VAN DER VLIESISTOTER/LUBACH interst of the company is regarded as the result of balancing the different interests of those involved in the activities of the company. When, as is the case in companies we are discussing here, public authorities are involved in the com pany, the common interest has at least to be regarded as one of the relevant interests to be balanced Thus the common interest can be seen as a relevant part of the interest of the company, but cannot be identical with the companies interest. That means also that a public authority within the the framework of the com pany cannot let the common interest play the same role as it would in a organisation governed by public law. Speakingof privatisation this should not be very surprising. Still in another way the govemment has to respect a balance. This is the balance between the powers a ttributed to the different bodies within the companies structure This balance is based on the Civil Code and public authorities, having choosen for a fomm based on private law have to stay within the given interdependence of the different organs. Basically does that mean thata public authority actingas a(mem ber of a) body of a private legal person does have smilar powers as any other organ or member thereof. Exercising his power he has to represent the common interest, but this cannot be a sufficient motive to disturb the companies intemalstructure 5.3.2 Using specific regulations based on public law Theoretically the govemment can by means of a formalact varate on the rules of Ch 2 of the Civil Code. Any formal act(enacted by the Crown and the parliament)has an equal status. And the axiom lex specials derogat legi generali applies. In such a case a legal person sui generis is created though not unimportant in the context of privatisation we will leave this aside Here we will discuss the lim its of influence by public regulations. This comes down to the question to which extent the as we saw, obligatory rules of Ch 2 CC, limit the enactment of public rules as ela borated in par. 5.2 sub b A more general limit follows from the viewpoint we mentioned above: public law regulation should be complementary to the possibilities of the private law on legal persons. Systematically itit is preferable that in cases that the government uses private legal persons the methods of influence should stay as muchas possible within the framework of the private construction that has been chosen. To many dev ations rom the regular structure brings a bout a hybrid organisation and it becomes unclear whether or not we have to do with a real private com pany. If there is a need for many specal rules the the fom of a private legal person is may not be suita ble for the issue which is at stake. This general lim it plays a role in the judgement of any public rule that is meant to influence the decisions of the competent bodies of the company whether they are of a more general or a more specific nature But public regulation in order to be able to influence concrete decisions even more easily interferes with the discretion which is an inherent part of the executive power in a company. That goes for instance for the power to approve the budget or annualaccount. Also questiona ble are specif ic rules which allow public authorities to give instructions as to to content of specific decisions the executive board has to So there is a need for restraint in making specific public rules in order to influence the company representing tasks in the common interestVAN DER VLIES/STOTER/LUBACH 10 interst of the company is regarded as the result of balancing the different interests of those involved in the activities of the company. When, as is the case in companies we are discussing here, public authorities are involved in the company, the common interest has at least to be regarded as one of the relevant interests to be balanced. Thus the common interest can be seen as a relevant part of the interest of the company, but cannot be identical with the companies interest. That means also that a public authority within the the framework of the company cannot let the common interest play the same role as it would in a organisation governed by public law. Speaking of privatisation this should not be very surprising. Still in another way the government has to respect a balance. This is the balance between the powers attributed to the different bodies within the companies structure. This balance is based on the Civil Code and public authorities, having choosen for a form based on private law have to stay within the given interdependence of the different organs. Basically does that mean that a public authority acting as a (member of a) body of a private legal person does have similar powers as any other organ or member thereof. Exercising his power he has to represent the common interest, but this cannot be a sufficient motive to disturb the companies internal structure. 5.3.2 Using specific regulations based on public law Theoretically the government can by means of a formal act variate on the rules of Ch 2 of the Civil Code. Any formal act (enacted by the Crown and the parliament) has an equal status. And the axiom lex specialis derogat legi generali applies. In such a case a legal person sui generis is created. Although not unimportant in the context of privatisation we will leave this aside. Here we will discuss the limits of influence by public regulations. This comes down to the question to which extent the as we saw, obligatory  rules of Ch 2 CC, limit the enactment of public rules as elaborated in par. 5.2 sub.b. A more general limit follows from the viewpoint we mentioned above: public law regulation should be complementary to the possibilities of the private law on legal persons. Systematically it it is preferable that in cases that the government uses private legal persons the methods of influence should stay as much as possible within the framework of the private construction that has been chosen. To many deviations from the regular structure brings about a hybrid organisation and it becomes unclear whether or not we have to do with a real private company. If there is a need for many special rules the the form of a private legal person is may not be suitable for the issue which is at stake. This general limit plays a role in the judgement of any public rule that is meant to influence the decisions of the competent bodies of the company, whether they are of a more general or a more specific nature. But public regulation in order to be able to influence concrete decisions even more easily interferes with the discretion which is an inherent part of the executive power in a company. That goes for instance for the power to approve the budget or annual account. Also questionable are specific rules which allow public authorities to give instructions as to to content of specific decisions the executive board has to make. So there is a need for restraint in making specific public rules in order to influence the company representing tasks in the common interest