复旦大学：《发展经济学》阅读材料与文献_Learning How to Open the Door：A Reassessment of China's "Opening"Strategy.pdf_大学文库

The China Quarterl Chinese policy change in heeding Nathans call to analyse the dynamic learning aspects of the Chinese policy process This article examines the development of three major foreign economi olicy initiatives formulated between 1979 and 1980- plan-oricnted export promotion policies, utilization of foreign finance capital (private and official capital inflows, direct foreign investment) and export process- ing zones. These pillars of China's initial"Opening Strategy"resulted from two decades of interaction with the global economy. Coalescing around an inwardly-oriented strategy of import substitution, certain Chinese elites learned how to harness the world capitalist marketplace to develop China. After the Third Plenum of 1978, this incremental learning initiated a gradual evolution towards a more outwardly-oriented development regime characteristic of the East Asian development model Cyclic Models, Incremental Learning and Opinion Group Approaches Nathan was most critical of the inflexible nature of the cyclic model Maoist polemicists often interpreted Chinese politics post-1949 as a zigzag "struggle between the two classes, the two roads and the two lines. Fearing that Western theories continued to impose this dialectic iew of the policy development process, Nathan argued for a learning model in which policy options were"so multiform and complex that the choices are really more than two, and might best be regarded as infinite. 8 In other words, Chinese clites have the ability to learn from thcir experiences, and are not caught in an unchanging loop of history et, there need not be an artificial separation between cyclic and lincar views of the Chinese policy process. The repetition of certain patterns and phases of the policy process does not preclude the evolutionary development of initiatives. While Chinese elites can learn from past successes and failures, their ability to implement progressive change can be interrupted by recurring policy patterns initiated by a change in the ruling elite coalition. Under such conditions, policy learning can occur over time. but at incremental One way to demonstrate this incremental process is to use the opinion translated from Hongar N.10(1973), cited in Nath an, "policy scillations PP. 731 8. Nathan, ibid. p 728 For a recent discussion of linear and cyclical process models, see Donald J Puchala 177-20 10. In contrast to organizational theorists such as James March, most of the recent foreign g has focused evel of analysis, starting with Robert Jervis, Perception and Mi International Princeton University Press, 1976), ch 6. For s ng a conceptual minefield International Organization, voL 48, No. 2(1994), pp. 279-312; as applied to the China urity field Pp: 27-61 I wcix policy in the 1980s and 1990s, "The China Journal, No 35 (1996) dissertation, University of Maryland, 1992)

Learning How to Open the Door group approach, which focuses on the policy elites Weltanschauung Richard Lowenthal’ s seminal work on the“ Communist dilemma” argued that all communist systems are faced with a conflict between the com ing goals of modernization and utopianism. While adopting a linear argument that modernization advocates would eventually prevail, Lowen- thal did not totally exclude the possibility that the antinomy of develop- ment goals could produce cyclic changes of policies. Recently, several litical scientists have used variations of the opinion group approach to over evidence of such cycles during the pre-and post-Third Plenum When applying this incremental learning model to Chinas pre-1979 evelopment policy, it could be argued that Chinese elites uniformly agreed to pursue an inwardly-oriented development regime. The inter national market was not considered a partner in development, but a dangerous adversary whose influences on the domestic economy must be controlled and, in certain instances . eliminated. however. Chinese elites disagreed over which path of development would achieve self-reliance. Certain elites, including Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li wannian and Bo Yibo(hereafter referred to as the post-GLF coalition), wanted to continue a"modernizing "strategy of import substitution(Is), whose imports of technology and equipment made an important contribu tion to Chinas overall economic development in the 1950s. Is develop- ment was a comprehensive strategy of importing foreign technology and knowledge to produce intermediate goods(petrochemicals, steel),pro- ducer(machincry) and consumer durables(automobiles, televisions, etc 11. Richard Lowenthal, Development vs utopia in communist pol Johnson(ed ) Change in Communist Systems(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) P. 54. Also see Alexander Eckstcin, China's