made political tension in Tsarist Russia in many respects greater than in most other European countries. Family law issues such as the equality of women, civil marriage and more liberal divorce had been perceived as matters of the highest political priority ever since the end of the 19th century. That was not so much because of the substance of pre-Revolutionary legislation, which was essentially no more conservative than in most West European countries. Family law issues stood relatively high on the political agenda because in the highly polarised pre-Revolutionary Russian society, all who strived for social change, from Marxists and anarchists to liberals and Leo tolstoy, did not only consider change in the public sphere to be of the utmost importance, but also change in the private sphere. Just like in Scandinavia, family law was one of the few issues where all opposition forces met in the middle. The ideas behind the reforms that the bolsheviks implemented were far from exclusively communist. It is better to say that at this time the communist ideas temporarily coincided with the whole opposition movement's liberal ideas about the family and the position of women. 6 The radical Soviet reforms of the first decades of the 20th century can be appreciated in different ways. Some scholars typify them as excesses of a revolutionary period that have limited relevance for the overall development of family law and its explanation. 63 Although certain renovations could be characterised as excessive, such as the paternity action, which allowed little opportunity to contest the action, 4 the core of the reforms form a unique example of the creation of a modern family law in a backward agrarian country. The changes came about in an undemocratic way, 65 the methods of their implementation were often inhumane, but their substance was exactly in line with the mainstream of the historical development of family law. In this respect, the Soviet Union just ran ahead of its time Countries with the most modern family legislation reached the same level of liberalisation of family law, consisting of the deinstitutionalisation of marriage and divorce, and the abolition of the whole notion of illegitimacy, only by the end of the 20th century. It is true that when the reforms were introduced, they did not correspond with the economic and social structure of the time. But the same is true for the bulk of Bolshevik policy, and these structures hanged very rapidly. Dramatic changes in the economy destroyed the trad itional family structure with unprecedented speed In next to no time, the family ceased to be the basic economic unit that it had previously been 66 Legislation that did not work well under the new -Communist ideology, as such, did manifest itself, but did not get its own way during this period. An example is the debate a bout the registration of marriage. Young communists headed by the prominent feminists Nesse Armand and Alexandra Kollontay, who were granted important positions in the Bolshevik government, strived for the a bolition of registration. They referred to Engels'sOrigins of the Family, Private Property and the State and argued that marriage had to die out soon and that its temporal preservation was just a"concession to the religious prejudice of the population. Lenin, who on this issue represented a more moderate group, was as usual more interested in the actual political impact than in the classical notions of Marxism. He argued that Engels writing should be understood in such a way that only the bourgeois family was doomed to die out in order make way for a new type, the proletarian family. See Lenin(1939) 63 Willekens typifies these reforms as radical reforms out of tune with socio-economic structures; Willekens (1997),p.78 64The family law of 1918 introduced the so-called registrative establishment of paternity. Women, married women included, could until three months before the birth declare before the registration officer that a certa in person was the fatherof their child. The putative father could contest this declaration before the court within wo weeks. Failure to do so(in time) was treated as recognition 6 The opinion of the population at large was never examined. My guess is that perhaps about 5% of the population(90%of whom consisted of the illiterate agrarian population) would have supported the reform. This would have been no different however. with the reforms of peter the greatmade political tension in Tsarist Russia in many respects greater than in most other European countries. Family law issues such as the equality of women, civil marriage and more liberal divorce had been perceived as matters of the highest political priority ever since the end of the 19th century. That was not so much because of the substance of pre-Revolutionary legislation, which was essentially no more conservative than in most West European countries. Family law issues stood relatively high on the political agenda because in the highly polarised pre-Revolutionary Russian society, all who strived for social change, from Marxists and anarchists to liberals and Leo Tolstoy, did not only consider change in the public sphere to be of the utmost importance, but also change in the private sphere. Just like in Scandinavia, family law was one of the few issues where all opposition forces met in the middle. The ideas behind the reforms that the Bolsheviks implemented were far from exclusively communist. It is better to say that at this time the communist ideas temporarily coincided with the whole opposition movement’s liberal ideas about the family and the position of women.62 The radical Soviet reforms of the first decades of the 20th century can be appreciated in different ways. Some scholars typify them as excesses of a revolutionary period that have limited relevance for the overall development of family law and its explanation.63 Although certain renovations could be characterised as excessive, such as the paternity action, which allowed little opportunity to contest the action,64 the core of the reforms form a unique example of the creation of a modern family law in a backward agrarian country. The changes came about in an undemocratic way,65 the methods of their implementation were often inhumane, but their substance was exactly in line with the mainstream of the historical development of family law. In this respect, the Soviet Union just ran ahead of its time. Countries with the most modern family legislation reached the same level of liberalisation of family law, consisting of the deinstitutionalisation of marriage and divorce, and the abolition of the whole notion of illegitimacy, only by the end of the 20th century. It is true that when the reforms were introduced, they did not correspond with the economic and social structure of the time. But the same is true for the bulk of Bolshevik policy, and these structures changed very rapidly. Dramatic changes in the economy destroyed the traditional family structure with unprecedented speed. In next to no time, the family ceased to be the basic economic unit that it had previously been.66 Legislation that did not work well under the new 62Communist ideology, as such, did manifest itself, but did not get its own way during this period. An example is the debate about the registration of marriage. Young communists headed by the prominent feminists I nesse Armand and Alexandra Kollontay, who were granted important positions in the Bolshevik government, strived for the abolition of registration. They referred to Engels’s ‘Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State’ and argued that marriage had to die out soon and that its temporal preservation was just a ‘concession to the religious prejudice of the population’. Lenin, who on this issue represented a more moderate group, was as usual more interested in the actual political impact than in the classical notions of Marxism. He argued that Engels’s writing should be understood in such a way that only the ‘bourgeois family’ was doomed to die out in order to make way for a new type, the ‘proletarian family’. See Lenin (1939). 63Willekens typifies these reforms as ‘radical reforms out of tune with socio-economic structures’; Willekens (1997), p. 78. 64The family law of 1918 introduced the so-called registrative establishment of paternity. Women, married women included, could until three months before the birth declare before the registration officer that a certain person was the father of their child. The putative father could contest this declaration before the court within two weeks. Failure to do so (in time) was treated as recognition. 65The opinion of the population at large was never examined. My guess is that perhaps about 5% of the population (90% of whom consisted of the illiterate agrarian population) would have supported the ref orm. This would have been no different, however, with the reforms of Peter the Great