《汉语与认知》课程教学资源（认知语言学专著）莱考夫《女人、火和危险的事物》George Lakoff Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things

George Lakoff Women,Fire,and Dangerous Things What Categories Reveal about the Mind The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

George Lakoff Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things What Categories Reveal about the Mind ~~ The University of Chicago Press \.'I;~ Chicago and London

Contents Acknowledgments Preface i Book I:The Mind beyond the Machine Part I:Categories and Cognitive Models 1 The Importance of Categorization 5 2 From Wittgenstein to Rosch 12 3 Prototype Effects in Language. 58 4 Idealized Cognitive Models 68 5 Metonymic Models 77 6 Radial Categories 91 7 Features,Stereotypes,and Defaults 115 8 More about Cognitive Models 118 9 Defenders of the Classical View 136 10 Review 153 Part II:Philosophical Implications 11 The Objectivist Paradigm 157 12 What's Wrong with Objectivist Metaphysics 185 13 What's Wrong with Objectivist Cognition 196 14 The Formalist Enterprise 219 15 Putnam's Theorem 229 16 A New Realism 260 17 Cognitive Semantics 269 18 Whorf and Relativism 304 vi

Acknowledgments Preface Contents IX Xl Book I: The Mind beyond the Machine Part I: Categories and Cognitive Models 1 The Importance of Categorization 2 From Wittg~nstein to Rosch 3 Prototype Effects in Language . 4 Idealized Cognitive Models 5 Metonymic Models 6 Radial Categories 7 Features, Stereotypes, and Defaults 8 More about Cognitive Models 9 Defenders of the Classical View 10 Review Part II: Philosophical Implications 11 The Objectivist Paradigm 12 What's Wrong with Objectivist Metaphysics 13 What's Wrong with Objectivist Cognition 14 The Formalist Enterprise 15 Putnam's Theorem 16 A New Realism 17 Cognitive Semantics 18 Whorf and Relativism 5 12 58 68 77 91 115 118 136 153 157 185 196 219 229 260 269 304 VlJ

viii Contents 19 The Mind-As-Machine Paradigm 338 20 Mathematics as a Cognitive Activity 353 21 Overview 370 Book II:Case Studies Introduction 377 1 Anger 380 2 Over 416 3 There-Constructions 462 Afterword 586 References 589 Name Index 601 Subject Index 605

VIlI Contents 19 The Mind-As-Machine Paradigm 20 Mathematics as a Cognitive Activity 21 Overview Introduction 1 Anger 2 Over 3 There-Constructions Afterword References Name Index Subject Index 338 353 370 Book II: Case Studies 377 380 416 462 586 589 601 605

Acknowledgments This book is very much a product of the incredibly stimulating and open intellectual environment of the University of California at Berkeley, where I have been privileged to work for the past thirteen years.I could not have done this work anywhere else.Much of what I have learned dur- ing this period has come through interactions with remarkable col- leagues,especially Brent Berlin,Hubert Dreyfus,Charles Fillmore,Jim Greeno,Paul Kay,Eleanor Rosch,Dan Slobin,Eve Sweetser,Len Talmy,Robert Wilensky,and Lotfi Zadeh.I have also been blessed with remarkable students,especially Claudia Brugman,Pamela Downing, Michele Emanatian,Rob MacLaury,Chad McDaniel,and Jeanne van Oosten,and much of this book reflects what I have learned from them. Case study 2 is an extension and elaboration of part of Brugman's 1981 master's thesis.Case study 1 was done jointly with Zoltan Kovecses, whose stay at Berkeley during the 1982-83 academic year was funded by the American Council of Learned Societies.Without their insight,their diligence,and their generosity,this book would be much the poorer. I have also been fortunate to be part of a widespread network of cogni- tive scientists whose research complements my own and who have been unsparingly generous in keeping me informed of their research and in commenting on mine: Alton L.Becker,at the University of Michigan Dwight Bolinger,emeritus from Harvard,now living in Palo Alto Gilles Fauconnier,of the University of Paris at St.Denis Dedre Gentner,at the University of Illinois at Urbana Mark Johnson,at Southern Illinois University Zoltan Kovecses,at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest Ronald Langacker,at the University of California at San Diego Susan Lindner,in Palo Alto James D.McCawley,at the University of Chicago iⅸ

