198 International Organization ubiquitous in economic life,forcing the state to compete with other actors for the use of economic resources.Thus,as the number of potential claimants to a particular resource grows (that is,the higher the demand for that resource),the more difficult becomes the state's task of procuring it for security purposes. How these difficulties become manifested in a state's security politics will be determined by the institutions and practices used to mobilize resources from the national economy.Where the state simply pays for the use of a resource,these diffi- culties will be reflected in the military budget.To prevent resources from being bid away to other users,the state must pay higher prices for resources in high demand (and thus enjoy fewer budgetary degrees of freedom)than for resources in low de- mand.Should its compensation fail to keep pace with the demand for resources elsewhere in the economy,the state will experience either shortages in the quantity or deficiencies in the quality of those resources it procures.Where the state compels the supply of resources (conscription,for example),the holders of those resources will invest greater efforts in evading state directives,the greater the potential returns from employing those resources in alternative uses.5 In this instance,the state's difficulties will manifest themselves not as budgetary pressures,but more subtly,such as through resource holders evading or shirking military duties,raising demands for better com- pensation or,in the extreme,engaging in political resistance.6 Second,I assume that not all resources contribute equally to military power.Con- sequently,the state's ability to respond to changing relative prices by effortlessly substituting toward resources whose prices are falling will be limited by the extent to which these less costly resources are militarily useful.I make this assumption for three reasons.First,existing military technologies may not permit substituting cheaper resources for dearer ones.Prior to World War I,mechanized forms of transportation could not replace muscle power as the critical means of battlefield mobility.This reality both necessitated the use of large field armies to concentrate force against the enemy and limited the degree to which European militaries could make their armies more "weapons(that is,capital)intensive."As William McNeil notes,"an army that sought to achieve mobility in the field,as all European armies did before 1914. simply lacked the transport capacity to supply more than a token population of guns that spat forth bullets at the rate of 600 a minute."7 Second,the state's ability to substitute among various resources is often limited by exogenous strategic circum- stances.Pre-World War I Britain,for example,required a(capital-intensive)navy to protect its empire and home islands.This strategic necessity prevented it from respond- ing to a rise in the relative price of capital by using more intensively those resources 5.These effects will be mitigated where the state directly holds the particular resource.Even here it seems plausible that the state's use of the resource is more likely to be contested,either by factions within the state or by social elites who would capture the returns from alternative uses,the greater the potential returns of those uses. 6.The translation of shifting opportunity costs of compulsory military service into political activity is straightforward.The more the opportunity costs of military service rise,the more likely are resource holders to demand policies that offset them. 7.McNeil 1982,273.See also Storz 1992,295-97.ubiquitousin economic life, forcing the state to compete with other actors for the use of economic resources. Thus, as the number of potential claimants to a particular resource grows (that is, the higher the demand for that resource), the more difficult becomes the state’s task of procuring it for security purposes. How these difficulties become manifested in a state’s security politics will be determined by the institutions and practices used to mobilize resources from the national economy. Where the state simply pays for the use of a resource, these diffi￾culties will be re ected in the military budget. To prevent resources from being bid away to other users, the state must pay higher prices for resources in high demand (and thus enjoy fewer budgetary degrees of freedom) than for resources in low de￾mand. Should its compensation fail to keep pace with the demand for resources elsewhere in the economy, the state will experience eithershortagesin the quantity or deŽ cienciesin the quality of those resources it procures. Where the state compels the supply of resources (conscription, for example), the holders of those resources will invest greater efforts in evading state directives, the greater the potentialreturns from employing those resources in alternative uses.5 In thisinstance, the state’s difficulties will manifest themselves not as budgetary pressures, but more subtly,such as through resource holders evading or shirking military duties, raising demands for better com￾pensation or, in the extreme, engaging in politicalresistance.6 Second, I assume that not all resources contribute equally to military power. Con￾sequently, the state’s ability to respond to changing relative prices by effortlessly substituting toward resources whose prices are falling will be limited by the extent to which these less costly resources are militarily useful. I make this assumption for three reasons. First, existingmilitary technologiesmay not permitsubstitutingcheaper resources for dearer ones. Prior to World War I, mechanized forms of transportation could not replace muscle power as the critical means of battleŽ eld mobility. This reality both necessitated the use of large Ž eld armies to concentrate force against the enemy and limited the degree to which European militaries could make their armies more ‘‘weapons(that is, capital) intensive.’’As William McNeil notes, ‘‘an army that sought to achieve mobility in the Ž eld, as all European armies did before 1914, simply lacked the transport capacity to supply more than a token population of guns that spat forth bullets at the rate of 600 a minute.’’ 7 Second, the state’s ability to substitute among various resources is often limited by exogenous strategic circum￾stances. Pre–World War I Britain, for example, required a (capital-intensive) navy to protect its empire and home islands.Thisstrategic necessity prevented it from respond￾ing to a rise in the relative price of capital by using more intensively those resources 5. These effects will be mitigated where the state directly holds the particular resource. Even here it seems plausible that the state’s use of the resource is more likely to be contested, either by factions within the state or by social elites who would capture the returns from alternative uses, the greater the potential returns of those uses. 6. The translation of shifting opportunity costs of compulsory military service into political activity is straightforward. The more the opportunity costs of military service rise, the more likely are resource holders to demand policies that offset them. 7. McNeil 1982, 273. See also Storz 1992, 295–97. 198 International Organization