14 Rise of developmental states in Northeast Asia Defining the threat perceptions of Taiwan and South Korea Between 1950 and 1980,Taiwan and South Korea's perceptions of intense threat were, first and foremost,rooted in the clear and most intimidating intentions of their enemies.'Most intimidating,because the national strategies of Mainland China and North Korea were'reunification by military forces'-that is,the end of Taiwan and South Korea as political entities.The intentions were 'clear,because they were repeatedly emphasised in the public statements of Chinese and North Korean leaders and demonstrated in the actions of their militaries. Verbal and written threats were common in the government-owned newspapers, official announcements and even the constitutions of China and North Korea.In addition,clear and most intimidating intentions were sustained through continuing military clashes.There were two so-called Taiwan Strait crises,the first in 1954 and the second in 1958,which were both marked by heavy bombardment by the People's Liberation Army (PLA)of the two KMT-held offshore islands.In fact,periodic bom bardment of one of the islands,Quemoy,continued throughout the 196os and 197os. In 1965,the two sides were also involved in three naval battles. South Korea faced a similar situation.Even though there has not been a major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953,the(North)Korean People's Army (KPA)initiated small clashes from time to time.From 1966-69,for example,there were close to 600 infiltrations by the KPA,and hundreds of soldiers from both sides were killed,captured or wounded.3 Taiwan's perception of the threatening intentions of Mainland China was also strongly influenced by the long and bloody history of armed conflict between the KMr and the Chinese Communist Party(cCp)dating back to 1927.With the possible exception of the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese War,armed conflict between the two sides was continuous.South Koreans,meanwhile,have lived with the memory of the Korean War in which millions of people died,and massive structural destruction was wrought.Moreover,ideological rivalries also hardened these conflicts-they were not simply military battles,but confrontations between socio-political orders. Capabilities are also important in constructing the perception of extremely inten- sive and long-term threats in Northeast Asia.Taiwan's perception is partly shaped by the asymmetric resource bases of the two governments.Mainland China has 50 times the population of Taiwan and 200 times the territory.China is a nuclear powerConflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 14 Rise of developmental states in Northeast Asia Defining the threat perceptions of Taiwan and South Korea Between 1950 and 1980, Taiwan and South Korea’s perceptions of intense threat were, first and foremost, rooted in the clear and most intimidating intentions of their enemies. ‘Most intimidating’, because the national strategies of Mainland China and North Korea were ‘reunification by military forces’—that is, the end of Taiwan and South Korea as political entities. The intentions were ‘clear’, because they were repeatedly emphasised in the public statements of Chinese and North Korean leaders and demonstrated in the actions of their militaries. Verbal and written threats were common in the government-owned newspapers, official announcements and even the constitutions of China and North Korea. In addition, clear and most intimidating intentions were sustained through continuing military clashes. There were two so-called Taiwan Strait crises, the first in 1954 and the second in 1958, which were both marked by heavy bombardment by the People’s Liberation Army () of the two -held offshore islands. In fact, periodic bom￾bardment of one of the islands, Quemoy, continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, the two sides were also involved in three naval battles. South Korea faced a similar situation. Even though there has not been a major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the (North) Korean People’s Army () initiated small clashes from time to time. From 1966–69, for example, there were close to 600 infiltrations by the , and hundreds of soldiers from both sides were killed, captured or wounded.31 Taiwan’s perception of the threatening intentions of Mainland China was also strongly influenced by the long and bloody history of armed conflict between the  and the Chinese Communist Party () dating back to 1927. With the possible exception of the 1937–45 Sino-Japanese War, armed conflict between the two sides was continuous. South Koreans, meanwhile, have lived with the memory of the Korean War in which millions of people died, and massive structural destruction was wrought. Moreover, ideological rivalries also hardened these conflicts—they were not simply military battles, but confrontations between socio-political orders. Capabilities are also important in constructing the perception of extremely inten￾sive and long-term threats in Northeast Asia. Taiwan’s perception is partly shaped by the asymmetric resource bases of the two governments. Mainland China has 50 times the population of Taiwan and 200 times the territory. China is a nuclear power