Analysis Developmental states and threat perceptions in North- east Asia Tianbiao Zhu The study of Northeast Asian develop- the developmental state came about if we ment has long been associated with that are to comprehend what part it played in of the developmental state.The current Northeast Asian development and how it literature on the developmental state has evolved since the early 1980s.It tends to focus on state economy and argues that a particular kind of threat state-business relations.In particular,it perception,namely that of an extremely concentrates on how the developmental intensive and long-term threat,played a state engineered economic success in key role in creating the developmental Northeast Asia,whether it played a states of Northeast Asia.Later,changed better role than the free market in threat perceptions provided the environ- promoting industrialisation,and what ment for the decline of such states. difficulties it encountered in the 198os and 1990s.Very few studies,however, Tianbiao Zhu is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Research take the developmental state as a histori- School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University.He received his MPhil from the cal phenomenon and assess its origins University of Cambridge and his PhD from Cornell and possible demise.This paper suggests University.His main interest is the political economy that it is crucial that we understand how of development in China,South Korea and Taiwan
Analysis Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia Tianbiao Zhu The study of Northeast Asian development has long been associated with that of the developmental state. The current literature on the developmental state tends to focus on state economy and state–business relations. In particular, it concentrates on how the developmental state engineered economic success in Northeast Asia, whether it played a better role than the free market in promoting industrialisation, and what difficulties it encountered in the 1980s and 1990s. Very few studies, however, take the developmental state as a historical phenomenon and assess its origins and possible demise. This paper suggests that it is crucial that we understand how the developmental state came about if we are to comprehend what part it played in Northeast Asian development and how it has evolved since the early 1980s. It argues that a particular kind of threat perception, namely that of an extremely intensive and long-term threat, played a key role in creating the developmental states of Northeast Asia. Later, changed threat perceptions provided the environment for the decline of such states. Tianbiao Zhu is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University. He received his MPhil from the University of Cambridge and his PhD from Cornell University. His main interest is the political economy of development in China, South Korea and Taiwan
Introduction Northeast Asian development has entered an interesting period.For many years, Japan,South Korea and Taiwan were held up to the rest of the developing world as a model for successful industrialisation.The economic problems that they con- fronted in the 199os,however,cast doubt on their developmental experience.At the heart of an analysis of Northeast Asian development is the notion of the develop- mental state.The current literature has focused on state economy and state- business relations in creating economic successes and problems in Northeast Asia, and very few studies have gone beyond those relations to investigate the origins and possible demise of the developmental state.This paper argues that we must understand how the developmental state came about if we are to comprehend what part it played in Northeast Asian development and how it has evolved since the early 198os. The inquiry begins with a simple question:what is the developmental state?In his 1982 book,Mrrt and the Japanese miracle,Chalmers Johnson coined the term the capitalist developmental state,and used it to describe the Japanese state in relation to bureaucratic autonomy,administrative guidance for industrial development and selective intervention in the economy.Other scholars later extended this idea to describe the Taiwanese and Korean states.In fact,the very name,'capitalist develop- mental state,tells us much about the basic characteristics of this type of state:it has to be 'capitalist,it has to be'developmental'and,with a few clarifications,it has to be 'cohesive'. By 'capitalist,I mean that the state has to commit itself to some basic values of capitalism,such as private property rights and market mechanisms.This study,like many others,discusses the developmental state in a capitalist world,so its'capital- istic'character will not be a focus but an assumed constant.By'developmental,I mean that the state has to have a consistent commitment to industrialisation.In order to establish this consistent commitment,the state should not be subordinate to any special business interests.This point is directly connected to the third charac- teristic of the developmental state,its'cohesiveness,meaning that the state has to be a unified force in dealing with business groups.Peter Evans argues that internal coherence,corporate identity and cohesive organisation are key elements of the developmental state.These elements contribute to state cohesiveness,which,in turn,guarantees that selective economic intervention by the developmental state will not be severely disrupted by special interests
