Preface xiii -Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal representa- tions of external reality -Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the world independent of the peculiar properties of any organisms. Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of exter- nal reality,the mind is a mirror of nature,and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world. -It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their en- vironment in the way they do.Human bodies may play a role in choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendental reason human beings actually employ,but they play no essential role in char- acterizing what constitutes a concept and what constitutes reason. Thought is abstract and disembodied,since it is independent of any limitations of the human body,the human perceptual system,and the human nervous system. -Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols that correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful thought and reason. -Thought is atomistic,in that it can be completely broken down into simple "building blocks"-the symbols used in thought-which are combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. Thought is logical in the narrow technical sense used by philosophical logicians;that is,it can be modeled accurately by systems of the sort used in mathematical logic.These are abstract symbol systems defined by general principles of symbol manipulation and mecha- nisms for interpreting such symbols in terms of"models of the world." Though such views are by no means shared by all cognitive scientists,they are nevertheless widespread,and in fact so common that many of them are often assumed to be true without question or comment.Many,per- haps even most,contemporary discussions of the mind as a computing machine take such views for granted. The idea of a category is central to such views.The reason is that most symbols (i.e.,words and mental representations)do not designate particular things or individuals in the world(e.g.,Rickey Henderson or the Golden Gate Bridge).Most of our words and concepts designate catego- ries.Some of these are categories of things or beings in the physical world-chairs and zebras,for example.Others are categories of activities and abstract things-singing and songs,voting and governments,etc.To a very large extent,the objectivist view of language and thought rests onPreface xiii - Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal representa￾tions of external reality. - Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the world independent of the peculiar properties of any organisms. - Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of exter￾nal reality, the mind is a mirror ofnature, and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world. - It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their en￾vironment in the way they do. Human bodies may play a role in choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendental reason human beings actually employ, but they play no essential role in char￾acterizing what constitutes a concept and what constitutes reason. - Thought is abstract and disembodied, since it is independent of any limitations of the human body, the human perceptual system, and the human nervous system. - Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols that correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful thought and reason. - Thought is atomistic, in that it can be completely broken down into simple "building blocks"-the symbols used in thought-which are combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. - Thought is logical in the narrow technical sense used by philosophical logicians; that is, it can be modeled accurately by systems of the sort used in mathematical logic. These are abstract symbol systems defined by general principles of symbol manipulation and mecha￾nisms for interpreting such symbols in terms of "models of the world." Though such views are by no means shared by all cognitive scientists, they are nevertheless widespread, and in fact so common that many of them are often assumed to be true without question or comment. Many, per￾haps even most, contemporary discussions of the mind as a computing machine take such views for granted. The idea of a category is central to such views. The reason is that most symbols (i.e., words and mental representations) do not designate particular things or individuals in the world (e.g., Rickey Henderson or the Golden Gate Bridge). Most of our words and concepts designate catego￾ries. Some of these are categories of things or beings in the physical world~hairs and zebras, for example. Others are categories of activities and abstract things-singing and songs, voting and governments, etc. To a very large extent, the objectivist view of language and thought rests on