European Political Science Review (2010),2:1,1-25 European Consortium for Political Research doi10.1017/5175577390999021X Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism' VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT* Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration,Director,Center for International Relations,Department of International Relations,Boston,MA,USA All three of the traditionally recognized new institutionalisms-rational choice,historical, and sociological-have increasingly sought to 'endogenize'change,which has often meant a turn to ideas and discourse.This article shows that the approaches of scholars coming out of each of these three institutionalist traditions who take ideas and discourse seriously can best be classified as part of a fourth'new institutionalism'-discursive institutionalism(DI) -which is concerned with both the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context.It argues that this newest of the 'new institutionalisms' has the greatest potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences,strategies,and normative orientations of actors.The article identifies the wide range of approaches that fit this analytic framework,illustrating the ways in which scholars of DI have gone beyond the limits of the traditional institutiona- lisms on questions of interests and uncertainty,critical junctures and incremental change, norms and culture.It defines institutions dynamically-in contrast to the older neo- institutionalisms'more static external rule-following structures of incentives,path- dependencies,and cultural framing-as structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents whose 'background ideational abilities'enable them to create(and maintain) institutions while their 'foreground discursive abilities'enable them to communicate critically about them,to change (or maintain)them.But the article also points to areas for improvement in DI,including the theoretical analysis of processes of ideational change,the use of the older neo-institutionalisms for background information,and the incorporation of the power of interests and position into accounts of the power of ideas and discourse. Keywords:ideas;discourse;discursive institutionalism;historical institutionalism;rational choice institutionalism;sociological institutionalism Introduction The three traditionally recognized 'new institutionalisms'of political science rational choice institutionalism(RI),historical institutionalism (HI),and socio- logical institutionalism(SI)-have one thing in common:they have been much E-mail:vschmidt@bu.edu
European Political Science Review (2010), 2:1, 1–25 & European Consortium for Political Research doi:10.1017/S175577390999021X Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism’ VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT * Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, Director, Center for International Relations, Department of International Relations, Boston, MA, USA All three of the traditionally recognized new institutionalisms – rational choice, historical, and sociological – have increasingly sought to ‘endogenize’ change, which has often meant a turn to ideas and discourse. This article shows that the approaches of scholars coming out of each of these three institutionalist traditions who take ideas and discourse seriously can best be classified as part of a fourth ‘new institutionalism’ – discursive institutionalism (DI) – which is concerned with both the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context. It argues that this newest of the ‘new institutionalisms’ has the greatest potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors. The article identifies the wide range of approaches that fit this analytic framework, illustrating the ways in which scholars of DI have gone beyond the limits of the traditional institutionalisms on questions of interests and uncertainty, critical junctures and incremental change, norms and culture. It defines institutions dynamically – in contrast to the older neoinstitutionalisms’ more static external rule-following structures of incentives, pathdependencies, and cultural framing – as structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ enable them to create (and maintain) institutions while their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ enable them to communicate critically about them, to change (or maintain) them. But the article also points to areas for improvement in DI, including the theoretical analysis of processes of ideational change, the use of the older neo-institutionalisms for background information, and the incorporation of the power of interests and position into accounts of the power of ideas and discourse. Keywords: ideas; discourse; discursive institutionalism; historical institutionalism; rational choice institutionalism; sociological institutionalism Introduction The three traditionally recognized ‘new institutionalisms’ of political science – rational choice institutionalism (RI), historical institutionalism (HI), and sociological institutionalism (SI) – have one thing in common: they have been much * E-mail: vschmidt@bu.edu 1
2 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT better at explaining continuity than change.In all three frameworks for analysis, institutions serve primarily as constraints.RI focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a 'logic of calculation'within political insti- tutions,defined as structures of incentives;HI details the development of political institutions,described as regularized patterns and routinized practices subject to a 'logic of path-dependence';and SI concentrates on social agents who act according to a 'logic of appropriateness'within political institutions,defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms.Because of their definitions of institutions,which they present largely as given,static,and con- straining,neo-institutionalist scholars in all three neo-institutionalisms have mainly explained change as coming from the outside,as the result of exogenous shocks.It is only relatively recently that they have sought to endogenize institu- tional change,by looking to explain the origins of or shifts in interest-based preferences,historical paths,or cultural frames.Although some such scholars have sought to do this while remaining within their older neo-institutionalism, others have turned to ideas and discourse.Just how many have done so in each of the three neo-institutionalisms varies considerably,however,with relatively few scholars working in the RI tradition,more in the HI tradition,and the most in the SI tradition.But importantly,all those who have come to take ideas and discourse seriously have broken with some of the fundamental presuppositions of their own institutionalist tradition at the same time that they have come to share enough in common to be identifiable as part of a fourth new institutionalism.And what they share includes not only an analytic framework but also a commitment to go beyond politics as usual'to explain the politics of change,whether this means the role of ideas in constituting political action,the power of persuasion in political debate, the centrality of deliberation for democratic legitimation,the(re)construction of political interests and values,or the dynamics of change in history and culture. I name this fourth new analytic framework 'discursive institutionalism'(DI)to call attention to the commonalities among the wide range of scholars who use ideas and discourse to explain political change (and continuity)in institutional context (see also Schmidt,2002:Ch.5,2006:Ch.5,2008).And I label all scholars who take ideas and discourse seriously as 'discursive institutionalists', whether they themselves use this term,prefer instead to classify themselves within one of the older institutionalist traditions,or have themselves come up with a different,more specific term to identify their particular take on ideas and/or discourse.Among these latter scholars,some focus primarily on the ideas side of the framework,calling their approach the 'ideational turn'(Blyth,2002),dis- cursive institutionalism (see Campbell and Pedersen,2001),ideational institu- tionalism (Hay,2001),and constructivist institutionalism(Hay,2006).Others emphasize the discourse side,whether calling it discourse analysis(Hajer,2003), the argumentative turn(Fischer,2003),or deliberative democracy(Dryzek,2000). Still others span the ideas/discourse divide,much like DI,whether through approaches focusing on the 'referentiel'(frame of reference)(Jobert,1989;Muller
better at explaining continuity than change. In all three frameworks for analysis, institutions serve primarily as constraints. RI focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a ‘logic of calculation’ within political institutions, defined as structures of incentives; HI details the development of political institutions, described as regularized patterns and routinized practices subject to a ‘logic of path-dependence’; and SI concentrates on social agents who act according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ within political institutions, defined as socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms. Because of their definitions of institutions, which they present largely as given, static, and constraining, neo-institutionalist scholars in all three neo-institutionalisms have mainly explained change as coming from the outside, as the result of exogenous shocks. It is only relatively recently that they have sought to endogenize institutional change, by looking to explain the origins of or shifts in interest-based preferences, historical paths, or cultural frames. Although some such scholars have sought to do this while remaining within their older neo-institutionalism, others have turned to ideas and discourse. Just how many have done so in each of the three neo-institutionalisms varies considerably, however, with relatively few scholars working in the RI tradition, more in the HI tradition, and the most in the SI tradition. But importantly, all those who have come to take ideas and discourse seriously have broken with some of the fundamental presuppositions of their own institutionalist tradition at the same time that they have come to share enough in common to be identifiable as part of a fourth new institutionalism. And what they share includes not only an analytic framework but also a commitment to go beyond ‘politics as usual’ to explain the politics of change, whether this means the role of ideas in constituting political action, the power of persuasion in political debate, the centrality of deliberation for democratic legitimation, the (re) construction of political interests and values, or the dynamics of change in history and culture. I name this fourth new analytic framework ‘discursive institutionalism’ (DI) to call attention to the commonalities among the wide range of scholars who use ideas and discourse to explain political change (and continuity) in institutional context (see also Schmidt, 2002: Ch. 5, 2006: Ch. 5, 2008). And I label all scholars who take ideas and discourse seriously as ‘discursive institutionalists’, whether they themselves use this term, prefer instead to classify themselves within one of the older institutionalist traditions, or have themselves come up with a different, more specific term to identify their particular take on ideas and/or discourse. Among these latter scholars, some focus primarily on the ideas side of the framework, calling their approach the ‘ideational turn’ (Blyth, 2002), discursive institutionalism (see Campbell and Pedersen, 2001), ideational institutionalism (Hay, 2001), and constructivist institutionalism (Hay, 2006). Others emphasize the discourse side, whether calling it discourse analysis (Hajer, 2003), the argumentative turn (Fischer, 2003), or deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000). Still others span the ideas/discourse divide, much like DI, whether through approaches focusing on the ‘re´ferentiel’ (frame of reference) (Jobert, 1989; Muller, 2 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT
Taking ideas and discourse seriously 3 1995)or on 'advocacy coalitions'(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1993).Yet others have resisted positing a fourth such institutionalism(e.g.,Campbell (2004),but see Campbell and Pedersen (2001)),mainly because they seek to blur the boundaries among the three older institutionalisms in order to show how ideas and discourse can serve to advance knowledge in the social sciences across methodological approaches.For our purposes,which is to demonstrate how the turn to ideas and discourse can take us beyond the limits of the three older neo- institutionalisms in order to explain the dynamics of change(and continuity),it is more useful to identify the commonalities in all approaches that focus on ideas and discourse as distinct from rationalist interests,path-dependent history,and cultural framing. Discursive institutionalism is an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political science that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through dis- course.On the substantive dimension of ideas and discourse,DI scholars consider ideas about 'what is and what ought to be'at different levels of generality (Schmidt,2008;Mehta,2010),going from policy ideas (e.g.,Kingdon,1984; Hall,1989)to programmatic ideas or paradigms(Hall,1993;Berman,1998)to deeper philosophical ideas(Campbell,2004).They also consider different types of ideas,including cognitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and necessity (e.g.,Jobert,1989;Hall,1993;Schmidt,2002:Ch.5)and normative ideas legitimated through appeal to values and appropriateness(e.g.,March and Olsen,1989;Schmidt,2000).And they consider the representation of ideas through discourse,including frames,narratives,myths,collective memories, stories,scripts,and more (e.g.,Roe,1994;Hajer,2003). On the interactive dimension,DI scholars consider the discursive processes by which such ideas are constructed in a 'coordinative'policy sphere and deliberated in a 'communicative'political sphere (Schmidt,2000,2002).The coordinative discourse encompasses the wide range of policy actors engaged in the construction of policy ideas.They may be organized in 'epistemic communities'of elites with shared ideas (Haas,1992),'advocacy coalitions'of elites with shared ideas and policy access(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1993),and'advocacy networks'of activists contesting ideas in international politics (Keck and Sikkink,1998).Or they may act as 'entrepreneurs'(Fligstein and Mara-Drita,1996)and 'mediators' (Jobert,1989;Muller,1995)who serve as catalysts for the ideas of such discursive communities. The communicative discourse encompasses the wide range of political actors who bring the ideas developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation.These actors may include political lea- ders involved in the top-down mass electoral process of public persuasion (see e.g.,Zaller,1992;Mutz et al.,1996),in public debates (Art,2006)or in the 'policy forums'of 'informed publics'(Rein and Schon,1991 engaged in 'com- municative action'(Habermas,1996).Or they may be members of civil society
