possible if his desires are not too obviously opposed to the general interest: the burglar will hardly attempt to persuade people that he is doing them good, though plutocrats make similar attempts, and often succeed. When our desires are for things which can enjoy in common, it seems not unreasonable to hope that others may concur; thus the philosopher who values Truth, Goodness and Beauty seems, to himself to be not merely expressing his own desires, but pointing the way to the welfare of all mankind. Unlike the burglar, he is able to believe that his desires are for something that has value in an impersonal sense. Ethics is an attempt to give universal, and not merely personal, importance to certain of our desires. I say "certain" of our desires, because in regard to some of them this is obviously impossible, as we saw in the case of the burglar. The man who makes money on the Stock Exchange by means of some secret knowledge does not wish others to be equally well informed: Truth (in so far as he values it) is for him a private possession, not the general human good that it is for the philosopher. The philosopher may, it is true, sink to the level of the stockjobber, as when he claims priority for a discovery. But this is a lapse: in his purely philosophic capacity, he wants only to enjoy the contemplation of Truth, in doing which he in no way interferes with others who wish to do likewise. (from Religion and Science)