Barbro bjorkman affluence under normal circumstances, but when contrasted with a dialysis atient, it just might. Irrespectively, it is clear that giving something away out of the goodness of your heart, not seeking any reward, would objectively qualify as (more) generous than selling that same thing. When applying this to the example above, it is clear that A displays an open-handed behavior whereas B, by requiring compensation, does not The second possible reply to the question"How do we know if it is more virtuous to donate than to sell? "is whether or not donating rather than selling will make us more admirable human beings To make the problem clearer we can imagine the following, somewhat Singeresque, situation. On my way home from the office, I walk by a pond where a man is drowning. Standing on the shore, I can hear his shrill panic-stricken cries for help. As he disappears under the water for the second time, I suddenly remember that I have a lifebuoy in my backpack and, as luck has it, I will not have any personal use for it on this particular evening unpack the lifebuoy I have two options. I can either (A) take advantage of the man's desperate situation and tell him that I will throw him the buoy if he promises to pay me the equivalent of his monthly salary or(B)I can save his life for free. Presumably there is not much doubt as to what a virtuous person would do in this situation. To help others unselfishly without expecting a reward is surely the virtuous thing to do, and, as outlined above, indeed, what an admirable person would have done. Virtue ethics claims that the virtuousness of the act is not decided by the consequences, yet option A above might seem more morally appealing if I were to use the money for charity rather than splurging on a new handbag. Let us revisit the example. The setting is the same, only this time the man in the water is a very wealthy but extremely stingy person and I am the local Red Cross representative who has spent the past decade trying to persuade him to part with if only a small fraction of his wealth, but to no avail. As I unpack my lifebuoy, I have two options. I can either(A) throw him the buoy on the condition that he donate a substantial part of his wealth to the Red Cross or some other aid foundation or(B)save his life for free. It appears relatively uncontroversial to say that engaging in charity, the giving of a part of ones wealth to those who are less fortunate, is a virtuous thing to do. But in the example above this admirable act is preceded by blackmail. It hardly seems admirable to take advantage of people s predicaments, to force them to agree to terms that they would not otherwise have accepted because they fear for their lives. We might be sympathetic to the person on the shore, but it seems odd to suggest that we would admire her when she exploits the circumstances. The fact that option A in the second example might have good consequences does not justify the blackmail. The good, the virtuous in this sense, ought to be chosen for its own sake, not for what it might lead to. Again, the virtues are not to be understood as instrumental virtuous actions do not cause fulfillment in the sense that an appropriate medicine might cause health Living the fulfilled life is the carrying out of fine and noble acts. The focus is on the virtuous character, not the right action, and it is hardly conceivable that a person of virtuous character would engage in blackmail with someone who fears for his/her life. This does not seem to be what one ought to do. 1 In conclusion, a case can be made that donating rather than selling can bring us closer to a state of flourishing and that we act in accordance with severalaffluence under normal circumstances, but when contrasted with a dialysis patient, it just might. Irrespectively, it is clear that giving something away out of the goodness of your heart, not seeking any reward, would objectively qualify as (more) generous than selling that same thing. When applying this to the example above, it is clear that A displays an open-handed behavior whereas B, by requiring compensation, does not. The second possible reply to the question “How do we know if it is more virtuous to donate than to sell?” is whether or not donating rather than selling will make us more admirable human beings. To make the problem clearer we can imagine the following, somewhat Singeresque, situation.19 On my way home from the office, I walk by a pond where a man is drowning. Standing on the shore, I can hear his shrill, panic-stricken cries for help. As he disappears under the water for the second time, I suddenly remember that I have a lifebuoy in my backpack and, as luck has it, I will not have any personal use for it on this particular evening. As I unpack the lifebuoy I have two options. I can either (A) take advantage of the man’s desperate situation and tell him that I will throw him the buoy if he promises to pay me the equivalent of his monthly salary or (B) I can save his life for free. Presumably there is not much doubt as to what a virtuous person would do in this situation. To help others unselfishly without expecting a reward is surely the virtuous thing to do, and, as outlined above, indeed, what an admirable person would have done. Virtue ethics claims that the virtuousness of the act is not decided by the consequences, yet option A above might seem more morally appealing if I were to use the money for charity rather than splurging on a new handbag.20 Let us revisit the example. The setting is the same, only this time the man in the water is a very wealthy but extremely stingy person and I am the local Red Cross representative who has spent the past decade trying to persuade him to part with if only a small fraction of his wealth, but to no avail. As I unpack my lifebuoy, I have two options. I can either (A) throw him the buoy on the condition that he donate a substantial part of his wealth to the Red Cross or some other aid foundation or (B) save his life for free. It appears relatively uncontroversial to say that engaging in charity, the giving of a part of one’s wealth to those who are less fortunate, is a virtuous thing to do. But in the example above this admirable act is preceded by blackmail. It hardly seems admirable to take advantage of people’s predicaments, to force them to agree to terms that they would not otherwise have accepted because they fear for their lives. We might be sympathetic to the person on the shore, but it seems odd to suggest that we would admire her when she exploits the circumstances. The fact that option A in the second example might have good consequences does not justify the blackmail. The good, the virtuous in this sense, ought to be chosen for its own sake, not for what it might lead to. Again, the virtues are not to be understood as instrumental. Virtuous actions do not cause fulfillment in the sense that an appropriate medicine might cause health. Living the fulfilled life is the carrying out of fine and noble acts. The focus is on the virtuous character, not the right action, and it is hardly conceivable that a person of virtuous character would engage in blackmail with someone who fears for his/her life. This does not seem to be what one ought to do.21 In conclusion, a case can be made that donating rather than selling can bring us closer to a state of flourishing and that we act in accordance with several, Barbro Björkman 66