Acknowledgments This book is very much a product of the incredibly stimulating and open intellectual environment of the University of California at Berkeley, where I have been privileged to work for the past thirteen years. I could not have done this work anywhere else. Much of what I have learned dur￾ing this period has come through interactions with remarkable col￾leagues, especially Brent Berlin, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Fillmore, Jim Greeno, Paul Kay, Eleanor Rosch, Dan Slobin, Eve Sweetser, Len Talmy, Robert Wilensky, and Lotti Zadeh. I have also been blessed with remarkable students, especially Claudia Brugman, Pamela Downing, Michele Emanatian, Rob MacLaury, Chad McDaniel, and Jeanne van Oosten, and much of this book reflects what I have learned from them. Case study 2 is an extension and elaboration of part of Brugman's 1981 master's thesis. Case study 1 was done jointly with Zoltan K6vecses, whose stay at Berkeley during the 1982-83 academic year was funded by the American Council of Learned Societies. Without their insight, their diligence, and their gener<?sity, this book would be much the poorer. I have also been fortunate to be part of a widespread network of cogni￾tive scientists whose research complements my own and who have been unsparingly generous in keeping me informed of their research and in commenting on mine: Alton L. Becker, at the University of Michigan Dwight Bolinger, emeritus from Harvard, now living in Palo Alto Gilles Fauconnier, of the University of Paris at St. Denis Dedre Gentner, at the University of Illinois at Urbana Mark Johnson, at Southern Illinois University Zoltan K6vecses, at Eotvos L6rand University in Budapest Ronald Langacker, at the University of California at San Diego Susan Lindner, in Palo Alto James D. McCawley, at the University of Chicago IX

X Acknowledgments David McNeill,at the University of Chicago Hilary Putnam,at Harvard University Naomi Quinn,at Duke University John Robert Ross,at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology David Zubin,at the State University of New York at Buffalo I would also like to thank R.M.W.Dixon and Annette Schmidt of the Australian National University for providing me with a lengthy discussion of their research on Dyirbal categorization,as well as Pamela Downing and Haruo Aoki,who provided me with details about Japanese classi- fiers.Mark Johnson and Hilary Putnam have been extremely helpful in discussing philosophical issues,especially their recent work.The philo- sophical views put forth here have been worked out in collaboration with Johnson over many years.Robert Solovay and Saunders Mac Lane pro- vided enormously useful discussions of the foundations of mathematics Extensive comments on drafts of the manuscript have been provided by Jay Atlas,Lawrence Barsalou,Claudia Brugman,Michele Emanatian, Charles Fillmore,Jim Greeno,Mark Johnson,Paul Kay,Zoltan Kovecses,Robert McCauley,James D.McCawley,Carolyn Mervis. Ulric Neisser,Eleanor Rosch,Edward Smith,Robert Wilensky. Sustenance of extraordinary quality was provided by Cafe Fanny in Berkeley. This research would not have been possible without grants from the National Science Foundation(grant no.BNS-8310445),the Sloan Foun- dation,and the Committee on Research of the University of California at Berkeley.I would especially like to thank Paul Chapin at NSF and Eric Wanner at Sloan. Large projects like this cannot be completed without enormous sacrifices on the home front.Claudia Brugman and Andy Lakoff have put up with my unavailability for longer than I would like to think.I thank them for their patience and perseverance with all my heart. Berkeley,California July,1985

