Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 137 doubts in the Chinese Politburo and a Soviet refusal to supply air cover to his troops(October 10-12).But in his October 13 and 14 telegrams to Zhou Enlai in Moscow,Mao reconfirmed his decision to enter Korea in force,even without a Soviet guarantee of air support.42 MAO'S RISK ANALYSIS Contrary to the premise of accounts that emphasize the need for more credible American threats,the telegram to Stalin demonstrates that Mao fully considered the possibility of an American declaration of war and U.S.bom- bardment of"many major cities and industrial centers"in China.While Mao did not mention atomic weapons,he foresaw,"at a minimum,"massive conventional strategic bombing.43 Beijing's fear of American bombing never diminished in the first months of U.S.operations.On November 22,two days before MacArthur's final drive north,the Central Military Commission warned South China forces that American pilots flying under the guise of Chiang's air force might make bombing runs against Chinese targets.44 Rather than deterring Mao,I argue,the possibility of U.S.bombing led him toward more aggressive military objectives in Korea than he might otherwise have pursued.In the telegram to Stalin,Mao reasoned that as long as Chinese and American forces faced each other in Korea,American bomb- ing of the mainland was a threat.His fear that China would be tied down in Korea while the United States attacked the Chinese mainland led him to conclude that the best strategy was to drive all foreign forces out of Korea as quickly as possible.45 With America out of Korea,Mao thought,any 42.The October 13 and October 14 telegrams to Zhou Enlai in the appendix provide evidence that Mao reconfirmed his original strategic assessment in mid-October.For an excellent discus- sion of Sino-Soviet relations and their impact on Mao's decision process in October,see Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance."Chen's analysis shows that Soviet reluctance gave Mao doubts about the wisdom of entering the Korean War.These doubts caused him to delay the implementation of his strategy by a few days.But as Mao's October 14 telegram to Zhou Enlai indicates,Mao did not alter the aggressive strategy outlined in early October. 43.It is not clear why Mao did not mention atomic bombs.It is possible that,as Nie Rongzhen had suggested,Mao saw atomic weapons as inappropriate in the largely agrarian Chinese arena. Richard Betts speculates that Mao may have been informed by the Soviets that the Americans had no intention of using atomic bombs against China.Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance,pp.34-36.It is also possible that,while the collection of documents available in the West are of a restricted nature,even they have been subject to deletion;sections about atomic deterrence may have been deleted except in collections at an even higher level of classification 44.See "Telegram From the Central Military Commission Concerning the Tightening of Air Defenses,"November 22,1950,in The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong,Vol.1,p.677. 45.See the October 2 telegram to Stalin in the appendix.On the adverse economic consequences of a two-front war,see Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War,"p.108. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace 1 137 doubts in the Chinese Politburo and a Soviet refusal to supply air cover to his troops (October 10-12). But in his October 13 and 14 telegrams to Zhou Enlai in Moscow, Mao reconfirmed his decision to enter Korea in force, even without a Soviet guarantee of air support.42 MAO S RISK ANALYSIS Contrary to the premise of accounts that emphasize the need for more credible American threats, the telegram to Stalin demonstrates that Mao fully considered the possibility of an American declaration of war and U.S. bom￾bardment of "many major cities and industrial centers" in China. While Mao did not mention atomic weapons, he foresaw, "at a minimum," massive conventional strategic bombing.43 Beijing's fear of American bombing never diminished in the first months of U.S. operations. On November 22, two days before MacArthur's final drive north, the Central Military Commission warned South China forces that American pilots flying under the guise of Chiang's air force might make bombing runs against Chinese targets.44 Rather than deterring Mao, I argue, the possibility of U.S. bombing led him toward more aggressive military objectives in Korea than he might otherwise have pursued. In the telegram to Stalin, Mao reasoned that as long as Chinese and American forces faced each other in Korea, American bomb￾ing of the mainland was a threat. His fear that China would be tied down in Korea while the United States attacked the Chinese mainland led him to conclude that the best strategy was to drive all foreign forces out of Korea as quickly as possible.45 With America out of Korea, Mao thought, any 42. The October 13 and October 14 telegrams to Zhou Enlai in the appendix provide evidence that Mao reconfirmed his original strategic assessment in mid-October. For an excellent discus￾sion of Sino-Soviet relations and their impact on Mao's decision process in October, see Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance." Chen's analysis shows that Soviet reluctance gave Mao doubts about the wisdom of entering the Korean War. These doubts caused him to delay the implementation of his strategy by a few days. But as Mao's October 14 telegram to Zhou Enlai indicates, Mao did not alter the aggressive strategy outlined in early October. 43. It is not clear why Mao did not mention atomic bombs. It is possible that, as Nie Rongzhen had suggested, Mao saw atomic weapons as inappropriate in the largely agrarian Chinese arena. Richard Betts speculates that Mao may have been informed by the Soviets that the Americans had no intention of using atomic bombs against China. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, pp. 34-36. It is also possible that, while the collection of documents available in the West are of a restricted nature, even they have been subject to deletion; sections about atomic deterrence may have been deleted except in collections at an even higher level of classification. 44. See "Telegram From the Central Military Commission Concerning the Tightening of Air Defenses," November 22, 1950, in The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1, p. 677. 45. See the October 2 telegram to Stalin in the appendix. On the adverse economic consequences of a two-front war, see Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 108. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions