circumstances was continuously amended. 67 The informality of pre-Christian family law is clearly d iscernible in the new russia gislation. with their rad ical rejection of the family law concepts based on the Christian trad ition, the bolsheviks reinstated concepts that had governed family law almost 2000 years before Stalins contra-reform: The Ukase of 8 July 1944 During Stalin's reign, all more or less liberal legislation was abolished. The New Economic Policy(nEP)made way for the command economy. A similar process took place in the field of family law. In 1936, abortion was declared a criminal offence. As contraception was lives of thousands of women The infamous Ukase of 8 July 194468 rad ically revoked several important previous innovations of family law. Informal marriage lost its legal status. The recognition of children born outside wedlock, the establishment of paternity by the courts and even a maintenance claim on behalf of a natural child were all rendered no longer possible. Even pre-Revolutionary legislation had been less harsh in this respect. Divorce proceedings became complicated and expensive: only in the second instance were the courts entitled to grant a divorce when they found that a marriage had irretrievably broken down. many scholars, both Russian and foreign, have tried to explain this dramatic contra- reform. 69 As in my view this explanation is essential for the proper appreciation of the reforms of the first two decades of Bolshevik rule, I will devote special attention to this problem Rheinstein, and in his tracks willekens, 70 see in the ukase a logical measure of a period of economic stabilisation that took back radical reforms out of tune with socio-economic structures. 71 Even to the extent that this correlation is so compelling, if the urban regions. The collectivisation at the beginning of the 1930s completely destroyed the agrarian famy 3 66The term ination of the New Economic Policy by the end of the 1920s abolished all small family businesses household. The family was no longer the only source of income for dependent family members. In 1922, only 25% of the total working force was female, in 1940 this number had risen to 39%, and in 1945(due to the War) it was 56%, see Kerblay (1996), p. 145. The family ceased to be an important econom ic unit. Single women who earned an income from employment and alimony from the fathers of their children were more or less able to raise their children alone. Although social security was in an inadequate state, women equally benefited from 67For instance, the Family Code of 1918 left the pre-Revolutionary separate property regime of marital property intact. This caused problems under the new liberal divorce law, because women without an income of their own had no claim to a share of family property. For this reason, the Code of 1926 introduced a marital property regime of lim ited community that gave these women proper protection 68 Vedomosti Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1944, N 37. 69In Russia, Stalin's fam ily legislation is widely perceived as just anotherexcess of totalitarianism. Even contemporaries experienced it as extremely unjust. Although no one at that time could say a word aga inst it, lawyers generally tried to soften its consequences. Not being allowed to grant maintenance a ga inst the natural father towards his illegitimate child on the basis of his paternity, they granted it instead on the basis of the factual upbringing of the child by the natural father. Factual upbringing was, at that time, a distinct ground for maintenance obligations. After Stalin's death, abortion was again legalised. The Fundamental Principles of 1968 not only restored the possibility of esta blishing the paternity of the natural father, but did so with retroactive effect. At the same time divorce law was libera lised 7oRheinstein(1972), pp. 231-243; Willekens (1997), p. 78 7Willekens(1997),p. 78circumstances was continuously amended.67 The informality of pre-Christian family law is clearly discernible in the new Russian legislation. With their radical rejection of the family law concepts based on the Christian tradition, the Bolsheviks reinstated concepts that had governed family law almost 2000 years before. Stalin’s contra-reform: The Ukase of 8 July 1944 During Stalin’s reign, all more or less liberal legislation was abolished. The New Economic Policy (NEP) made way for the command economy. A similar process took place in the field of family law. In 1936, abortion was declared a criminal offence. As contraception was virtually unknown in the Soviet Union, abortion was the only means of family planning. As a result of the sudden prohibition, many women relied on clandestine abortion, which cost the lives of thousands of women. The infamous Ukase of 8 July 194468 radically revoked several important previous innovations of family law. Informal marriage lost its legal status. The recognition of children born outside wedlock, the establishment of paternity by the courts and even a maintenance claim on behalf of a natural child were all rendered no longer possible. Even pre-Revolutionary legislation had been less harsh in this respect. Divorce proceedings became complicated and expensive: only in the second instance were the courts entitled to grant a divorce when they found that a marriage had irretrievably broken down. Many scholars, both Russian and foreign, have tried to explain this dramatic contra-reform.69 As in my view this explanation is essential for the proper appreciation of the reforms of the first two decades of Bolshevik rule, I will devote special attention to this problem. Rheinstein, and in his tracks Willekens,70 see in the Ukase a logical measure of a period of economic stabilisation that took back ‘radical reforms out of tune with socio-economic structures’.71 Even to the extent that this correlation is so compelling, if 66The termination of the New Economic Policy by the end of the 1920s abolished all small family businesses in the urban regions. The collectivisation at the beginning of the 1930s completely destroyed the agrarian family household. The family was no longer the only source of income for dependent family members. In 1922, only 25% of the total working force was female, in 1940 this number had risen to 39%, and in 1945 (due to the War) it was 56%; see Kerblay (1996), p. 145. The family ceased to be an important economic unit. Single wome n who earned an income from employment and alimony from the fathers of their children were more or less able to raise their children alone. Although social security was in an inadequate state, women equally benefited from it. 67For instance, the Family Code of 1918 left the pre-Revolutionary separate property regime of marital property intact. This caused problems under the new liberal divorce law, because women without an income of their own had no claim to a share of family property. For this reason, the Code of 1926 introduced a marital property regime of limited community that gave these women proper protection. 68Vedomosti Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1944, N 37. 69In Russia, Stalin’s family legislation is widely perceived as just another excess of totalitarianism. Even contemporaries experienced it as extremely unjust. Although no one at that time could say a word against it, lawyers generally tried to soften its consequences. Not being allowed to grant maintenance against the natural father towards his illegitimate child on the basis of his paternity, they granted it instead on the basis of the factual upbringing of the child by the natural father. Factual upbringing was, at that time, a distinct ground for maintenance obligations. After Stalin’s death, abortion was again legalised. The Fundamental Principles of 1968 not only restored the possibility of establishing the paternity of the natural father, but did so with retroactive effect. At the same time, divorce law was liberalised. 70Rheinstein (1972), pp. 231-243; Willekens (1997), p. 78. 71Willekens (1997), p. 78