Economic Revolution(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Pp. 37-65; Skinner and Winckler, "Compliance succession in rura ommunist China, "p 412. For an updated version of the op Vol. 46. No. 1(1992), pp. 101-145. Because of its inclusive nature, this study does not adopt 12. According to Lowenthal, "throughout the history of these indigenous Communist cgimes a kind of natural alternation has occurred in which periods of revolutionary upheaval re followed by periods of consolidation and economic progress, and these in turn by new evolutionary upheavals, though the alternation does not seem regular enough to meaningfully described as cyclical. "See Lowenthal, Development vS utopia, "p. 54 13, Dorothy Solinger, Chinese Business Under Socialism(Berkeley: University of California, 1984), p. 298: Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution(Washington, DC rookings, 1987), pp. 83-84: Eric Harwit, Chinas Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems Ind Prospects(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), Pp. 15-42; Jude Howell, China Opens its Doors(Boulder, CO: Lynne Ricnner, 1993), pp 32-35; 252-59 Peiji,“G Chinas forcign trade development strategy"), in Wu Jikun(ed ) Duiwai maoyi fazhan ie(Foreign Trade Development Sti hubanshc, 1984), Pp. 26-36: Dwight H. Perkins, The central features of China's economi E Comparative Perspective( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), Pp. No 26(1988), pp. 627-28: Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Grow Foreign Trade, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), Pp. 117-130

482 The China Quarterly that normally would have been imported. Other elites, including Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, promoted a more utopian strategy of semi-autarchy, characterized by the cessation of all foreign trade and investment activities, except for very limited, government-mandated actions. Instead of an over-reliance on technology, bureaucracy and market incentives these elites embraced more normative measures to mobilize the people's sense of nationalism and communist ideals to achieve self-sufficiency. 7 The resulting dispute between the various opinion groups condemned China to a cycling within the inwardly-oriented development regime for nearly two decades. 8 Yet this did not prevent the Chinese elites wh promoted modernization from learning how to deal with the international marketplace On regaining power after 1971 and again after 1976, they reviewed and reimplemented many of the post-GLF foreign economic policies of the early 1960s. This article concludes that by the Third Plenum many elites supporting the modernization strategy had learne the limitations of an inwardly-oriented development regime; thus they proposed to experiment with several foreign economic policy initiatives indicative of an outwardly-oriented development regime 15. Bela balass alassa, The Pr of Industrial De s in Intemational Finance, No. 141(Princeton: Princeton University Press, formation on Chinas Is stratcgy, sce Nicolas Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, World bank tgg world g5agg bince geverodks rcenand Chp inae washington, mv "n Harry Harding(ed ) China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s(New Haven: Yale University res,1984),pp.83-90 that"both the carlicr writings of Mao and the later writings between words and actions can be a wide one. "They recognize the"plausibility". to plicy of econo ign economic policy during the Cultural Revolution and the summer of 1976"was sentially a closed door policy. "Sce Samuel P, S Ho and Ralph w. Huenemann, Chi an recognize that various coalitions supl various philosophies, bureaucratic identit opalesce around a pinion. In hi ost-Glf period, Lieberthal acknowledges that Mao did not"fully share the goals and around Mao's“ faith in 甲 Forward and thac, spfi i ange and rectification. "See Kenneth Lieberth:=m University Press, 1987), pp 335-356, especially pp. 351-84( Cambridge: Cambridge Fairbank (eds ) The Cambridge History of China, Vol olicy, "pp. 291, 300-302: for further discussion on the antinomy of trategies during the pre-1978 period, see Lawrence C. Reardon, "T pp.281-30port processing zones, "Journal of Contemporary China, Vol 5, No. 13(1996). 19. Utopians"also engaged in"incremental learning. "See Lieberthal. "The Great Leap Forward, " pp. 354-55 20. Joseph Nye would define the incremental learning of the pre-1978 period as"simple mation merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-mean chain. The actor simply u he same goal. "The decision to embark on a more outwardly-oriented strategy would be

