Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 135 Chinese government documents can offer us solid evidence about Chinese intentions.Without them,all the arguments discussed above rest on specu- lation.34 Mao's Opening Strategy:The Telegrams to Stalin and Zhou Enlai The telegrams to Stalin and Zhou (see appendix)demonstrate that Mao entered Korea in October for the general reason offered by Whiting in his classic account of the case:China felt threatened by the American presence in North Korea.35 In the October 2 telegram to Stalin,Mao offers a domino- theory account for why China must stand up to the United States.36 But Mao's fears were even deeper than Whiting and other Western analysts have perceived.The October 13 telegram to Zhou Enlai demonstrates that Mao was afraid not only of an immediate American push beyond the Yalu,but also of the long-term economic and domestic political implications if he hedged against that eventuality by placing standing forces on the Manchurian border.Even if the Americans did not attack Manchuria in the short term, their presence in North Korea would tie down Chinese defense forces in the border region.This would be fiscally expensive and also politically danger- ous,as the American presence near North China would embolden domestic counter-revolutionaries while the dual-purpose military forces Mao needed to combat them were occupied on the border.37 In the October 13 telegram to Zhou,Mao refers to the cost of passive defenses and his concern over the hydroelectric plants on the border;these references demonstrate that,con- trary to MacArthur's and Whiting's claims,these factors did play an impor- tant role in Mao's thinking.Acheson's emphasis on the plants in his reas- surance statements was not misplaced.Yet,given Mao's additional fear of growing American arrogance and falling dominos,Whiting is still correct in arguing that Acheson's reassurances were insufficient.38 34.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.172. 35.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,passim 36.For an excellent discussion of domino psychology,see Robert Jervis,"Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,"in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder,eds.,Dominoes and Bandwagons:Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1991),pp.20-50. 37.On the prohibitive expense of passive defenses in Manchuria,see Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War,"p.104. 38.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,ch.8. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace 1 135 Chinese government documents can offer us solid evidence about Chinese intentions. Without them, all the arguments discussed above rest on specu￾lation.m Mao's Opening Strategy: The Telegrams to Stalin and Zhou Enlai The telegrams to Stalin and Zhou (see appendix) demonstrate that Mao entered Korea in October for the general reason offered by Whiting in his classic account of the case: China felt threatened by the American presence in North Korea.35 In the October 2 telegram to Stalin, Mao offers a domino￾theory account for why China must stand up to the United States.36 But Mao's fears were even deeper than Whiting and other Western analysts have perceived. The October 13 telegram to Zhou Enlai demonstrates that Mao was afraid not only of an immediate American push beyond the Yalu, but also of the long-term economic and domestic political implications if he hedged against that eventuality by placing standing forces on the Manchurian border. Even if the Americans did not attack Manchuria in the short term, their presence in North Korea would tie down Chinese defense forces in the border region. This would be fiscally expensive and also politically danger￾ous, as the American presence near North China would embolden domestic counter-revolutionaries while the dual-purpose military forces Mao needed to combat them were occupied on the border.37 In the October 13 telegram to Zhou, Mao refers to the cost of passive defenses and his concern over the hydroelectric plants on the border; these references demonstrate that, con￾trary to MacArthur's and Whiting's claims, these factors did play an impor￾tant role in Mao's thinking. Acheson's emphasis on the plants in his reas￾surance statements was not misplaced. Yet, given Mao's additional fear of growing American arrogance and falling dominos, Whiting is still correct in arguing that Acheson's reassurances were insufficient.38 34. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 172. 35. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, passim. 36. For an excellent discussion of domino psychology, see Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 20-50. 37. On the prohibitive expense of passive defenses in Manchuria, see Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 104. 38. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, ch. 8. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions