Intervention for supplies;they were impatient and always anxious to advance, but China would have to supply the garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports was questionable,he argued.19 In addition,although this was no doubt partly a face-saving formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary basis,necessary only in a period of acute crisis.'The English ambassador says it is possible to send troops to help suppress the rebels,but only temporarily,not permanently',an Edict of February 25,1862,read.'He should be informed that after the alarm was sounded at Shanghai,troops were despatched from every quarter.But since this relief has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the help of foreign countries;but once our strength has been concentrated there,and put under competent command,naturally there will be no need of help.'20 There was no anxiety to see large numbers of foreign troops brought to China to help suppress the rebels.In the middle of 1862,after the failure of the first combined attempt to clear a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai,there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops from India to assist in a later campaign.Both Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang,who was leading the Chinese forces in Kiangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sceptical of their value on the ground that recent reverses near Shanghai showed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China's own forces,and Tseng arguing that China's own resources were adequate to the task in hand.Many cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote,the means for subduing Kiangsu and Chekiang exist,and if our policies do not succeed and the rebel conflagra- tion die out,China should bear the burden herself....How can we lightly hire foreign forces and so become an object of scorn to later generations?'China,in suppressing the rebels,should not plant the seeds of future complications,he concluded.21 When criticized for being too accommodating towards the foreign powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation in which Bruce could sympathize with him,Prince Kung vehemently defended the policies of the Tsungli Yamen and indicated another aspect of the official Manchu attitude towards foreign aid.'As for the opinion that foreign help in putting down the rebels is not trustworthy,I am very far from saying 117rr,矽纟rv召 rF矽 jo刀 for suppⅡes;they werei1npauent and a1ways anxiousto advance, but China wouId have to supp1y伍 e garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports、 vas ques伍 onab1e,he argued,|9 In addition,altllough this was no doubt partly a face冖 savmg formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary bas厶,necessary only in a peⅡ od of acute αi“s.‘ The Engloh ambassador says it is possible to scnd troops to help suppress the rebels,but0n1y temporaⅡ ly,not permanently’ ,an Edict of Februa,ry25,1862,read.‘ IΙe should be informed that after the alar1m was sounded at shanghai,troops、 氵、`ere despatched from eVery quarter。 But since this reⅡ ef has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the heIp offoreign countⅡ es;but once our strength has been cOncentrated there,and put under competent CoⅡ1Inand,naturaⅡ y there wi11be no need of help'20There Was no anxiety to see large numbers of f° reign troops brought to CⅡna to help suppress the rebcIs。 I殂 the middle of1862,after 伍e faⅡurc of the nrst c。mbined attempt to clear a thirtyˉmile radius around shanghai, there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops frO1n India to assist in a later campaign。 Both Tseng Kuoˉ fan and Tso Tsungˉ t’ ang,who lvas leading the Chinese forces in Xjangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sc。 ptical oftheir value on the ground that recent reVerses near Shanghai sh° wed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China’ s Own forces, and Tseng arguhg that China’ s own resources were adequate to the task in hand,】 Ⅰˇ‘[any cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote, ‘the Ineans for subduing XⅡ angsu and Chekiang exist,and if our poⅡ cies do not succeed and the rebe1con丑 agra￾tion die out,ChiI1a should bear the burden herse1【 、。。.1Iow can we ligl△ dy Ⅱre fore璁 n forces and so become an o刂 ect of scom to later generati° ns?’ C血a,in suppressing the rebels,should not phnt the seeds of future complications,he concluded。 ⒓1 When criticizcd for being too accommodathg to、vards the fore廴 了1powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation 瑰h婆茹l祧赢甜皙嬲骢飞紫责靶F慨e阝甘:号 indioated another aspeot ofthe o伍 cial⒒汀anchu attitude tOwards foreign aid。 ‘As for the opⅡ1ion that foreign help in putung down the rebels h not trustwOrthy,I am very far f1· om saying 1I7