Learning How to Open the Door 483 Three Cases of Incremental Learning 1. Plan-Oriented Export Promotion Policies Despite the international norms promoted by the World Trade Organi zation, economies ranging fromfree traders"such as the United States to more mercantilist states such as france and Japan continue to enact a variety of export promotion measures. China is no exception. Chinese leaders have in the past provided export incentives ranging from admi istrative orders imposing export priorities to more remunerative approaches such as providing rubber galoshes to farmers producing hogs for export. The Third Plenums"opening"strategy was to a large degree a continuation and enhancement of measures first implemented in the Export promotion: pre-Third Plenum origins. Following the economic collapse resulting from the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese leadership urgently needed to finance grain imports to feed China's starving millions and repay its foreign debts, especially to an increasingly estranged Sovict partner. China could no longer rely on the insulated barter arrangements with the Soviet bloc countries following the Sino-Soviet split, and had to engage the capitalist marketplace. The post-GLF coalition thus experi mented with a variety of export promotion measures to overcome expor procurement problems and to " develop production of products suited for to suit the characteristics of the capitalist market, "2 quality and variety export to the capitalist markets, further raise product By June 1963, the success of these measures and China's overall economic recovery enabled he Chinese to readopt a small-scale IS programme based on importing technology and turnkey plants from Western capitalist econ One of the first export promotion initiatives enacted during the post footnote cotinued result of"complex learning, "which"involves recognition of conflic\ a "mrs. "s Nuclcar leaming and U.S.-Sovict security regimes, "In No. 3(1987), P. 380; sce also Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Theory of Action Perspective(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980), pp 20-26: Levy, Learning and foreign policy, pp 286-87. Peter Hall borrows from Thomas Kuhn the ide d in patterms of policy, third order change is often a more disjunctive process and the state, " Comparative Politics, No. 25(1993),p. 279. 21. National Foreign Trade Conference, 5-27 September 1963, in X hubanshe, 1996), p 910; Fang Weizhong(ed ) Zhonghua renmin gonghe (1949-1980)(A Chronology of Major Events in the PRC's Economy (1949- 22. Long Chucai (ed ) Liyong waizi gailun(An Introduction to the Use of Foreign see Robert L. Pric Joint Economic Committce (ed ) gress, Ist Session(Wa n. DC: GPO in China. "in U.S Congress, Joint Economic Committee (ed ) China: A Reassessment of the Econony, 94th Congress, Ist Session (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), Pp 712-721

The China Quarterly gLF period applied administrative means to prioritize export procure ment, where quotas were threatened by Chinas looming economic crisi Despite the growing threat of massive starvation, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued an"Emergency directive"on 26 October 1959 inaugurating the Yi qi, er xiang san chao("First squeeze, secondly replace, thirdly exceed") policy. The policy"squeezed"from the domestic economyall commodities which [had] not met the export plan and whose domestic consumption [could] be reduced or eliminated Secondly, it mandated the"replacement"of any export commodities that could not be procured on the domestic market by other obtainable, exportable goods. Thirdly, the policy insisted that production units exceed"their planned export quota. The policy also provided"Five priorities"(Wu youxian) status to all export products, guaranteeir priority in production and processing, in access to raw materials and packaging supplies, in procurement and in transportation. 4 A second important initiative was the Yijin yangchu ("Import pro duction inputs to produce exports")foreign trade programme. Its purpose was to increase foreign exchange by"importing raw materials, equipment and technology from abroad, processing [the material] into a finished product and then exporting it. "The basic strategy was straightforward guarantee export procurement and raise the amount of foreign exchange receipts derived from exports. It was achieved in part by launching a nation-wide procurement, export, allocation and transportation campaign (Shougou, chukou, diaoyun yundong), raising the value-added content of export commodities and increasing gold production. Such administrat- asures set the goals and provided the"stick"to mect and exceed By the early 1960s, the post-GLF elite realized they needed to provide certain" carrots"to motivate Chinese farmers and factory Agricultural producers were"bribed"with the increase of state procure ment prices and the institution of various bonus schemes. Mirroring initiatives taken on the domestic market, the leadership approved 23. Li Xiannian, Duiwai