Why We Are Not Allowed to Sell organs and do not seem to violate any, of the central virtues when we refrain from monetary compensation in these instances. Promoting Virtuous Behavior Although the accusation that virtue ethics is not action guiding might well pose a substantial challenge to the theory as such, this critique does not to seem to strike at the heart of the idea put forward in this paper, namely, that a virtuous people given the choice would donate rather than sell their organs to those in need. In fact, this appears to be an instance where we can turn to virtue ethics for advice and guidance Virtue ethics does not, at least not in its modern form, easily lend itself to clear-cut theories for social organization. To fully investigate the debate sur- rounding the issue at hand is well beyond the scope of this paper. In the following section, I only attempt to sketch what seems to me a possible line of argument It does not necessarily follow from the belief that people ought to be virtuous that society should facilitate or encourage such behavior. According to Aris- totle, however, there is such a connection. " It is evident that the best politeia that arrangement according to which anyone whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing life. "22 In modern times we have, on the other hand, witnessed a call for the neutral society partly as a result of liberal political ideas gaining popularity. It is argued that to open up for individual choices what is seen as state coercion has to be kept to a minimum, a conviction that does not t well with the Aristotelian priority of the good. 2 That said, there are contemporary proponents of virtue ethics as an appropriate theory for social construction. One of these is William Galston, who advocates not only the compatibility of liberalism and virtue theory but also that"liberalism needs an account of goods and virtues that enables it to oppose the extremes of both unfettered individual choice and unchecked state coercion"(pp. 258-59). Further to this point he argues: " Sustaining these institutions lof the liberal society] and practices, in turn, requires of liberal citizens specific excellences and character traits: the liberal virtues. These virtues are by no means natural or innate. Liberal communities must, then, be especially attentive to the processes, formal and informal, by which these virtues are strengthened or eroded"(p.18-19)25 A way of linking virtue ethics to social organization is to shift the focus to rights; an example would be Rosalind Hursthouse's argument that the con- struction of the just society (to be understood as the properly functioning society) is prior to rights-that ethics is prior to politics. Hence, the starting oint should be eudaemonia and the rights(as codified, e.g. in laws)in the just society should be those rights that allow the members of that society to achieve a state of eudaemonia. Taking the cue from G. E. M. Anscombe's papers on rights, promises, and justice, Hursthouse champions a eudaemonia-based account of rights and the just society, thus rejecting the priority of the right in favor of that of the good. Anscombe calls rights "naturally unintelligible, " because"a right is not a natural phenomenon that can be discerned and named as feature found in some class of creatures by, say, a taxonomist"(p. 138) Pushing for an analytical understanding of what a right is, Anscombe uses a certain set of stopping modals, that is, "a set of you cannots which surrounds,and do not seem to violate any, of the central virtues when we refrain from monetary compensation in these instances. Promoting Virtuous Behavior Although the accusation that virtue ethics is not action guiding might well pose a substantial challenge to the theory as such, this critique does not to seem to strike at the heart of the idea put forward in this paper, namely, that all virtuous people given the choice would donate rather than sell their organs to those in need. In fact, this appears to be an instance where we can turn to virtue ethics for advice and guidance. Virtue ethics does not, at least not in its modern form, easily lend itself to clear-cut theories for social organization. To fully investigate the debate sur￾rounding the issue at hand is well beyond the scope of this paper. In the following section, I only attempt to sketch what seems to me a possible line of argument. It does not necessarily follow from the belief that people ought to be virtuous that society should facilitate or encourage such behavior. According to Aris￾totle, however, there is such a connection. “It is evident that the best politeia is that arrangement according to which anyone whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing life.” 22 In modern times we have, on the other hand, witnessed a call for the neutral society partly as a result of liberal political ideas gaining popularity. It is argued that to open up for individual choices what is seen as state coercion has to be kept to a minimum, a conviction that does not sit well with the Aristotelian priority of the good.23 That said, there are contemporary proponents of virtue ethics as an appropriate theory for social construction. One of these is William Galston, who advocates not only the compatibility of liberalism and virtue theory but also that “liberalism needs an account of goods and virtues that enables it to oppose the extremes of both unfettered individual choice and unchecked state coercion” (pp. 258–59).24 Further to this point he argues: “Sustaining these institutions [of the liberal society] and practices, in turn, requires of liberal citizens specific excellences and character traits: the liberal virtues. These virtues are by no means natural or innate. Liberal communities must, then, be especially attentive to the processes, formal and informal, by which these virtues are strengthened or eroded” (pp. 18–19).25 A way of linking virtue ethics to social organization is to shift the focus to rights; an example would be Rosalind Hursthouse’s argument26 that the con￾struction of the just society (to be understood as the properly functioning society) is prior to rights—that ethics is prior to politics. Hence, the starting point should be eudaemonia and the rights (as codified, e.g., in laws) in the just society should be those rights that allow the members of that society to achieve a state of eudaemonia. Taking the cue from G. E. M. Anscombe’s papers on rights, promises, and justice, Hursthouse champions a eudaemonia-based account of rights and the just society, thus rejecting the priority of the right in favor of that of the good. Anscombe calls rights “naturally unintelligible,” because “a right is not a natural phenomenon that can be discerned and named as a feature found in some class of creatures by, say, a taxonomist” (p. 138).27 Pushing for an analytical understanding of what a right is, Anscombe uses a certain set of stopping modals, that is, “a set of ‘you cannots’ which surrounds, Why We Are Not Allowed to Sell Organs 67