International Security 17:1 136 THE CROSSING OF THE PARALLEL AS A TRIGGERING EVENT Various data from early October suggests that the American crossing of the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,was the triggering event that convinced Mao to enter the war in force.Mao's initial decision to enter the war(October 2)was made the day after MacArthur called for the surrender of all North Korean forces on both sides of the parallel.Mao gave his initial orders to form the Chinese People's Volunteers on October 8,the day after American troops began crossing the parallel.On the same day he informed Kim Il- sung of China's intention to enter the war.39 Chinese memoirs and scholarly accounts help us understand why Ameri- ca's crossing of the parallel convinced Mao of America's aggressive intent and led him to dismiss subsequent American promises of restraint.Mao's suspicions about American intentions had been growing since June when, at the outset of the Korean War,Truman reversed the U.S.policy of non- interference in the Chinese civil war by sending the U.S.7th fleet to block the Taiwan Straits.This guaranteed a sanctuary for"counter-revolutionaries" (Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang),provided a base for future American air attacks against the mainland,and suggested to Mao that America might at any time go back on its word and invade Chinese territory.40 With Mao's belief in American duplicity and expansionism thus sharpened, Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea triggered Mao's decision to enter Korea in force.The American presence in both Taiwan and North Korea meant that China would always face the unacceptable threat of a two-front war.The expansion of American military operations in Korea convinced Mao that a war between American and Chinese forces was inev- itable,regardless of the details of subsequent American coercive diplomacy.41 Mao was not,however,eager to enter the war.According to Chinese scholars,Mao reconsidered his October 2 decision in the light of lingering 39.See "The Directive Concerning the Formation of the People's Volunteer Army,"October 8, 1950,in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong,Vol.1,pp.543-544;and"Telegram to Kim Il-sung Concerning Sending the Volunteer Army to Enter Korea for Combat,"October 8,1950,ibid.,p.545 40.Emphasizing the importance of America's intervention in the Taiwan Straits in Mao's threat assessment is Hong,Recollections,p.1;also see Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War,"p.101. 41.On the continuing connection between Taiwan and Korea in the minds of the Chinese leadership see Chai and Zhao,Panmunjon Negotiations,pp.81-82.Chai and Zhao report that on October 4,Marshal Peng Dehuai warned the Politburo of the dangers of simultaneous American threats to Northeast China from Korea and to Shanghai and East China from Taiwan.Also see Ye Yumeng,Dispatching Troops to Korea,pp.3-6.For Mao's belief in the inevitability of war after the Taiwan blockade and the crossing of the 38th parallel,see Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War,"pp.103-108;and Ye,Dispatching Troops to Korea,p.93. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 17:1 1 136 THE CROSSING OF THE PARALLEL AS A TRIGGERING EVENT Various data from early October suggests that the American crossing of the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, was the triggering event that convinced Mao to enter the war in force. Mao's initial decision to enter the war (October 2) was made the day after MacArthur called for the surrender of all North Korean forces on both sides of the parallel. Mao gave his initial orders to form the Chinese People's Volunteers on October 8, the day after American troops began crossing the parallel. On the same day he informed Kim Il￾sung of China's intention to enter the war.39 Chinese memoirs and scholarly accounts help us understand why Ameri￾ca's crossing of the parallel convinced Mao of America's aggressive intent and led him to dismiss subsequent American promises of restraint. Mao's suspicions about American intentions had been growing since June when, at the outset of the Korean War, Truman reversed the U.S. policy of non￾interference in the Chinese civil war by sending the U.S. 7th fleet to block the Taiwan Straits. This guaranteed a sanctuary for "counter-revolutionaries" (Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang), provided a base for future American air attacks against the mainland, and suggested to Mao that America might at any time go back on its word and invade Chinese territory.40 With Mao's belief in American duplicity and expansionism thus sharpened, Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea triggered Mao's decision to enter Korea in force. The American presence in both Taiwan and North Korea meant that China would always face the unacceptable threat of a two-front war. The expansion of American military operations in Korea convinced Mao that a war between American and Chinese forces was inev￾itable, regardless of the details of subsequent American coercive diplomacy.41 Mao was not, however, eager to enter the war. According to Chinese scholars, Mao reconsidered his October 2 decision in the light of lingering 39. See "The Directive Concerning the Formation of the People's Volunteer Army," October 8, 1950, in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1, pp. 543-544; and "Telegram to Kim Il-sung Concerning Sending the Volunteer Army to Enter Korea for Combat," October 8, 1950, ibid., p. 545. 40. Emphasizing the importance of America's intervention in the Taiwan Straits in Mao's threat assessment is Hong, Recollections, p. 1; also see Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 101. 41. On the continuing connection between Taiwan and Korea in the minds of the Chinese leadership see Chai and Zhao, Panmunjon Negotiations, pp. 81-82. Chai and Zhao report that on October 4, Marshal Peng Dehuai warned the Politburo of the dangers of simultaneous American threats to Northeast China from Korea and to Shanghai and East China from Taiwan. Also see Ye Yumeng, Dispatching Troops to Korea, pp. 3-6. For Mao's belief in the inevitability of war after the Taiwan blockade and the crossing of the 38th parallel, see Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," pp. 103-108; and Ye, Dispatching Troops to Korea, p. 93. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions