5 with the Qing bureaucracy.Finally,Hart genuinely believed,as did Li,that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army,they had every right to its services Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view.General Brown,for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately,"leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles."On December 19,1863,the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that...Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic]operations.It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on.It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour,for they have none;but they are keenly alive to their interests,and,rather than sacrifice these,may accomodate their actions to European principles....[If Li Hongzhang finds]that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the all- important aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA],he will in [the]future refrain from acts of treachery.[15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults,but he was also anxious to placate Gordon.He therefore sent Dr.Halliday Macartney,who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser,to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander Gordon,as it developed,vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman.Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor,presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why?The answer is simple:Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle,the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan.Furthemore,Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence.This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego.Finally,according to General Brown,Gordon had received "direct hints"that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings.In a letter to the British Minister,Bruce, Gordon later claimed:"I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them,of no character,and that the Footae [Governor Li]will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic]put in,or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp,of whose action at times we should never feel certain."[16] Meanwhile,Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service.Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25,1864,suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon,using Hart as his intermediary,the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications.An entry for January 18 states simply:"My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again,and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou."At this point,Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution.This was not only because of the I.G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security;it was also because,as he indicated in his private journal,he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of"an able and reliable"man,who just happened to5 with the Qing bureaucracy. Finally, Hart genuinely believed, as did Li, that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army, they had every right to its services. Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view. General Brown, for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately, "leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles." On December l9, l863, the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that . . . Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic] operations. It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on. It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour, for they have none; but they are keenly alive to their interests, and, rather than sacrifice these, may accomodate their actions to European principles . . . . [If Li Hongzhang finds] that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the all￾important aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA], he will in [the] future refrain from acts of treachery." [15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults, but he was also anxious to placate Gordon. He therefore sent Dr. Halliday Macartney, who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser, to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander. Gordon, as it developed, vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman. Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor, presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why? The answer is simple: Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle, the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan. Furthemore, Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence. This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego. Finally, according to General Brown, Gordon had received "direct hints" that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings. In a letter to the British Minister, Bruce, Gordon later claimed: "I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character, and that the Footae [Governor Li] will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic] put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain." [16] Meanwhile, Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service. Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25, l864, suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon, using Hart as his intermediary, the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications. An entry for January l8 states simply: "My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again, and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou." At this point, Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution. This was not only because of the I. G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security; it was also because, as he indicated in his private journal, he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of "an able and reliable" man, who just happened to