x Acknowledgments David McNeill, at the University of Chicago Hilary Putnam, at Harvard University Naomi Quinn, at Duke University John Robert Ross, at the Massachusetts Institute of Techn'ology David Zubin, at the State University of New York at Buffalo I would also like to thank R. M. W. Dixon and Annette Schmidt of the Australian National University for providing me with a lengthy discussion of their research on Dyirbal categorization, as well as Pamela Downing and Haruo Aoki, who provided me with details about Japanese classi￾fiers. Mark Johnson and Hilary Putnam have been extremely helpful in discussing philosophical issues, especially their recent work. The philo￾sophical views put forth here have been worked out in collaboration with Johnson over many years. Robert Solovay and Saunders Mac Lane pro￾vided enormously useful discussions of the foundations of mathematics. Extensive comments on drafts of the manuscript have been provided by Jay Atlas, Lawrence Barsalou, Claudia Brugman, Michele Emanatian, Charles Fillmore, Jim Greeno, Mark Johnson, Paul Kay, Zoltan Kbvecses, Robert McCauley, James D. McCawley, Carolyn Mervis, Ulric Neisser, Eleanor Rosch, Edward Smith, Robert Wilensky. Sustenance of extraordinary quality was provided by Cafe Fanny in Berkeley. This research would not have been possible without grants from the National Science Foundation (grant no. BNS-8310445), the Sloan Foun￾dation, and the Committee on Research of the University of California at Berkeley. I would especially like to thank Paul Chapin at NSF and Eric Wanner at Sloan. Large projects like this cannot be completed without enormous sacrifices on the home front. Claudia Brugman and Andy Lakoff have put up with my unavailability for longer than I would like to think. I thank them for their patience and perseverance with all my heart. Berkeley, California July, 1985

Preface Cognitive science is a new field that brings together what is known about the mind from many academic disciplines:psychology,linguistics,anthro- pology,philosophy,and computer science.It seeks detailed answers to such questions as:What is reason?How do we make sense of our experi- ence?What is a conceptual system and how is it organized?Do all people use the same conceptual system?If so,what is that system?If not,exactly what is there that is common to the way all human beings think?The questions aren't new,but some recent answers are. This book is about the traditional answers to these questions and about recent research that suggests new answers.On the traditional view,rea- son is abstract and disembodied.On the new view,reason has a bodily ba- sis.The traditional view sees reason as literal,as primarily about proposi- tions that can be objectively either true or false.The new view takes imaginative aspects of reason-metaphor,metonymy,and mental imag- ery-as central to reason,rather than as a peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal. The traditional account claims that the capacity for meaningful thought and for reason is abstract and not necessarily embodied in any organism. Thus,meaningful concepts and rationality are transcendental,in the sense that they transcend,or go beyond,the physical limitations of any orga- nism.Meaningful concepts and abstract reason may happen to be embod- ied in human beings,or in machines,or in other organisms-but they exist abstractly,independent of any particular embodiment.In the new view,meaning is a matter of what is meaningful to thinking,functioning beings.The nature of the thinking organism and the way it functions in its environment are of central concern to the study of reason. Both views take categorization as the main way that we make sense of experience.Categories on the traditional view are characterized solely by the properties shared by their members.That is,they are characterized xi

Preface Cognitive science is a new field that brings together what is known cbout the mind from many academic disciplines: psychology, linguistics, anthro￾pology, philosophy, and computer science. It seeks detailed answers to such questions as: What is reason? How do we make sense of our experi￾ence? What is a conceptual system and how is it organized? Do all people use the same conceptual system? Ifso, what is that system? If not, exactly what is there that is common to the way all human beings think? The questions aren't new, but some recent answers are. This book is abou~ the traditional answers to these questions and about recent research that suggests new answers. On the traditional view, rea￾son is abstract and disembodied. On the new view, reason has a bodily ba￾sis. The traditional view sees reason as literal, as primarily about proposi￾tions that can be objectively either true or false. The new view takes imaginative aspects of reason-metaphor, metonymy, and mental imag￾ery-as central to reason, rather than as a peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal. The traditional account claims that the capacity for meaningful thought and for reason is abstract and not necessarily embodied in any organism. Thus, meaningful concepts and rationality are transcendental, in the sense that they transcend, or go beyond, the physical limitations of any orga￾nism. Meaningful concepts and abstract reason may happen to be embod￾ied in human beings, or in machines, or in other organisms-but they exist abstractly, independent of any particular embodiment. In the new view, meaning is a matter of what is meaningful to thinking, functioning beings. The nature of the thinking organism and the way it functions in its environment are of central concern to the study of reason. Both views take categorization as the main way that we make sense of experience. Categories on the traditional view are characterized solely by the properties shared by their members. That is, they are characterized Xl