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 6 Introduction Northeast Asian development has entered an interesting period.1 For many years, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were held up to the rest of the developing world as a model for successful industrialisation. The economic problems that they confronted in the 1990s, however, cast doubt on their developmental experience. At the heart of an analysis of Northeast Asian development is the notion of the developmental state. The current literature has focused on state economy and state– business relations in creating economic successes and problems in Northeast Asia, and very few studies have gone beyond those relations to investigate the origins and possible demise of the developmental state. This paper argues that we must understand how the developmental state came about if we are to comprehend what part it played in Northeast Asian development and how it has evolved since the early 1980s. The inquiry begins with a simple question: what is the developmental state? In his 1982 book, and the Japanese miracle, Chalmers Johnson coined the term the ‘capitalist developmental state’, and used it to describe the Japanese state in relation to bureaucratic autonomy, administrative guidance for industrial development and selective intervention in the economy.2 Other scholars later extended this idea to describe the Taiwanese and Korean states.3 In fact, the very name, ‘capitalist developmental state’, tells us much about the basic characteristics of this type of state: it has to be ‘capitalist’, it has to be ‘developmental’ and, with a few clarifications, it has to be ‘cohesive’. By ‘capitalist’, I mean that the state has to commit itself to some basic values of capitalism, such as private property rights and market mechanisms. This study, like many others, discusses the developmental state in a capitalist world, so its ‘capitalistic’ character will not be a focus but an assumed constant. By ‘developmental’, I mean that the state has to have a consistent commitment to industrialisation. In order to establish this consistent commitment, the state should not be subordinate to any special business interests. This point is directly connected to the third characteristic of the developmental state, its ‘cohesiveness’, meaning that the state has to be a unified force in dealing with business groups. Peter Evans argues that internal coherence, corporate identity and cohesive organisation are key elements of the developmental state.4 These elements contribute to state cohesiveness, which, in turn, guarantees that selective economic intervention by the developmental state will not be severely disrupted by special interests
My explanation of the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia is directly concerned with two of its basic characteristics:its cohesiveness and its consistent commitment to industrialisation.I argue that the Northeast Asian states had a particular kind of perception regarding external military threats-viewing them as extremely intensive and long term-and that this was a primary factor in creating cohesive states and ensuring their consistent commitment to industrialisa- tion.In other words,this particular kind of threat perception gave rise to the dev- elopmental state in Northeast Asia.I also contend that changed threat perceptions in the 198os and 199os provided the environment for the decline of the developmental state.The first part of this study discusses the analytical link between threat,threat perception and the developmental state,and alternative arguments concerning the rise of the developmental state.The second and third parts of the study provide evidence of the relationship between the particular kind of threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. With few modifications,this argument could apply to the Japanese case(especially Meiji Japan).However,limited space means that this study concentrates on South Korea and Taiwan.It should also be noted that the aim of this paper is to explain the rise and decline of the developmental state rather than economic growth or indus- trialisation.A country's economic performance is determined by multiple factors,of which its form of state in relation to economic management is but one. Towards a threat perception-centred argument State and state interest This investigation into the relationship between threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia begins with the concept of the state.In particular,the study addresses how it has been treated in the famous state- versus-market debate,which has dominated the academic field of Northeast Asian political economy since the early 198os.By introducing different images of the state from this debate,the state and state interest are problematised on an analytical level. The paper then shows how an external military threat may solve the analytical prob- lem of the state and state interest,and thereby provides a framework for examining the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. The state-versus-market debate is essentially about the role of the state in Northeast Asian development.Those who focus on the positive role of the state-for simpli-
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 7Analysis My explanation of the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia is directly concerned with two of its basic characteristics: its cohesiveness and its consistent commitment to industrialisation. I argue that the Northeast Asian states had a particular kind of perception regarding external military threats—viewing them as extremely intensive and long term—and that this was a primary factor in creating cohesive states and ensuring their consistent commitment to industrialisation. In other words, this particular kind of threat perception gave rise to the developmental state in Northeast Asia. I also contend that changed threat perceptions in the 1980s and 1990s provided the environment for the decline of the developmental state. The first part of this study discusses the analytical link between threat, threat perception and the developmental state, and alternative arguments concerning the rise of the developmental state. The second and third parts of the study provide evidence of the relationship between the particular kind of threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. With few modi fications, this argument could apply to the Japanese case (especially Meiji Japan ). However, limited space means that this study concentrates on South Korea and Taiwan. It should also be noted that the aim of this paper is to explain the rise and decline of the developmental state rather than economic growth or industrialisation. A country’s economic performance is determined by multiple factors, of which its form of state in relation to economic management is but one. Towards a threat perception-centred argument State and state interest This investigation into the relationship between threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia begins with the concept of the state. In particular, the study addresses how it has been treated in the famous stateversus-market debate, which has dominated the academic field of Northeast Asian political economy since the early 1980s. By introducing di fferent images of the state from this debate, the state and state interest are problematised on an analytical level. The paper then shows how an external military threat may solve the analytical problem of the state and state interest, and thereby provides a framework for examining the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. The state-versus-market debate is essentially about the role of the state in Northeast Asian development. Those who focus on the positive role of the state—for simpli-
city,let us call them 'the statists'-argue that selective state intervention allowed investment to be directed to key industries,which would not have occurred under normal market operations.The state,therefore,was responsible for the economic success of Japan,South Korea and Taiwan in the post-Second World War period.3 By contrast,neoclassical economists attribute Northeast Asian success to the free market.They acknowledge a positive role for public policies(and hence for govern- ment),but believe that the proper role of government is to facilitate market opera- tion rather than to alter it.?In explaining the 1997 financial crisis and subsequent economic decline in Northeast Asia,some neoclassical economists have been quick to link the region's problems with past state intervention.They argue that an excess- ively close relationship between state and business promoted special interests and thereby distorted the free market. I believe that the essential difference between these two perspectives lies in their different levels of analysis.The statists,like many other political scientists,take the state and its development interests as given,and perform their examination at the state-society level or above.Consequently,it is normal for them to treat the develop- mental state in Northeast Asia as a unitary actor dealing with social forces,which is thus able to manage state-business relations in the pursuit of economic develop- ment.Meanwhile,the neoclassical economists question the statist concept of the state and the state's interest.If the state is comprised of rational individuals,how can those individuals stick together,let alone pursue a common goal of industrialisation? Politicians and bureaucrats are self-interested human beings who seek to maximise their own economic wealth and political power.Rent-seeking theorists,in particular, argue that heavy state intervention necessarily leads to rent-seeking activity.0 Some statists,though,do acknowledge and even use the rent-seeking image of the state in their analyses.For example,Evans classified developing countries into three categories.At one extreme are developmental states,such as Japan,South Korea and Taiwan;at the other extreme are rent-seeking states like the former Zaire.In between,there are'intermediate'states like Brazil and India.However,these three types of state are the starting point of Evans'assessment of different levels of economic performance.The aim of his study is not to explain what gives rise to different types of state and how they may change.The developmental state as a unitary actor and its development interests continue to be assumed. It is not my intention to address the state-versus-market debate in detail,but the analytical differences concerning the state do raise a crucial question regarding the
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 8 city, let us call them ‘the statists’—argue that selective state intervention allowed investment to be directed to key industries, which would not have occurred under normal market operations. The state, therefore, was responsible for the economic success of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the post-Second World War period.5 By contrast, neoclassical economists attribute Northeast Asian success to the free market.6 They acknowledge a positive role for public policies (and hence for government), but believe that the proper role of government is to facilitate market operation rather than to alter it.7 In explaining the 1997 financial crisis and subsequent economic decline in Northeast Asia, some neoclassical economists have been quick to link the region’s problems with past state intervention. They argue that an excessively close relationship between state and business promoted special interests and thereby distorted the free market.8 I believe that the essential difference between these two perspectives lies in their different levels of analysis. The statists, like many other political scientists, take the state and its development interests as given, and perform their examination at the state–society level or above. Consequently, it is normal for them to treat the developmental state in Northeast Asia as a unitary actor dealing with social forces, which is thus able to manage state–business relations in the pursuit of economic development.9 Meanwhile, the neoclassical economists question the statist concept of the state and the state’s interest. If the state is comprised of rational individuals, how can those individuals stick together, let alone pursue a common goal of industrialisation? Politicians and bureaucrats are self-interested human beings who seek to maximise their own economic wealth and political power. Rent-seeking theorists, in particular, argue that heavy state intervention necessarily leads to rent-seeking activity.10 Some statists, though, do acknowledge and even use the rent-seeking image of the state in their analyses. For example, Evans classified developing countries into three categories.11 At one extreme are developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; at the other extreme are rent-seeking states like the former Zaire. In between, there are ‘intermediate’ states like Brazil and India. However, these three types of state are the starting point of Evans’ assessment of different levels of economic performance. The aim of his study is not to explain what gives rise to different types of state and how they may change. The developmental state as a unitary actor and its development interests continue to be assumed. It is not my intention to address the state-versus-market debate in detail, but the analytical differences concerning the state do raise a crucial question regarding the
rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.Under what conditions can the neoclassical image of the state transform into the statist image of the state, and vice versa?To what extent can self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats act as one,and what conditions can produce such group solidarity and push these politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the consistent pursuit of industrialisation? Or,to put it simply,what creates a developmental state? External military threats can serve as a bridge between the neoclassical and statist images of the state.Concerning the genesis of co-operative institutions,sociologist Michael Hechter argues that crises,such as wars and natural disasters,lead to co- operation among self-interested individuals;the more serious the predicament, the greater the desire for co-operation.Ibelieve that a security crisis in which an external military threat jeopardises national survival is the most serious predicament, since the personal wealth,political power and even lives of the politicians and bureau crats of the threatened country are in great danger.Such an external threat should provide the strongest incentive for self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats of the threatened country to put group(security)interests ahead of all others and to co-operate and behave as a unitary actor.In this way,state cohesiveness is forged. Hechter also contends that this co-operative institution is likely to produce addi- tional goods because it has the advantage of being organised.So it is possible for the cohesive state to produce'not only national security,but also industrialisation, especially in the long run,as economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power.Consequently,an external military threat may strengthen the state and prompt it to commit to industrialisation.This general point is supported by Erich Weede's statistical analysis of 31 developing countries during the 197os,which found that an external threat could restrict rent seeking in the threatened country.4 By problematising the state,a framework is provided that hypothesises the relation- ship between military threat and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.It suggests that external military threats gave rise to the develop- mental state by forging state cohesiveness,generating a commitment to industrialisa- tion and by limiting rent-seeking activities.But later,as such threats declined,group solidarity weakened and the commitment to industrialisation became inconsistent. This opened the door to rent seeking,which ultimately led to the decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Having analysed the concept of the developmental state,the next step is to take a closer look at the external military threat on which this framework hinges.Obviously
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 9Analysis rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Under what conditions can the neoclassical image of the state transform into the statist image of the state, and vice versa? To what extent can self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats act as one, and what conditions can produce such group solidarity and push these politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the consistent pursuit of industrialisation? Or, to put it simply, what creates a developmental state? External military threats can serve as a bridge between the neoclassical and statist images of the state. Concerning the genesis of co-operative institutions, sociologist Michael Hechter argues that crises, such as wars and natural disasters, lead to cooperation among self-interested individuals; the more serious the predicament, the greater the desire for co-operation.12 I believe that a security crisis in which an external military threat jeopardises national survival is the most serious predicament, since the personal wealth, political power and even lives of the politicians and bureaucrats of the threatened country are in great danger. Such an external threat should provide the strongest incentive for self-interested rational politicians and bureaucrats of the threatened country to put group (security ) interests ahead of all others and to co-operate and behave as a unitary actor. In this way, state cohesiveness is forged. Hechter also contends that this co-operative institution is likely to produce additional goods because it has the advantage of being organised.13 So it is possible for the cohesive state to ‘produce’ not only national security, but also industrialisation, especially in the long run, as economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power. Consequently, an external military threat may strengthen the state and prompt it to commit to industrialisation. This general point is supported by Erich Weede’s statistical analysis of 31 developing countries during the 1970s, which found that an external threat could restrict rent seeking in the threatened country.14 By problematising the state, a framework is provided that hypothesises the relationship between military threat and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. It suggests that external military threats gave rise to the developmental state by forging state cohesiveness, generating a commitment to industrialisation and by limiting rent-seeking activities. But later, as such threats declined, group solidarity weakened and the commitment to industrialisation became inconsistent. This opened the door to rent seeking, which ultimately led to the decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. Having analysed the concept of the developmental state, the next step is to take a closer look at the external military threat on which this framework hinges. Obviously
