4 INTRODUCTION millions of people who are at risk from the insecurity that is the inevitable by-product of state decline and failure.Therefore,this book discusses not only the history of state creation and consolidation but also evaluates different policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges African states face today. The method adopted by this book is,by necessity,much more contro- versial than the topic.To answer the questions posed regarding the na- ture of state-making,it is important to examine the entire sub-Saharan region.Of course,this is a vast area that contains different peoples,re- gions,and states.However,sub-Saharan Africa has a large number of entities that still can be compared because they share similar,although by no means identical,population structures,levels of technological devel- opment,and stocks of material wealth.Sub-Saharan Africa also has been organized as a particular international regime for more than a century and the rules adopted by colonialists and independent African leaders have had a profound effect on how states have been consolidated.Thus,I am making what Charles Tilly has called "huge (but not stupendous) comparisons"within a particular state system.? At the same time,it is necessary to analyze the problems of state con- solidation in Africa over several hundred years:from the precolonial pe- riod,through the short but intense interlude of formal European colo- nialism,to the modern era of independent states.In particular,it is critical to understand the continuities in state consolidation over the cen- turies.Here I am responding to Harry Eckstein's challenge to return to historically grounded comparative politics.Of course,an argument in favor of historical depth would be banal if the subject was European state development given the obvious continuities over time in that region. However,a similar argument regarding Africa is unconventional because of the almost universal assumption that colonialism changed everything, for the better or worse,depending on the biases of the individual author. I argue that it was impossible for the Europeans to have changed "every- thing"in the few decades that they ruled Africa.They also had to take Africa's political geography as a given because they were unwilling and unable to change the landscape. Therefore,this book spans a vast geographical landmass and hundreds of years.Inevitably,it glosses over or misses the nuances that differentiate various regions,societies,and countries.Put another way,I ignore a vast number of trees in order to see the forest.I am aware of these costs.I have spent much of my career arguing for a greater appreciation of the Charles Tilly,Big Structures,Large Processes,Huge Comparisons (New York:Russell Sage Foundation,1984),p.74. Harry Eckstein,"Unfinished Business:Reflections on the Scope of Comparative Poli- tics,"Comparative Political Studies 31 (August 1998):p.520.4 INTRODUCTION millions of people who are at risk from the insecurity that is the inevitable by-product of state decline and failure. Therefore, this book discusses not only the history of state creation and consolidation but also evaluates different policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges African states face today. The method adopted by this book is, by necessity, much more contro￾versial than the topic. To answer the questions posed regarding the na￾ture of state-making, it is important to examine the entire sub-Saharan region. Of course, this is a vast area that contains different peoples, re￾gions, and states. However, sub-Saharan Africa has a large number of entities that still can be compared because they share similar, although by no means identical, population structures, levels of technological devel￾opment, and stocks of material wealth. Sub-Saharan Africa also has been organized as a particular international regime for more than a century and the rules adopted by colonialists and independent African leaders have had a profound effect on how states have been consolidated. Thus, I am making what Charles Tilly has called “huge (but not stupendous) comparisons” within a particular state system.2 At the same time, it is necessary to analyze the problems of state con￾solidation in Africa over several hundred years: from the precolonial pe￾riod, through the short but intense interlude of formal European colo￾nialism, to the modern era of independent states. In particular, it is critical to understand the continuities in state consolidation over the cen￾turies. Here I am responding to Harry Eckstein’s challenge to return to historically grounded comparative politics.3 Of course, an argument in favor of historical depth would be banal if the subject was European state development given the obvious continuities over time in that region. However, a similar argument regarding Africa is unconventional because of the almost universal assumption that colonialism changed everything, for the better or worse, depending on the biases of the individual author. I argue that it was impossible for the Europeans to have changed “every￾thing” in the few decades that they ruled Africa. They also had to take Africa’s political geography as a given because they were unwilling and unable to change the landscape. Therefore, this book spans a vast geographical landmass and hundreds of years. Inevitably, it glosses over or misses the nuances that differentiate various regions, societies, and countries. Put another way, I ignore a vast number of trees in order to see the forest. I am aware of these costs. I have spent much of my career arguing for a greater appreciation of the 2 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), p. 74. 3 Harry Eckstein, “Unfinished Business: Reflections on the Scope of Comparative Poli￾tics,” Comparative Political Studies 31 (August 1998): p. 520