maoyi trade work"), in Li Xiannian, Li Xiannian lun caizheng jinrong maoyi, 1950-1991 (Li inance and Trade, 1950-1991), VoL. I(B Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji guanli dashiji(A Chronology of the Major Events in th s Economy and Management)( Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1986), p 131 Secretaries, approved by the CCP Central Committee on 3 March 1960, in Dangd ngji guanli bianjibu, A C) ogy of Major Events in the PRC. 5. Tan Qingfeng, Yao Xuecong, and Li Shusen(eds ) Waimao fuchi shengchan shijian (The Practice of Supporting Foreign Trade Production)(Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jing aoyi chubanshe, 1984), p 43; Zhongguo duiwai maoyi gailun bianxiezu(ed. ) Zhong duiwai maoyi gailun(An Introduction to Chinas Foreign Trade)(Beijing: Duiwai maoyi 26. Professional conference on problems of gold production called by the SEC 61, in Dangdai Zhongguo de jingji guanli bianjibu, A Chronology of Major Events in the 27. For instance, see"Guanyu liangshi jiangli banfa he youlian jiage wenti"("Methods for the grain bonus methods and problems in the oil crop pricing"), issued by the State Council

Learning How to Open the Door 485 increases in export procurement prices in 1961. By 1965, the State Council had approved a separate foreign trade procurement price, which stipulated higher procurement prices for goods whose quality, variety or packaging exceeded that of similar goods intended for the domestic market. The leadership again copied initiatives in the domestic sector, instituting a bonus scheme to stimulate production of a variety of agricultural sideline products for export. Following Li Xiannian's sug gestions of March 1961, the state initially offered grain to producers of economic crops-tea, silk, peppermint oil, apples, oranges and shelled walnuts. By 1962, foreign trade corporations could offer a variety of bonus items to the producer in exchange for the procurement of 108 export commodities. Speaking to the National Foreign Trade Planning Conference in September 1963, Li Xiannian even suggested mixing administrative and remunerative measures by extending the remunerative carrot" of foreign goods bonuses to participants of the yijin yangchu programme. Thus, despite massive starvation in the Chinese country side, elites after 1961 succeeded in procuring export commodities from Chinese farmers, who were both commanded by administrative decree and motivated by cartons of cigarettes, bolts of scarce silks and squeaky tennis shoes. 33 Mirroring the remunerative schemes for agricultural export ment, the state offered export financing through the Ministry of Trade and the Chinese Peoples Construction Bank, which initiated a 600 million yuan loan programme to expand export production of industrial goods( Chukou gongyepin shengchan zhuanxiang daikuan) 34 The state also allowed localities to retain a portion of their foreign Office of Finance and Trade and approved/transmitted the CCP Central Commi November 1960, in Dangdai guanli bianjibu, A Chronology of Major Events in the PRC's Econom 148-49 regulations on a unified price Council in November 1965 ingfeng et al. The Practice of Supporting Foreign Trade Production, pp 52-56 29. For instance, see""Guanyu shougou zhongyao ji anjibu, A Chronology of Major Events in the PRC ' s Economy and Mar et al. The Practice of Supporting Foreign Trade Production, pp. 16-40Sce Tan 30. For a complete nt of the export nian,Kefu dongqian jingji ng the current e ngji kunnan de ji ge wenti"("Several problems in rade work acording to the new situantion o, apcweah ta the national foreign Trade piani Conference, delivered on 26 September 1963, in Li Xiannian, Discussions on Finance and Trade, vol. 2, p. 151 33, Tan Qingfeng et al. The Practice of Supporting Foreign Trade Production, pp. 18-19. 69 in 1964 and recodificd in 1972, 1975 and 1982. Sce Tan Qingfeng et al. ibid. p. 70; "Chukou gongyepin dustrial products for export"), Maojizongzi 82.35, issued by the Ministry o oreign Economics and Trade, the Ministry of Finance and the People's Construction Bank

486 The China Quarterly exchange earnings in order to"bring the initiatives of the localities into full play. " Where foreign exchange revenue was previously sold to Peoples Bank of China, the new retention rights were seen by key economic policy figures as an effective tool to motivate an increase in export production During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong believed that politics was in command, and that" one only [needed] to use spiritual encouragement nd not material incentives"to stimulate production. The Chinese furthermore could implement a more self-reliant strategy in which China no longer needed to import large turnkey plants from Europe and Japan As a result, the majority of the 1960s export promotion strategies were eliminated, including the bonus scheme, the loan programme expanding industrial production for export, the allocation of foreign exchange to localities(waihui fencheng)and"using imports to develop exports. 