not every threat jeopardises national survival,and not every threat to national survival can make the state commit consistently to industrialisation Threat and threat perception There is an existing literature on the relationship between military tension and economic development in general,and in Northeast Asia in particular.One body of work has focused on the connection between war,state making and the rise of capi- talism in Europe.5 These comparative historical studies argue that the rise of organic states and capitalism in Europe was due to centuries of military competition among European countries.Persistent military competition and interstate rivalry in Europe, so the argument goes,created centralised states and the strong economic founda- tions essential for military success. There are also studies of the relationship between military threat and industrialisa- tion in Northeast Asia.Several analyses point out that political survival under external threat is the main concern of the developmental states in Northeast Asia, and that industrialisation is a means rather than a goal Perhaps the only study that gives a detailed account of the security-growth link in Northeast Asia is Jung-en Woo's 1991 book,Race to the Swift.7 Woo argues that security concerns were the main force pushing the South Korean state to mobilise financial resources for rapid industrialisation.She divides the Cold War into different periods and examines,in particular,how security concerns were related to economic strategy in the 197os. Her 1998 article compares Taiwan to South Korea,arguing that national security was directly tied to the state-led nature of development in both cases.s A general question in the threat-development literature is why do some threats and wars strengthen the state and promote economic development while others do not? Gregory Kasza argues that the common weakness of studies in this field is that they attribute equal significance to all military threats and wars.In fact,different military threats and wars affect state formation and commitment to development in different ways.It is difficult for a country to consider long-term objectives like industrialisa- tion while actively engaged in war.Equally,industrialisation is not an automatic response for all countries under threat.Precisely how a country responds to a mili- tary threat depends on how it perceives the danger.The literature reviewed above tends to ignore this crucial issue.20 By introducing threat perception into the relationship between threats and developmental states and their economic policies, this study departs from previous analyses
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 10 not every threat jeopardises national survival, and not every threat to national survival can make the state commit consistently to industrialisation. Threat and threat perception There is an existing literature on the relationship between military tension and economic development in general, and in Northeast Asia in particular. One body of work has focused on the connection between war, state making and the rise of capitalism in Europe.15 These comparative historical studies argue that the rise of organic states and capitalism in Europe was due to centuries of military competition among European countries. Persistent military competition and interstate rivalry in Europe, so the argument goes, created centralised states and the strong economic foundations essential for military success. There are also studies of the relationship between military threat and industrialisation in Northeast Asia. Several analyses point out that political survival under external threat is the main concern of the developmental states in Northeast Asia, and that industrialisation is a means rather than a goal.16 Perhaps the only study that gives a detailed account of the security–growth link in Northeast Asia is Jung-en Woo’s 1991 book, Race to the Swift.17 Woo argues that security concerns were the main force pushing the South Korean state to mobilise financial resources for rapid industrialisation. She divides the Cold War into different periods and examines, in particular, how security concerns were related to economic strategy in the 1970s. Her 1998 article compares Taiwan to South Korea, arguing that national security was directly tied to the state-led nature of development in both cases.18 A general question in the threat–development literature is why do some threats and wars strengthen the state and promote economic development while others do not? Gregory Kasza argues that the common weakness of studies in this field is that they attribute equal significance to all military threats and wars.19 In fact, different military threats and wars affect state formation and commitment to development in different ways. It is difficult for a country to consider long-term objectives like industrialisation while actively engaged in war. Equally, industrialisation is not an automatic response for all countries under threat. Precisely how a country responds to a military threat depends on how it perceives the danger. The literature reviewed above tends to ignore this crucial issue.20 By introducing threat perception into the relationship between threats and developmental states and their economic policies, this study departs from previous analyses
The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception. 11 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the international- relations field,2threat perception,as used in this study,is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state.Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capa- bility of the threatening state and friendly state.Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending,the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state.But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain.For example,leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent.Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat mis- perception.In some cases,though,intentions are relatively easy to determine,based on past and recent experience of the relevant state."For instance,threatened countries,especially weak nations,find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they 'have been subject to repeated attack and mili- tary pressure4 Outside support may provide real security,but it also induces real anxiety:the more one relies on external assistance,the greater the cost if that support is with- drawn.This again involves uncertainty about an ally's intentions.Enemy intentions also require more discussion.Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state,estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat,but also the intensity of the threat.Repeated aggressive action,threatening statements, past experience of conflict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat.Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived,the response options are varied.International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses,suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction.In fact,very few external threats inspire such a commitment(this probably explains why the inter- national-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue).This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term.Only an extremely intense threat will suffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state,and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response.Industrial- isation,the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 11Analysis The international-relations literature is rich in its discussion of threat perception.21 Based on the common understanding of threat perception in the internationalrelations field,22 threat perception, as used in this study, is rooted in expected threat and expected external support to the threatened state. Both expected threat and expected external support are often estimated by gauging the intention and capability of the threatening state and friendly state. Capability can be estimated by comparing the relative size of defence spending, the armed forces and the economy in the threatening state with those in the threatened state and friendly state. But any calculation of intentions is more uncertain. For example, leaders can make public statements that are ambiguous or contrary to their real intent. Misreading the intentions of the threatening state and/or friendly state often leads to threat misperception. In some cases, though, intentions are relatively easy to determine, based on past and recent experience of the relevant state.23 For instance, threatened countries, especially weak nations, find it relatively easy to estimate the intentions of the threatening countries if they ‘have been subject to repeated attack and military pressure’.24 Outside support may provide real security, but it also induces real anxiety: the more one relies on external assistance, the greater the cost if that support is withdrawn. This again involves uncertainty about an ally’s intentions. Enemy intentions also require more discussion. Given the strong capability of a potentially threatening state, estimates of intentions must include not only the existence of the threat, but also the intensity of the threat. Repeated aggressive action, threatening statements, past experience of con flict and uncertainty about outside support can produce a perception of a highly intensive threat. Obviously changes in the intentions and capability of the enemy and ally can alter this threat perception. Once a threat is perceived, the response options are varied. International-relations literature focuses on short-term and political/military responses, suggesting that a commitment to industrialisation is not an inevitable reaction. In fact, very few external threats inspire such a commitment (this probably explains why the international-relations literature has almost no discussion of the issue). This study argues that commitment to industrialisation can follow only when the perceived threat is intensive and long term. Only an extremely intense threat will su ffice to unite politicians and bureaucrats and to create a cohesive state, and only a long-term threat can motivate the cohesive state to engage in a long-term response. Industrialisation, the foundation of national strength in general and military power in partic-
12 ular,is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat.It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to pro- duce a long-term response.Klaus Knorr notes that'[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant(especially the recent)past5 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of North- east Asia.It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling elites in South Korea and Taiwan,and, therefore,shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states.This geopolitics- focused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example,according to the latter,expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia.While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia,this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region.For instance,the strategic approach made by the us to China in the early 197os generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia,but it actually heightened Taiwan's perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War,which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War.Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region's geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan,and later its invasion of China.In particular,he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local elites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration,and that many of these elites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945.In this way,the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan.In fact,Cummings'argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However,this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings.First,unlike Korea,Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese.The Kuomintang (KMT)government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 12 ular, is a primary option when a cohesive state seeks to combat a long-term threat. It remains to be seen whether such a threat can be perceived sufficiently early to produce a long-term response. Klaus Knorr notes that ‘[a]ll we can do is to speculate on the shape of future events by studying the relevant (especially the recent) past’.25 Geopolitics and geopolitical structures The argument put