1995) or on ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Yet others have resisted positing a fourth such institutionalism (e.g., Campbell (2004), but see Campbell and Pedersen (2001)), mainly because they seek to blur the boundaries among the three older institutionalisms in order to show how ideas and discourse can serve to advance knowledge in the social sciences across methodological approaches. For our purposes, which is to demonstrate how the turn to ideas and discourse can take us beyond the limits of the three older neoinstitutionalisms in order to explain the dynamics of change (and continuity), it is more useful to identify the commonalities in all approaches that focus on ideas and discourse as distinct from rationalist interests, path-dependent history, and cultural framing. Discursive institutionalism is an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political science that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse. On the substantive dimension of ideas and discourse, DI scholars consider ideas about ‘what is and what ought to be’ at different levels of generality (Schmidt, 2008; Mehta, 2010), going from policy ideas (e.g., Kingdon, 1984; Hall, 1989) to programmatic ideas or paradigms (Hall, 1993; Berman, 1998) to deeper philosophical ideas (Campbell, 2004). They also consider different types of ideas, including cognitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and necessity (e.g., Jobert, 1989; Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2002: Ch. 5) and normative ideas legitimated through appeal to values and appropriateness (e.g., March and Olsen, 1989; Schmidt, 2000). And they consider the representation of ideas through discourse, including frames, narratives, myths, collective memories, stories, scripts, and more (e.g., Roe, 1994; Hajer, 2003). On the interactive dimension, DI scholars consider the discursive processes by which such ideas are constructed in a ‘coordinative’ policy sphere and deliberated in a ‘communicative’ political sphere (Schmidt, 2000, 2002). The coordinative discourse encompasses the wide range of policy actors engaged in the construction of policy ideas. They may be organized in ‘epistemic communities’ of elites with shared ideas (Haas, 1992), ‘advocacy coalitions’ of elites with shared ideas and policy access (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and ‘advocacy networks’ of activists contesting ideas in international politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Or they may act as ‘entrepreneurs’ (Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996) and ‘mediators’ (Jobert, 1989; Muller, 1995) who serve as catalysts for the ideas of such discursive communities. The communicative discourse encompasses the wide range of political actors who bring the ideas developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. These actors may include political leaders involved in the top-down mass electoral process of public persuasion (see e.g., Zaller, 1992; Mutz et al., 1996), in public debates (Art, 2006) or in the ‘policy forums’ of ‘informed publics’ (Rein and Scho¨n, 1991 engaged in ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1996). Or they may be members of civil society Taking ideas and discourse seriously 3
4 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT engaged in the bottom-up discursive interactions of grass-roots organizations, social movements,'mini-publics'(see Goodin and Dryzek,2006),local empowered participatory governance'(Fung and Wright,2003),and citizens whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes-where actions speak even more loudly than words. The 'institutionalism'in discursive institutionalism suggests that this approach is not only about the communication of ideas or 'text'but also about the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse.The institutions of discursive institutionalism,however,are not the external rule-following structures of the three older institutionalisms that serve primarily as constraints on actors,whether as rationalist incentives,historical paths,or cultural frames.They are instead simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, which are internal to 'sentient'(thinking and speaking)agents whose 'background ideational abilities'explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their 'foreground discursive abilities'enable them to communicate critically about those institutions,to change (or maintain)them (Schmidt,2008).When dis- cursive institutionalists engage with any one of the older three neo-institutionalisms, therefore,they tend to use their results as background information,whether as the unproblematic basis for further inquiry -say,to elaborate on preference formation and to elucidate critical junctures-or as the problematic assumptions to be inves- tigated.With regard to institutional change,this would involve demonstrating how and when ideas in discursive interactions enable actors to overcome constraints which explanations in terms of interests,path dependence,and/or culture present as overwhelming impediments to action. Discursive institutionalism thus shares with the other neo-institutionalisms a core focus on the importance of institutions,but it differs in its definition of institutions, in its objects and logics of explanation,and in the ways in which it deals with change (see Table 1).Because the three older new institutionalisms'are well known,as are their drawbacks,this article provides only brief sketches of these here (for a fuller account,see Schmidt(2009a)).And because there is such a vast range of scholarly ideas about ideas and discourse (see Goodin and Tilly,2006:Pt IV),my purpose is not to review them all here.Rather,it is to show how DI fits against the other three new institutionalisms and,in doing so,to demonstrate that DI offers a framework within which to theorize about the dynamics of institutional change. The article begins with the turn to ideas first in RI,next in HI,and then in SI before exploring the interactive dimension of discourse.The article concludes with a consideration of the interrelationships among the four new institutionalisms. Rational choice institutionalism and the turn to ideas Rational choice institutionalism posits rational actors with fixed preferences who calculate strategically to maximize their preferences,and for whom institutions
engaged in the bottom-up discursive interactions of grass-roots organizations, social movements, ‘mini-publics’ (see Goodin and Dryzek, 2006), local ‘empowered participatory governance’ (Fung and Wright, 2003), and citizens whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes – where actions speak even more loudly than words. The ‘institutionalism’ in discursive institutionalism suggests that this approach is not only about the communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also about the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse. The institutions of discursive institutionalism, however, are not the external rule-following structures of the three older institutionalisms that serve primarily as constraints on actors, whether as rationalist incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames. They are instead simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, which are internal to ‘sentient’ (thinking and speaking) agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change (or maintain) them (Schmidt, 2008). When discursive institutionalists engage with any one of the older three neo-institutionalisms, therefore, they tend to use their results as background information, whether as the unproblematic basis for further inquiry – say, to elaborate on preference formation and to elucidate critical junctures – or as the problematic assumptions to be investigated. With regard to institutional change, this would involve demonstrating how and when ideas in discursive interactions enable actors to overcome constraints which explanations in terms of interests, path dependence, and/or culture present as overwhelming impediments to action. Discursive institutionalism thus shares with the other neo-institutionalisms a core focus on the importance of institutions, but it differs in its definition of institutions, in its objects and logics of explanation, and in the ways in which it deals with change (see Table 1). Because the three older ‘new institutionalisms’ are well known, as are their drawbacks, this article provides only brief sketches of these here (for a fuller account, see Schmidt (2009a)). And because there is such a vast range of scholarly ideas about ideas and discourse (see Goodin and Tilly, 2006: Pt IV), my purpose is not to review them all here. Rather, it is to show how DI fits against the other three new institutionalisms and, in doing so, to demonstrate that DI offers a framework within which to theorize about the dynamics of institutional change. The article begins with the turn to ideas first in RI, next in HI, and then in SI before exploring the interactive dimension of discourse. The article concludes with a consideration of the interrelationships among the four new institutionalisms. Rational choice institutionalism and the turn to ideas Rational choice institutionalism posits rational actors with fixed preferences who calculate strategically to maximize their preferences, and for whom institutions 4 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT
Table 1.The four new institutionalisms Rational choice institutionalism Historical institutionalism Sociological institutionalism Discursive institutionalism Object of explanation Behavior of rational actors Structures and practices Norms and culture of social Ideas and discourse of sentient agents agents Logic of explanation Calculation Path-dependency Appropriateness Communication Definition of institutions Incentive structures Macro-historical structures and Cultural norms and frames Meaning structures and regularities constructs Approach to change Static continuity through Static -continuity through Static -continuity through Dynamic-change (and fixed preferences,stable path dependency interrupted cultural norms and rules continuity)through ideas and institutions by critical junctures discursive interaction Explanation of change Exogenous shock Exogenous shock Exogenous shock Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities Taking Recent innovations to Endogenous ascription of Endogenous description of Endogenous construction Endogenous construction through explain change interest shifts through RI incremental change through (merge with DI) reframing,recasting collective ideas political coalitions or HI layering,drift,conversion memories and narratives self-reinforcing or self- through epistemic communities, undermining processes advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy discourse RI=rational choice institutionalism;HI=historical institutionalism;DI=discursive institutionalism. seriously
Table 1. The four new institutionalisms Rational choice institutionalism Historical institutionalism Sociological institutionalism Discursive institutionalism Object of explanation Behavior of rational actors Structures and practices Norms and culture of social agents Ideas and discourse of sentient agents Logic of explanation Calculation Path-dependency Appropriateness Communication Definition of institutions Incentive structures Macro-historical structures and regularities Cultural norms and frames Meaning structures and constructs Approach to change Static – continuity through fixed preferences, stable institutions Static – continuity through path dependency interrupted by critical junctures Static – continuity through cultural norms and rules Dynamic – change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction Explanation of change Exogenous shock Exogenous shock Exogenous shock Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities Recent innovations to explain change Endogenous ascription of interest shifts through RI political coalitions or HI self-reinforcing or selfundermining processes Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion Endogenous construction (merge with DI) Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy RI 5 rational choice institutionalism; HI 5 historical institutionalism; DI 5 discursive institutionalism. Taking ideas and discourse seriously 5
6 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT represent the incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties resulting from the multiplicity of individual preferences and issues(see e.g.,Hardin,1982;Ostrom, 1990).This approach has arguably been the most resistant to the turn to ideas. The ways in which DI deals with questions of interests and institutions challenges the very premises of RI about the fixed nature of preferences and the stability of institutions.Preference formation,moreover,which is at the center of DI con- cerns,was until very recently of little interest to RI scholars,while institutional change was ruled out analytically a priori.But critiques of RI-emphasizing its economic determinism,its inability to deal with institutional change endogenously, and its difficulties in accounting for preference formation (see e.g.,Mansbridge, 1990;Green and Shapiro,1994;Scharpf,1997)-have led scholars in the RI tradition in recent years to seek to 'endogenize'change. In their attempts to find new ways to account for preference formation and institutional shifts,RI scholars have mostly looked to political coalition forma- tion,although they have sometimes even sought a rapprochement with HI(e.g., Katznelson and Weingast,2005).For example,Iversen and Soskice(2006)argue that formal electoral institutions act as incentive structures that produce political coalitions which implement certain kinds of socio-economic policies,more ine- galitarian in majoritarian systems,less inegalitarian in proportional ones.The problem with such an approach is that it remains highly deterministic,as insti- tutions determine politics which determine political outcomes,and it still can't explain the origins of the institutions or of the political coalitions that created them,let alone why they might change institutions or policies over time.In contrast,Grief and Laitin (2004),in seeking to build HI insights into game- theoretic analysis,redefine the goal of institutions-from 'self-enforcing'to self- reinforcing or self-undermining institutions-and their effects-as 'parametric'in the short term,meaning exogenous and fixed for agents who act on self-enforcing beliefs,but only 'quasi-parametric'in the long run,meaning endogenous and variable as individuals are led to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs.The problem here is that although this may better account for change over time in game-theoretic terms,we are still left with the irrationality of the choice of institutions to begin with;the deterministic trajectory of change over time,now for better or worse;and the limited rationality of these supposedly rational'actors at any given point in time. Relatively few RI scholars have turned to ideas to solve the problem of insti- tutional change.Among those who have,the most significant RI engagement with ideas began in the 1990s,although it has remained rather circumscribed. Goldstein (1993)and Goldstein and Keohane (1993)provide the classic exposi- tion of the RI approach to ideas(see also Weingast,1995).They deem ideational explanation useful only when and if explanation in terms of 'objective'or material'interests is insufficient,which may occur in one of three ways,each of which is problematic in a different way.First,ideas may come before interests, acting as 'road maps'for individual actors to clarify their goals or limit the range