40 This period of semi-autarchy ended with the death of Mao's appointed successor, Marshal Lin Biao, in September 1971. Zhou Enlai, with help of the other post-GLF coalition members, readjusted the countrys development strategy to overcome the after-effects of the Cultural Revo- lution and to stimulate domestic development. Somewhat freed from Maoist utopian dictates and the economic constraints of the early 1960s the post-GLF coalition reimplemented a comprehensive, large-scale Is domestic development strategy whose total projected cost in foreign exchange was US$4.3 billion. 4I footnoTe cotinued shang jihuasi (ed. ) Lilu wenjian huibian(A e)(Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1986), rcial and foreign trade work), delivered at an Office Conference of the State Council Office of Finance and Trade on 25 August 1965, in Li Xiannian, Discussions on Finance and Trade, Vol. 2, pp. 254-5 ibmiteezhi guashuai wenti de yijian"("Opinion on putting politics in of Major Events in the PRCi's Ecomordai zh, and approvedtransmitted by the CCP Central the State Council on 16 June 1968, in Dangdai Zho ts in the PRC s Economy and mianbu fenpei wenti"("Problem of distributing cotton cloth to inhabitants of Im burbs in 1969), issued on 4 March 1969, in Dangdai Zhongguo de jingji guanl rade Production 39. Guanyu quxian feimaoyi waihui fencheng banfa da the method of apportioning foreign exchange for non-trade channels"), issued by the ncil on 9 May 1967, in D Major Events in the PRC's Economy and Management, p. 240 Tan Qingfeng et al. The Practice of Suppe request for instructions conceming the increase of equipment imports shi baogao" onomic exchange"), was submitted to the State Council by the SPC on 2 January 1973 and

Leaning How to Open the door 487 To finance the"4-3"development strategy, the post-GLF coalition reviewed the export promotion policies of the early 1960s, many of which were subsequently revived and expanded. To repair the damage to Chinas industrial export sector, the State Council approved a Ministry of Foreign Trade plan to revive the Specialized Loan Programme for Industrial Export Production in 1972. 42 After reviewing the post-GLF loan programme that had been terminated during the Cultural Revolution the State Council determined that such loans had been very effective in developing export industrial products, raising quality and variety, and improving packaging. 43 The State Council thus set aside 200 million yuan to target foreign trade industries, state-owned industrial or mining concerns and collectives; in reviewing the programme in 1975, the State Council again acknowledged its effectiveness, doubling its commitment to 550 million yuan The Specialized Loan Programme was denominated in non-convertible renminbi-useless for importing the advanced production equipment needed to improve quality and variety and compete on the international market. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Peoples Bank authorized a"new kind of work"-the short-Term Foreign Exchange Loan programme established under the Ministry of Foreign Trade's Specialized Foreign Trade Corporations. These Corporations were directed to distribute the loans to production industries that would dvanced technology, equipment and materials production capacity, raise product quality, increase variety, improve packaging and design;.. import raw and supplementary materials to be processed and exported develop transportation and tourism industries f Major Events in the PRCs Ecor ortation of 13 four chemical fibre plants, three petro-chemical plants, an alkylbenzene factory, 43 coal mine facilities, three large electrical generating plants as well as an assortment of turbines and jet 42. Chukou gongyepin shengchan zhuanxiang daikuan de yijian"("An opinion on the of Forcign Trade and approved by the State Council in 1972, in Tan Qingfeng ef al. The Practice of supporting Foreign Trade 43. For an analysis of the" Measures"and its post-1972 result, see Tan Qingfeng et al. ibid. Trade)(Beijing: Duiwai mao chubanshe, 1986), pp 30-3 Guanyu zhuanfa 'duanqi waihui daikuan shixing banfa' xi zunzhao zhixing(fu duanqi waihui daikuan shixing banfa)"("The letter of instructions conceming the issuance provisional measures gn exchange loans)"), Maochudaierzi 7399/Yin waizi 73 135, issued by the MFT and the People's Bank of China on 16 June 1973, in Zhongguo renmin yinhang jihuasi, A Collection of Documents on Interest Rates, pp. 378-79 45. Duiwai jingji maoyibu renshi jiaoyuju, chukou huayuan gailun bianxiezu(ed. ) Chukou huayuan gailun(An introduction to Export Sourcing)(Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai ngji maoyi chubar