forward in this study is closely linked to the geopolitics of Northeast Asia. It suggests that the actions and policies of the major geopolitical actors affected the threat perceptions of the ruling élites in South Korea and Taiwan, and, therefore, shaped the rise and decline of these developmental states. This geopoliticsfocused argument should be distinguished from geopolitical structural arguments. For example, according to the latter, expected threats and expected outside support for South Korea and Taiwan were a function of the Cold War confrontation in Northeast Asia. While there was a clear division and rivalry between the communist and capitalist camps in Northeast Asia, this geopolitical structure is not flexible enough to capture the complexity of geopolitics in the region. For instance, the strategic approach made by the to China in the early 1970s generally reduced Cold War tension in Northeast Asia, but it actually heightened Taiwan’s perception of the threat from the mainland. A more persuasive argument concerns the geopolitical structure that existed before the Cold War, which had an impact on the formation of the developmental state in South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War. Bruce Cumings contends that Japan dominated the region’s geopolitical structure from the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War with its colonisation of Korea and Taiwan, and later its invasion of China.26 In particular, he argues that the Japanese colonisers trained local élites in Korea and Taiwan to assist their colonial administration, and that many of these élites were incorporated into the post-colonial governments after 1945. In this way, the Japanese model of the developmental state was transmitted to South Korea and Taiwan. In fact, Cummings’ argument is dominant among the very limited number of studies that focus on the origins of the developmental state in Northeast Asia.27 However, this argument suffers from a few serious shortcomings. First, unlike Korea, Taiwan was ruled by a large number of politicians and bureaucrats who came from Mainland China and had not been trained by the Japanese. The Kuomintang () government basically moved to Taiwan from the mainland as a unit in 1949
Furthermore,the KMr government of the mainland era is often regarded as an ex- 13 tremely corrupt administration.In fact,one of the inventors of the rent-seeking theory,Gordon Tullock,was in China at that time,and witnessed the corruption and rent-seeking activities of the KMT regime.He later wrote: undoubtedly this experience had a lot to do with my eventual discovery of rent seeking. Second,even in relation to Korea,some scholars argue that there was significant historical discontinuity in the 195os,when the corrupt government of Syngman Rhee bore no resemblance to the earlier Japanese colonial state or to the future developmental state of Park Chung-Hee.29 Finally,if Japanese colonialism produced the developmental state in Korea(and even Taiwan),where did the Japanese dev- elopmental state come from?0 Of course,historical continuity cannot solely explain the transformation of corrupt governments into developmental states.This study highlights an alternative source of interest formation:perceived external military threat that is intense and long term However,this does not mean that historical legacies played no part in the process. While the perception of intensive and long-term threats created cohesive states and inspired development in South Korea and Taiwan(see below),historical legacies determined the particular way in which the developmental state engaged in econ- omic management.For example,the kMT government continued (after leaving the mainland)to promote public enterprises and to use them as major instruments in carrying out its industrial policy.In South Korea,however,Park's government,like the Japanese colonial administration,promoted big business conglomerates and guided them in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation.But those specific character- istics are clearly secondary to the shared characteristics between the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan.A corrupt government can still promote public enterprises or business conglomerates,but it can hardly have a consistent commit- ment to industrialisation. This study will discuss the shared characteristics only,as they are essential to under- standing the rise and decline of the developmental state.On this note,the paper will now present specific evidence on the threat perceptions of South Korea and Taiwan and their relation to those shared characteristics,and,therefore,to the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia
Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 13Analysis Furthermore, the government of the mainland era is often regarded as an extremely corrupt administration. In fact, one of the inventors of the rent-seeking theory, Gordon Tullock, was in China at that time, and witnessed the corruption and rent-seeking activities of the regime. He later wrote: undoubtedly this experience had a lot to do with my eventual discovery of rent seeking.28 Second, even in relation to Korea, some scholars argue that there was signi ficant historical discontinuity in the 1950s, when the corrupt government of Syngman Rhee bore no resemblance to the earlier Japanese colonial state or to the future developmental state of Park Chung-Hee.29 Finally, if Japanese colonialism produced the developmental state in Korea (and even Taiwan ), where did the Japanese developmental state come from?30 Of course, historical continuity cannot solely explain the transformation of corrupt governments into developmental states. This study highlights an alternative source of interest formation: perceived external military threat that is intense and long term. However, this does not mean that historical legacies played no part in the process. While the perception of intensive and long-term threats created cohesive states and inspired development in South Korea and Taiwan (see below ), historical legacies determined the particular way in which the developmental state engaged in economic management. For example, the government continued (after leaving the mainland) to promote public enterprises and to use them as major instruments in carrying out its industrial policy. In South Korea, however, Park’s government, like the Japanese colonial administration, promoted big business conglomerates and guided them in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation. But those speci fic characteristics are clearly secondary to the shared characteristics between the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan. A corrupt government can still promote public enterprises or business conglomerates, but it can hardly have a consistent commitment to industrialisation. This study will discuss the shared characteristics only, as they are essential to understanding the rise and decline of the developmental state. On this note, the paper will now present speci fic evidence on the threat perceptions of South Korea and Taiwan and their relation to those shared characteristics, and, therefore, to the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia
14 Rise of developmental states in Northeast Asia Defining the threat perceptions of Taiwan and South Korea Between 1950 and 1980,Taiwan and South Korea's perceptions of intense threat were, first and foremost,rooted in the clear and most intimidating intentions of their enemies.'Most intimidating,because the national strategies of Mainland China and North Korea were'reunification by military forces'-that is,the end of Taiwan and South Korea as political entities.The intentions were 'clear,because they were repeatedly emphasised in the public statements of Chinese and North Korean leaders and demonstrated in the actions of their militaries. Verbal and written threats were common in the government-owned newspapers, official announcements and even the constitutions of China and North Korea.In addition,clear and most intimidating intentions were sustained through continuing military clashes.There were two so-called Taiwan Strait crises,the first in 1954 and the second in 1958,which were both marked by heavy bombardment by the People's Liberation Army (PLA)of the two KMT-held offshore islands.In fact,periodic bom bardment of one of the islands,Quemoy,continued throughout the 196os and 197os. In 1965,the two sides were also involved in three naval battles. South Korea faced a similar situation.Even though there has not been a major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953,the(North)Korean People's Army (KPA)initiated small clashes from time to time.From 1966-69,for example,there were close to 600 infiltrations by the KPA,and hundreds of soldiers from both sides were killed,captured or wounded.3 Taiwan's perception of the threatening intentions of Mainland China was also strongly influenced by the long and bloody history of armed conflict between the KMr and the Chinese Communist Party(cCp)dating back to 1927.With the possible exception of the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese War,armed conflict between the two sides was continuous.South Koreans,meanwhile,have lived with the memory of the Korean War in which millions of people died,and massive structural destruction was wrought.Moreover,ideological rivalries also hardened these conflicts-they were not simply military battles,but confrontations between socio-political orders. Capabilities are also important in constructing the perception of extremely inten- sive and long-term threats in Northeast Asia.Taiwan's perception is partly shaped by the asymmetric resource bases of the two governments.Mainland China has 50 times the population of Taiwan and 200 times the territory.China is a nuclear power
Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 14 Rise of developmental states in Northeast Asia Defining the threat perceptions of Taiwan and South Korea Between 1950 and 1980, Taiwan and South Korea’s perceptions of intense threat were, first and foremost, rooted in the clear and most intimidating intentions of their enemies. ‘Most intimidating’, because the national strategies of Mainland China and North Korea were ‘reunification by military forces’—that is, the end of Taiwan and South Korea as political entities. The intentions were ‘clear’, because they were repeatedly emphasised in the public statements of Chinese and North Korean leaders and demonstrated in the actions of their militaries. Verbal and written threats were common in the government-owned newspapers, official announcements and even the constitutions of China and North Korea. In addition, clear and most intimidating intentions were sustained through continuing military clashes. There were two so-called Taiwan Strait crises, the first in 1954 and the second in 1958, which were both marked by heavy bombardment by the People’s Liberation Army () of the two -held offshore islands. In fact, periodic bombardment of one of the islands, Quemoy, continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, the two sides were also involved in three naval battles. South Korea faced a similar situation. Even though there has not been a major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the (North) Korean People’s Army () initiated small clashes from time to time. From 1966–69, for example, there were close to 600 infiltrations by the , and hundreds of soldiers from both sides were killed, captured or wounded.31 Taiwan’s perception of the threatening intentions of Mainland China was also strongly influenced by the long and bloody history of armed conflict between the and the Chinese Communist Party () dating back to 1927. With the possible exception of the 1937–45 Sino-Japanese War, armed conflict between the two sides was continuous. South Koreans, meanwhile, have lived with the memory of the Korean War in which millions of people died, and massive structural destruction was wrought. Moreover, ideological rivalries also hardened these conflicts—they were not simply military battles, but confrontations between socio-political orders. Capabilities are also important in constructing the perception of extremely intensive and long-term threats in Northeast Asia. Taiwan’s perception is partly shaped by the asymmetric resource bases of the two governments. Mainland China has 50 times the population of Taiwan and 200 times the territory. China is a nuclear power