represent the incentive structures that reduce the uncertainties resulting from the multiplicity of individual preferences and issues (see e.g., Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1990). This approach has arguably been the most resistant to the turn to ideas. The ways in which DI deals with questions of interests and institutions challenges the very premises of RI about the fixed nature of preferences and the stability of institutions. Preference formation, moreover, which is at the center of DI concerns, was until very recently of little interest to RI scholars, while institutional change was ruled out analytically a priori. But critiques of RI – emphasizing its economic determinism, its inability to deal with institutional change endogenously, and its difficulties in accounting for preference formation (see e.g., Mansbridge, 1990; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Scharpf, 1997) – have led scholars in the RI tradition in recent years to seek to ‘endogenize’ change. In their attempts to find new ways to account for preference formation and institutional shifts, RI scholars have mostly looked to political coalition formation, although they have sometimes even sought a rapprochement with HI (e.g., Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). For example, Iversen and Soskice (2006) argue that formal electoral institutions act as incentive structures that produce political coalitions which implement certain kinds of socio-economic policies, more inegalitarian in majoritarian systems, less inegalitarian in proportional ones. The problem with such an approach is that it remains highly deterministic, as institutions determine politics which determine political outcomes, and it still can’t explain the origins of the institutions or of the political coalitions that created them, let alone why they might change institutions or policies over time. In contrast, Grief and Laitin (2004), in seeking to build HI insights into gametheoretic analysis, redefine the goal of institutions – from ‘self-enforcing’ to selfreinforcing or self-undermining institutions – and their effects – as ‘parametric’ in the short term, meaning exogenous and fixed for agents who act on self-enforcing beliefs, but only ‘quasi-parametric’ in the long run, meaning endogenous and variable as individuals are led to act in a manner that does not reproduce the associated beliefs. The problem here is that although this may better account for change over time in game-theoretic terms, we are still left with the irrationality of the choice of institutions to begin with; the deterministic trajectory of change over time, now for better or worse; and the limited rationality of these supposedly ‘rational’ actors at any given point in time. Relatively few RI scholars have turned to ideas to solve the problem of institutional change. Among those who have, the most significant RI engagement with ideas began in the 1990s, although it has remained rather circumscribed. Goldstein (1993) and Goldstein and Keohane (1993) provide the classic exposition of the RI approach to ideas (see also Weingast, 1995). They deem ideational explanation useful only when and if explanation in terms of ‘objective’ or ‘material’ interests is insufficient, which may occur in one of three ways, each of which is problematic in a different way. First, ideas may come before interests, acting as ‘road maps’ for individual actors to clarify their goals or limit the range 6 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT
Taking ideas and discourse seriously 7 of strategies to be taken-in which case ideas seem to determine interests,but we have no explanation of the selection mechanism by which certain ideas get chosen over others (Yee,1997:1024;Blyth,2002:16;Gofas and Hay,2010).Second, ideas may come after interests,acting as 'focal points'for actors to choose among equally acceptable alternatives (i.e.,multiple Pareto-improving equilibria)-in which case ideas serve at best to 'mop up'residual variance,and we still can't explain the mechanism by which the now exogenously,interest-determined ideas are picked(see Yee,1997:1025-1027;Blyth,2002:26;Gofas and Hay,2010). Third,ideas may be embedded in institutions,in which case it is the institutions rather than the ideas that really matter to the actors(Yee,1996;Gofas and Hay, 2010).A fourth-way RI scholars see ideas coming in is as after-the-fact legit- imation of actors'interest-based action,following an instrumental logic,or as 'hooks'for elite interests (e.g.,Shepsle,1985)-in which case ideas are not really taken seriously at all. In all of these approaches,then,ideas have not gone very far beyond interests, since they are little more than mechanisms for choosing among interests,focal points for switching among equilibria(see critique by Ruggie,1998:866-867),or after-the-fact justification for interest-based choices.Douglas North(1990)went farther,first by using ideas to overcome the problem of how to explain institu- tional construction,then by casting ideas as 'shared mental modes'.However,as Blyth(2003:696-697,2002:Ch.2)argues,the contradictions inherent in both such approaches may have been 'a bridge too far'.First,if ideas create institu- tions,then how can institutions make ideas 'actionable'?But second,if instead ideas are 'mental modes',then what stops ideas from having an effect on the content of interests,and not just on the order of interests,which means that ideas would constitute interests,rather than the other way around. The problem for RI scholars,then,and the reason most of them quickly abandoned the pursuit of ideas,is that they could not continue to maintain the artificial separation of 'objective'interests from 'subjective'ideas about interests, that is,beliefs and desires.Such subjective interests threatened to overwhelm the objective ones which are at the basis of the rationalists'thin model of rationality, by undermining the 'fixed'nature of preferences and the notion of outcomes as a function of pre-existing preferences.And without fixed preferences as well as neutral institutional incentive structures,RI scholars lose the parsimony of the approach and everything that follows from it,including the ability to mathema- tically model games rational actors play as opposed to those 'real actors play' (see Scharpf,1997;Rothstein,2005:Ch.1).This helps explain why the foray into ideas for most dyed-in-the-wool RI scholars was short-lived.For those who persisted,however,a whole new approach to the explanation of interests and institutions has opened up. For DI scholars engaged with the RI tradition,subjective interests replace the objective ones of RI,as ideas about interests that bring in a much wider range of strategic ideas and social norms that must be explained in terms of their meaning
