482 The China Quarterly that normally would have been imported. Other elites, including Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, promoted a more utopian strategy of semi-autarchy, characterized by the cessation of all foreign trade and investment activities, except for very limited, government-mandated actions. Instead of an over-reliance on technology, bureaucracy and market incentives these elites embraced more normative measures to mobilize the people's sense of nationalism and communist ideals to achieve self-sufficiency. 7 The resulting dispute between the various opinion groups condemned China to a cycling within the inwardly-oriented development regime for nearly two decades. 8 Yet this did not prevent the Chinese elites wh promoted modernization from learning how to deal with the international marketplace On regaining power after 1971 and again after 1976, they reviewed and reimplemented many of the post-GLF foreign economic policies of the early 1960s. This article concludes that by the Third Plenum many elites supporting the modernization strategy had learne the limitations of an inwardly-oriented development regime; thus they proposed to experiment with several foreign economic policy initiatives indicative of an outwardly-oriented development regime 15. Bela balass alassa, The Pr of Industrial De s in Intemational Finance, No. 141(Princeton: Princeton University Press, formation on Chinas Is stratcgy, sce Nicolas Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, World bank tgg world g5agg bince geverodks rcenand Chp inae washington, mv "n Harry Harding(ed ) China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s(New Haven: Yale University res,1984),pp.83-90 that"both the carlicr writings of Mao and the later writings between words and actions can be a wide one. "They recognize the"plausibility". to plicy of econo ign economic policy during the Cultural Revolution and the summer of 1976"was sentially a closed door policy. "Sce Samuel P, S Ho and Ralph w. Huenemann, Chi an recognize that various coalitions supl various philosophies, bureaucratic identit opalesce around a pinion. In hi ost-Glf period, Lieberthal acknowledges that Mao did not"fully share the goals and around Mao's“ faith in 甲 Forward and thac, spfi i ange and rectification. "See Kenneth Lieberth:=m University Press, 1987), pp 335-356, especially pp. 351-84( Cambridge: Cambridge Fairbank (eds ) The Cambridge History of China, Vol olicy, "pp. 291, 300-302: for further discussion on the antinomy of trategies during the pre-1978 period, see Lawrence C. Reardon, "T pp.281-30port processing zones, "Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 5, No. 13(1996). 19. Utopians"also engaged in"incremental learning. "See Lieberthal. "The Great Leap Forward, " pp. 354-55 20. Joseph Nye would define the incremental learning of the pre-1978 period as"simple mation merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-mean chain. The actor simply u he same goal. "The decision to embark on a more outwardly-oriented strategy would be