xii Preface (a)independently of the bodily nature of the beings doing the categoriz- ing and(b)literally,with no imaginative mechanisms(metaphor,meton- ymy,and imagery)entering into the nature of categories.In the new view,our bodily experience and the way we use imaginative mechanisms are central to how we construct categories to make sense of experience. Cognitive science is now in transition.The traditional view is hanging on,although the new view is beginning to take hold.Categorization is a central issue.The traditional view is tied to the classical theory that categories are defined in terms of common properties of their members. But a wealth of new data on categorization appears to contradict the traditional view of categories.In its place there is a new view of catego- ries,what Eleanor Rosch has termed the theory of prototypes and basic- level categories.We will be surveying that data and its implications. The traditional view is a philosophical one.It has come out of two thousand years of philosophizing about the nature of reason.It is still widely believed despite overwhelming empirical evidence against it. There are two reasons.The first is simply that it is traditional.The accumu- lated weight of two thousand years of philosophy does not go away over- night.We have all been educated to think in those terms.The second reason is that there has been,until recently,nothing approaching a well- worked-out alternative that preserves what was correct in the traditional view while modifying it to account for newly discovered data.This book will also be concerned with describing such an alternative. We will be calling the traditional view objectivism for the following reason:Modern attempts to make it work assume that rational thought consists of the manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get their meaning via a correspondence with the world,objectively con- strued,that is,independent of the understanding of any organism.A col- lection of symbols placed in correspondence with an objectively struc- tured world is viewed as a representation of reality.On the objectivist view,all rational thought involves the manipulation of abstract symbols which are given meaning only via conventional correspondences with things in the external world. Among the more specific objectivist views are the following: -Thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. -The mind is an abstract machine,manipulating symbols essentially in the way a computer does,that is,by algorithmic computation. -Symbols (e.g.,words and mental representations)get their meaning via correspondences to things in the external world.All meaning is of this character

xii Preface (a) independently of the bodily nature of the beings doing the categoriz￾ing and (b) literally, with no imaginative mechanisms (metaphor, meton￾ymy, and imagery) entering into the nature of categories. In the new view, our bodily experience and the way we use imaginative mechanisms are central to how we construct categories to make sense of experience. Cognitive science is now in transition. The traditional view is hanging on, although the new view is beginning to take hold. Categorization is a central issue. The traditional view is tied to the classical theory that categories are defined in terms of common properties of their members. But a wealth of new data on categorization appears to contradict the traditional view of categories. In its place there is a new view of catego￾ries, what Eleanor Rosch has termed the theory of prototypes and basic￾level categories. We will be surveying that data and its implications. The traditional view is a philosophical one. It has come out of two thousand years of philosophizing about the nature of reason. It is still widely believed despite overwhelming empirical evidence against it. There are two reasons. The first is simply that it is traditional. The accumu￾lated weight of two thousand years of philosophy does not go away over￾night. We have all been educated to think in those terms. The second reason is that there has been, until recently, nothing approaching a well￾worked-out alternative that preserves what was correct in the traditional view while modifying it to account for newly discovered data. This book will also be concerned with describing such an alternative. We will be calling the traditional view objectivism for the following reason: Modern attempts to make it work assume that rational thought consists of the manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get their meaning via a correspondence with the world, objectively con￾strued, that is, independent of the understanding of any organism. A col￾lection of symbols placed in correspondence with an objectively struc￾tured world is viewed as a representation of reality. On the objectivist view, all rational thought involves the manipulation of abstract symbols which are given meaning only via conventional correspondences with things in the external world. Among the more specific objectivist views are the following: - Thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. - The mind is an abstract machine, manipulating symbols essentially in the way a computer does, that is, by algorithmic computation. _ Symbols (e.g., words and mental representations) get their meaning via correspondences to things in the external world. All meaning is of this character

Preface xiii -Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal representa- tions of external reality -Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the world independent of the peculiar properties of any organisms. Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of exter- nal reality,the mind is a mirror of nature,and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world. -It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their en- vironment in the way they do.Human bodies may play a role in choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendental reason human beings actually employ,but they play no essential role in char- acterizing what constitutes a concept and what constitutes reason. Thought is abstract and disembodied,since it is independent of any limitations of the human body,the human perceptual system,and the human nervous system. -Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols that correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful thought and reason. -Thought is atomistic,in that it can be completely broken down into simple "building blocks"-the symbols used in thought-which are combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. Thought is logical in the narrow technical sense used by philosophical logicians;that is,it can be modeled accurately by systems of the sort used in mathematical logic.These are abstract symbol systems defined by general principles of symbol manipulation and mecha- nisms for interpreting such symbols in terms of"models of the world." Though such views are by no means shared by all cognitive scientists,they are nevertheless widespread,and in fact so common that many of them are often assumed to be true without question or comment.Many,per- haps even most,contemporary discussions of the mind as a computing machine take such views for granted. The idea of a category is central to such views.The reason is that most symbols (i.e.,words and mental representations)do not designate particular things or individuals in the world(e.g.,Rickey Henderson or the Golden Gate Bridge).Most of our words and concepts designate catego- ries.Some of these are categories of things or beings in the physical world-chairs and zebras,for example.Others are categories of activities and abstract things-singing and songs,voting and governments,etc.To a very large extent,the objectivist view of language and thought rests on

Preface xiii - Symbols that correspond to the external world are internal representa￾tions of external reality. - Abstract symbols may stand in correspondence to things in the world independent of the peculiar properties of any organisms. - Since the human mind makes use of internal representations of exter￾nal reality, the mind is a mirror ofnature, and correct reason mirrors the logic of the external world. - It is thus incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have the bodies they have and function in their en￾vironment in the way they do. Human bodies may play a role in choosing which concepts and which modes of transcendental reason human beings actually employ, but they play no essential role in char￾acterizing what constitutes a concept and what constitutes reason. - Thought is abstract and disembodied, since it is independent of any limitations of the human body, the human perceptual system, and the human nervous system. - Machines that do no more than mechanically manipulate symbols that correspond to things in the world are capable of meaningful thought and reason. - Thought is atomistic, in that it can be completely broken down into simple "building blocks"-the symbols used in thought-which are combined into complexes and manipulated by rule. - Thought is logical in the narrow technical sense used by philosophical logicians; that is, it can be modeled accurately by systems of the sort used in mathematical logic. These are abstract symbol systems defined by general principles of symbol manipulation and mecha￾nisms for interpreting such symbols in terms of "models of the world." Though such views are by no means shared by all cognitive scientists, they are nevertheless widespread, and in fact so common that many of them are often assumed to be true without question or comment. Many, per￾haps even most, contemporary discussions of the mind as a computing machine take such views for granted. The idea of a category is central to such views. The reason is that most symbols (i.e., words and mental representations) do not designate particular things or individuals in the world (e.g., Rickey Henderson or the Golden Gate Bridge). Most of our words and concepts designate catego￾ries. Some of these are categories of things or beings in the physical world~hairs and zebras, for example. Others are categories of activities and abstract things-singing and songs, voting and governments, etc. To a very large extent, the objectivist view of language and thought rests on