of strategies to be taken – in which case ideas seem to determine interests, but we have no explanation of the selection mechanism by which certain ideas get chosen over others (Yee, 1997: 1024; Blyth, 2002: 16; Gofas and Hay, 2010). Second, ideas may come after interests, acting as ‘focal points’ for actors to choose among equally acceptable alternatives (i.e., multiple Pareto-improving equilibria) – in which case ideas serve at best to ‘mop up’ residual variance, and we still can’t explain the mechanism by which the now exogenously, interest-determined ideas are picked (see Yee, 1997: 1025–1027; Blyth, 2002: 26; Gofas and Hay, 2010). Third, ideas may be embedded in institutions, in which case it is the institutions rather than the ideas that really matter to the actors (Yee, 1996; Gofas and Hay, 2010). A fourth-way RI scholars see ideas coming in is as after-the-fact legitimation of actors’ interest-based action, following an instrumental logic, or as ‘hooks’ for elite interests (e.g., Shepsle, 1985) – in which case ideas are not really taken seriously at all. In all of these approaches, then, ideas have not gone very far beyond interests, since they are little more than mechanisms for choosing among interests, focal points for switching among equilibria (see critique by Ruggie, 1998: 866–867), or after-the-fact justification for interest-based choices. Douglas North (1990) went farther, first by using ideas to overcome the problem of how to explain institutional construction, then by casting ideas as ‘shared mental modes’. However, as Blyth (2003: 696–697, 2002: Ch. 2) argues, the contradictions inherent in both such approaches may have been ‘a bridge too far’. First, if ideas create institutions, then how can institutions make ideas ‘actionable’? But second, if instead ideas are ‘mental modes’, then what stops ideas from having an effect on the content of interests, and not just on the order of interests, which means that ideas would constitute interests, rather than the other way around. The problem for RI scholars, then, and the reason most of them quickly abandoned the pursuit of ideas, is that they could not continue to maintain the artificial separation of ‘objective’ interests from ‘subjective’ ideas about interests, that is, beliefs and desires. Such subjective interests threatened to overwhelm the objective ones which are at the basis of the rationalists’ thin model of rationality, by undermining the ‘fixed’ nature of preferences and the notion of outcomes as a function of pre-existing preferences. And without fixed preferences as well as neutral institutional incentive structures, RI scholars lose the parsimony of the approach and everything that follows from it, including the ability to mathematically model games rational actors play as opposed to those ‘real actors play’ (see Scharpf, 1997; Rothstein, 2005: Ch. 1). This helps explain why the foray into ideas for most dyed-in-the-wool RI scholars was short-lived. For those who persisted, however, a whole new approach to the explanation of interests and institutions has opened up. For DI scholars engaged with the RI tradition, subjective interests replace the objective ones of RI, as ideas about interests that bring in a much wider range of strategic ideas and social norms that must be explained in terms of their meaning Taking ideas and discourse seriously 7
8 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT to the actors within a given'meaning context'rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests.Material interests,economic in particular,which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature,are not ignored.But in discursive institutionalism, scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them,such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests (see Schmidt,2008). The kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may also differ,depending upon the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned.Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Wittgenstein's(1972)little-noticed distinction between the language- games based on our everyday experiences in the world,which tend to admit of few doubts or mistakes,and language-games based on our (social)scientific pictures of the world,which may always allow for doubts,mistakes,and even gestalt switches (see Schmidt,2008).The problem with RI is that it tends to develop(social)scientific pictures-games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experience- games-a point also made by Taleb and Pilpel(2005;see discussion in Blyth,2010), who demonstrate that the world in which we live is a lot more uncertain than the world of risk economists and rational choice institutionalists generally assume,given the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. As Blyth(2002:31-39,2010;see also Schmidt,2008)argues,the problem with RI is that it assumes that most phenomena are explainable in terms of 'Knightian risk',because they are part of a directly observable world that agents can perceive more or less well and in which they can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences,such as in the US Congress.Such phenomena, Blyth shows,are in actuality better explained in terms of 'Knightian uncertainty, because they are part of a world that is not directly observable,such as the global economy,in which agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but unsure of what their interests are,given that the uncertainties are too great,the moment unique,prediction impossible,and agents'interests always structurally underdetermined.Blyth (2002)illustrates this by noting that the Great Depression in the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were cases of Knightian uncertainty for both the United States and Sweden,as governments,business,and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative 'narratives'and 'causal stories'about the reasons for the crisis,seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action,with ideas serving as 'weapons'and 'blueprints'in the struggle to replace existing institutions. Woll (2008)demonstrates that there are also less dramatic instances of Knightian uncertainty,such as the kind faced by multinational businesses lobbying for the deregulation of international trade in services.Here,firms'ideas about which
to the actors within a given ‘meaning context’ rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests. Material interests, economic in particular, which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature, are not ignored. But in discursive institutionalism, scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them, such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests (see Schmidt, 2008). The kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may also differ, depending upon the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned. Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Wittgenstein’s (1972) little-noticed distinction between the languagegames based on our everyday experiences in the world, which tend to admit of few doubts or mistakes, and language-games based on our (social) scientific pictures of the world, which may always allow for doubts, mistakes, and even gestalt switches (see Schmidt, 2008). The problem with RI is that it tends to develop (social) scientific pictures-games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experiencegames – a point also made by Taleb and Pilpel (2005; see discussion in Blyth, 2010), who demonstrate that the world in which we live is a lot more uncertain than the world of risk economists and rational choice institutionalists generally assume, given the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. As Blyth (2002: 31–39, 2010; see also Schmidt, 2008) argues, the problem with RI is that it assumes that most phenomena are explainable in terms of ‘Knightian risk’, because they are part of a directly observable world that agents can perceive more or less well and in which they can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences, such as in the US Congress. Such phenomena, Blyth shows, are in actuality better explained in terms of ‘Knightian uncertainty’, because they are part of a world that is not directly observable, such as the global economy, in which agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but unsure of what their interests are, given that the uncertainties are too great, the moment unique, prediction impossible, and agents’ interests always structurally underdetermined. Blyth (2002) illustrates this by noting that the Great Depression in the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were cases of Knightian uncertainty for both the United States and Sweden, as governments, business, and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative ‘narratives’ and ‘causal stories’ about the reasons for the crisis, seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action, with ideas serving as ‘weapons’ and ‘blueprints’ in the struggle to replace existing institutions. Woll (2008) demonstrates that there are also less dramatic instances of Knightian uncertainty, such as the kind faced by multinational businesses lobbying for the deregulation of international trade in services. Here, firms’ ideas about which 8 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT
Taking ideas and discourse seriously 9 utility to maximize (interests),how to maximize it (strategies),and to what end (goals)explains not only changes in their identity,as they moved from seeing themselves as national champions to global players,but also changes in institutions, as trade in services was developed in a context of single-level(US)games spurred by business and multi-level (EU)games in which global liberalization was linked to attempts to spur business support for liberalization in the member states.But Woll (2008:161),as she herself notes,reifies a single corporate rationality for the sake of parsimony,and thus misses out on the negotiation processes inside firms as well as between them that make for a much more complex ideational construction of interests than the stylized one she developed. Culpepper(2005)shows how one might zoom in to consider such ideational processes in detail,in the institutional changes(or continuities)of the corporate governance systems of France and Germany in the 1990s.In the case of France,he argues that CEOs underwent a joint belief shift at a critical juncture,when a central figure in the system of cross-shareholding exited,thereby 'signalling'an idea that led to a shift in belief system when other French CEOs followed suit after an exchange of ideas.German CEOs,by contrast,did not change the rules of the game at their own critical juncture,when a major firm was taken over by a foreign company,because the outsider nature of the takeover had little effect on the CEOs'belief system. Culpepper's approach has the advantage for RI of helping to maintain the possibility of game-theoretic analysis,by positing an equilibrium state with fixed preferences and stable institutions before and after the period of ideational change.The disadvantage is that it formalizes an empirical process that was,in reality,a lot more messy and uncertain than the discussion suggests(see Schmidt, 1997,2002:Ch.6),making 'revolutionary'a process of change that was a lot more incremental.French CEOs had already voiced dissatisfaction with the sys- tem prior to the central figure's precipitating action while the Germans were a lot more dissatisfied with the system,as was evident from their partial defection once the rules were changed with regard to capital gains tax in 2002(Schmidt,2002: Ch.6;Kinderman,2005).Moreover,by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional 'game'and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional 'game',we have changing DI ideas within a critical moment preceded and followed by RI crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions,however,as Rothstein(2005)shows,also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change.This is because,as he argues,institutions them- selves should not be treated as neutral structures of incentives but,rather,as the carriers of ideas or 'collective memories'which make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors'ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance.Rothstein(2005:168-198) illustrates this with the case of the long-term survival of the institutions of Sweden's collective bargaining system,which became the carriers of ideas or 'collective
utility to maximize (interests), how to maximize it (strategies), and to what end (goals) explains not only changes in their identity, as they moved from seeing themselves as national champions to global players, but also changes in institutions, as trade in services was developed in a context of single-level (US) games spurred by business and multi-level (EU) games in which global liberalization was linked to attempts to spur business support for liberalization in the member states. But Woll (2008: 161), as she herself notes, reifies a single corporate rationality for the sake of parsimony, and thus misses out on the negotiation processes inside firms as well as between them that make for a much more complex ideational construction of interests than the stylized one she developed. Culpepper (2005) shows how one might zoom in to consider such ideational processes in detail, in the institutional changes (or continuities) of the corporate governance systems of France and Germany in the 1990s. In the case of France, he argues that CEOs underwent a joint belief shift at a critical juncture, when a central figure in the system of cross-shareholding exited, thereby ‘signalling’ an idea that led to a shift in belief system when other French CEOs followed suit after an exchange of ideas. German CEOs, by contrast, did not change the rules of the game at their own critical juncture, when a major firm was taken over by a foreign company, because the outsider nature of the takeover had little effect on the CEOs’ belief system. Culpepper’s approach has the advantage for RI of helping to maintain the possibility of game-theoretic analysis, by positing an equilibrium state with fixed preferences and stable institutions before and after the period of ideational change. The disadvantage is that it formalizes an empirical process that was, in reality, a lot more messy and uncertain than the discussion suggests (see Schmidt, 1997, 2002: Ch. 6), making ‘revolutionary’ a process of change that was a lot more incremental. French CEOs had already voiced dissatisfaction with the system prior to the central