xiv Preface the nature of categories.On the objectivist view,things are in the same category if and only if they have certain properties in common.Those properties are necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the cate- gory. On the objectivist view of meaning,the symbols used in thought get their meaning via their correspondence with things-particular things or categories of things-in the world.Since categories,rather than individ- uals,matter most in thought and reason,a category must be the sort of thing that can fit the objectivist view of mind in general.All conceptual categories must be symbols (or symbolic structures)that can designate categories in the real world,or in some possible world.And the world must come divided up into categories of the right kind so that symbols and symbolic structures can refer to them."Categories of the right kind"are classical categories,categories defined by the properties common to all their members. In recent years,conceptual categories have been studied intensively and in great detail in a number of the cognitive sciences-especially an- thropology,linguistics,and psychology.The evidence that has accumulated is in conflict with the objectivist view of mind.Conceptual categories are,on the whole,very different from what the objectivist view requires of them.That evidence suggests a very different view,not only of categories,but of human reason in general: -Thought is embodied,that is,the structures used to put together our conceptual systems grow out of bodily experience and make sense in terms of it;moreover,the core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in perception,body movement,and experience of a physi- cal and social character. -Thought is imaginative,in that those concepts which are not directly grounded in experience employ metaphor,metonymy,and mental imagery-all of which go beyond the literal mirroring,or representa- tion,of external reality.it is this imaginative capacity that allows for "abstract"thought and takes the mind beyond what we can see and feel.The imaginative capacity is also embodied-indirectly-since the metaphors,metonymies,and images are based on experience,of- ten bodily experience.Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way:every time we categorize something in a way that does not mir- ror nature,we are using general human imaginative capacities -Thought has gestalt properties and is thus not atomistic;concepts have an overall structure that goes beyond merely putting together concep- tual“building blocks”by general rules.. Thought has an ecological structure.The efficiency of cognitive pro-

xiv Preface the nature of categories. On the objectivist view, things are in the same category if and only if they have certain properties in common. Those properties are necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the cate￾gory. On the objectivist view of meaning, the symbols used in thought get their meaning via their correspondence with things-particular things or categories of things-in the world. Since categories, rather than individ￾uals, matter most in thought and reason, a category must be the sort of thing that can fit the objectivist view of mind in general. All conceptual categories must be symbols (or symbolic structures) that can designate categories in the real world, or in some possible world. And the world must come divided up into categories of the right kind so that symbols and symbolic structures can refer to them. "Categories of the right kind" are classical categories, categories defined by the properties common to all their members. In recent years, conceptual categories have been studied intensively and in great detail in a number of the cognitive sciences~specially an￾thropology, linguistics, and psychology. The evidence that has accumulated is in conflict with the objectivist view of mind. Conceptual categories are, on the whole, very different from what the objectivist view requires of them. That evidence suggests a very different view, not only of categories, but of human reason in general: - Thought is embodied, that is, the structures used to put together our conceptual systems grow out of bodily eXyerience and make sense in terms of it; moreover, the core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physi￾cal and social character. _ Thought is imaginative, in that those concepts which are not directly grounded in experience employ metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery-all of which go beyond the literal mirroring, or representa￾tion, of external reality. It is this imaginative capacity that allows for "abstract" thought and takes the mind beyond what we can see and feel. The imaginative capacity is also embodied-indirectly-since the metaphors, metonymies, and images are based on experience, of￾ten bodily experience. Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way: every time we categorize something in a way that does not mir￾ror nature, we are us'iog general human imaginative capacities. _ Thought has gestalt properties and is thus not atomistic; concepts have an overall structure that goes beyond merely putting together concep￾tual "building blocks" by general rules. _ Thought has an ecological structure. The efficiency of cognitive pro-

Preface XV cessing,as in learning and memory,depends on the overall structure of the conceptual system and on what the concepts mean.Thought is thus more than just the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. Conceptual structure can be described using cognitive models that have the above properties. -The theory of cognitive models incorporates what was right about the traditional view of categorization,meaning,and reason,while ac- counting for the empirical data on categorization and fitting the new view overall I will refer to the new view as experiential realism or alternatively as ex- perientialism.The term experiential realism emphasizes what experien- tialism shares with objectivism:(a)a commitment to the existence of the real world,(b)a recognition that reality places constraints on concepts, (c)a conception of truth that goes beyond mere internal coherence,and (d)a commitment to the existence of stable knowledge of the world. Both names reflect the idea that thought fundamentally grows out of embodiment."Experience"here is taken in a broad rather than a narrow sense.It includes everything that goes to make up actual or potential experiences of either individual organisms or communities of organisms -not merely perception,motor movement,etc.,but especially the internal genetically acquired makeup of the organism and the nature of its interactions in both its physical and its social environments. Experientialism is thus defined in contrast with objectivism,which holds that the characteristics of the organism have nothing essential to do with concepts or with the nature of reason.On the objectivist view,hu- man reason is just a limited form of transcendental reason.The only roles accorded to the body are (a)to provide access to abstract concepts,(b)to provide "wetware,"that is,a biological means of mimicking patterns of transcendental reason,and (c)to place limitations on possible concepts and forms of reason.On the experientialist view,reason is made possible by the body-that includes abstract and creative reason,as well as reasoning about concrete things.Human reason is not an instantiation of transcendental reason;it grows out of the nature of the organism and all that contributes to its individual and collective experience:its genetic in- heritance,the nature of the environment it lives in,the way it functions in that environment,the nature of its social functioning,and the like. The issue is this: Do meaningful thought and reason concern merely the manipulation of abstract symbols and their correspondence to an objective reality, independent of any embodiment (except,perhaps,for limitations im- posed by the organism)?

Preface xv cessing, as in learning and memory, depends on the overall structure of the conceptual system and on what the concepts mean. Thought is thus more than just the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. - Conceptual structure can be described using cognitive models that have the above properties. - The theory of cognitive models incorporates what was right about the traditional view of categorization, meaning, and reason, while ac￾counting for the empirical data on categorization and fitting the new view overall. I will refer to the new view as experiential realism or alternatively as ex￾perientialism. The term experiential realism emphasizes what experien￾tialism shares with objectivism: (a) a commitment to the existence of the real world, (b) a recognition that reality places constraints on concepts, (c) a conception of truth that goes beyond mere internal coherence, and (d) a commitment to the existence of stable knowledge of the world. Both names reflect the idea that thought fundamentally grows out of embodiment. "Experience" here is taken in a broad rather than a narrow sense. It includes everything that goes to make up actual or potential experiences of either individual organisms or communities of organisms -not merely perception, motor movement, etc., but especially the internal genetically acquired makeup of the organism and the nature of its interactions in both its physical and its social environments. Experientialism is thus defined in contrast with objectivism, which holds that the characteristics of the organism have nothing essential to do with concepts or with the nature of reason. On the objectivist view, hu￾man reason is just a limited form of transcendental reason. The only roles accorded to the body are (a) to provide access to abstract concepts, (b) to provide "wetware," that is, a biological means of mimicking patterns of transcendental reason, and (c) to place limitations on possible concepts and forms of reason. On the experientialist view, reason is made possible by the body-that includes abstract and creative reason, as well as reasoning about concrete things. Human reason is not an instantiation of transcendental reason; it grows out of the nature of the organism and all that contributes to its individual and collective experience: its genetic in￾heritance, the nature of the environment it lives in, the way it functions in that environment, the nature of its social functioning, and the like. The issue is this: Do meaningful thought and reason concern merely the manipulation of abstract symbols and their correspondence to an objective reality, independent of any embodiment (except, perhaps, for limitations im￾posed by the organism)?