figure’s precipitating action while the Germans were a lot more dissatisfied with the system, as was evident from their partial defection once the rules were changed with regard to capital gains tax in 2002 (Schmidt, 2002: Ch. 6; Kinderman, 2005). Moreover, by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional ‘game’ and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional ‘game’, we have changing DI ideas within a critical moment preceded and followed by RI crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions, however, as Rothstein (2005) shows, also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change. This is because, as he argues, institutions themselves should not be treated as neutral structures of incentives but, rather, as the carriers of ideas or ‘collective memories’ which make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors’ ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance. Rothstein (2005: 168–198) illustrates this with the case of the long-term survival of the institutions of Sweden’s collective bargaining system, which became the carriers of ideas or ‘collective Taking ideas and discourse seriously 9
10 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT memories'created at a critical juncture in the 1930s,when the system evolved into the trusted 'public institution'based on peaceful and collaborative industrial relations which continues to this day,despite changes related to the employers' pull-out of the national centralized system. Discursive institutionalist scholars who engage with the RI tradition,then,like RI scholars,speak the language of interests,incentive structures,and collective action.But they see these as infused with a wide range of ideas and norms rather than narrowly focused on an instrumental rationality of utility-maximization, with incentive structures normative rather than neutral,interests subjective rather than objective,and their explanations,where these are RI 'pictures of the world', much more uncertain than RI scholars recognize. Historical institutionalism and the turn to ideas Historical institutionalism focuses on how institutions,understood as sets of regularized practices with rule-like qualities,structure action and outcomes. It emphasizes not just the operation and development of institutions but also the path-dependencies and unintended consequences that result from such historical development (Steinmo et al.,1992;Hall and Taylor,1996:938;Thelen,1999; Pierson,2000).HI has been more open to the turn to ideas than RI.This is because whereas RI has certain ontological and epistemological presuppositions about agency that clash with those of DI,HI lacks agency,for which HI scholars often turn to RI or SI (see Hall and Taylor,1996:940-941)and,increasingly,to DI.Moreover, critiques of HI-such as those that emphasize its historical determinism where it focuses on critical junctures (e.g.,Collier and Collier,1991)leading to path- dependence (Mahoney,2000;Pierson,2000),along with its inability to explain institutional change endogenously,even if more recent HI scholars have succeeded in describing incremental change,through layering,conversion,and drift(Thelen, 2004;Streeck and Thelen,2005)-have left an opening to DI. Whereas RI scholars have largely resisted the turn to ideas,HI scholars have been divided over how far to go with regard to ideas.The question here is where the tipping point is between HI scholars who continue to see institutions as constitutive of ideas and those who might better be called DI scholars within a HI tradition because they see ideas as constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them. Interestingly enough,even in the book that gave HI its name(Steinmo et al.,1992), the few chapters that were focused on ideas-those of Hall,King,and Weir-take us beyond HI.Among these scholars,Hall's work has arguably been the most eclectic.It began as entirely HI on the differences in the political economic rules and institutional role of the state in Britain and France (Hall,1986),followed with a largely HI approach to ideas focused on the priority of national institutional structures to explain the differential influence of Keynesianism (Hall,1989), continued with a DI explanation of how Thatcher's monetarist ideas were
memories’ created at a critical juncture in the 1930s, when the system evolved into the trusted ‘public institution’ based on peaceful and collaborative industrial relations which continues to this day, despite changes related to the employers’ pull-out of the national centralized system. Discursive institutionalist scholars who engage with the RI tradition, then, like RI scholars, speak the language of interests, incentive structures, and collective action. But they see these as infused with a wide range of ideas and norms rather than narrowly focused on an instrumental rationality of utility-maximization, with incentive structures normative rather than neutral, interests subjective rather than objective, and their explanations, where these are RI ‘pictures of the world’, much more uncertain than RI scholars recognize. Historical institutionalism and the turn to ideas Historical institutionalism focuses on how institutions, understood as sets of regularized practices with rule-like qualities, structure action and outcomes. It emphasizes not just the operation and development of institutions but also the path-dependencies and unintended consequences that result from such historical development (Steinmo et al., 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000). HI has been more open to the turn to ideas than RI. This is because whereas RI has certain ontological and epistemological presuppositions about agency that clash with those of DI, HI lacks agency, for which HI scholars often turn to RI or SI (see Hall and Taylor, 1996: 940–941) and, increasingly, to DI. Moreover, critiques of HI – such as those that emphasize its historical determinism where it focuses on critical junctures (e.g., Collier and Collier, 1991) leading to pathdependence (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), along with its inability to explain institutional change endogenously, even if more recent HI scholars have succeeded in describing incremental change, through layering, conversion, and drift (Thelen, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) – have left an opening to DI. Whereas RI scholars have largely resisted the turn to ideas, HI scholars have been divided over how far to go with regard to ideas. The question here is where the tipping point is between HI scholars who continue to see institutions as constitutive of ideas and those who might better be called DI scholars within a HI tradition because they see ideas as constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them. Interestingly enough, even in the book that gave HI its name (Steinmo et al., 1992), the few chapters that were focused on ideas – those of Hall, King, and Weir – take us beyond HI. Among these scholars, Hall’s work has arguably been the most eclectic. It began as entirely HI on the differences in the political economic rules and institutional role of the state in Britain and France (Hall, 1986), followed with a largely HI approach to ideas focused on the priority of national institutional structures to explain the differential influence of Keynesianism (Hall, 1989), continued with a DI explanation of how Thatcher’s monetarist ideas were 10 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT
