Economic Coercion 651 stitute for military statecraft,then the conceptual distinction between the high- politics and low-politics cases falls apart.33 The other two objections-high-politics cases involve greater stakes and more zero-sum bargaining-can be challenged on substantive and conceptual grounds. Certainly,demands regarding territorial disputes are more important than regula- tions governing tuna drift nets.However,demands of that magnitude are a rare phenomenon even within the category of "high politics."A majority of the cases in Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott consist of the sender requesting "modest changes" in target policy.34 Furthermore,this criticism underestimates the demands that are made in matters of low politics.Asking states to alter their domestic laws or regulations is an intrinsically political demand,equivalent to asking nation-states to alter their human rights regime or other internal political arrangements.35 These demands violate Westphalian sovereignty-the exclusion of external ac- tors from domestic authority structures-and as such,represent a significant po- litical demand.36 The final criticism is that because states care only about wealth maximization in low-politics disputes,they will respond more readily to sanctions than in high- politics disputes.37 The premise behind this critique-that states care only about absolute gains in disputes over economic or regulatory issues-does not rest on solid conceptual footing.Some prominent international relations theorists argue that states care about their relative economic position as much as wealth maximi- zation.38 At a minimum,the history of the Section 301 mechanism indicates that the United States strengthens and uses this sanctions mechanism when it wants to maximize its relative position vis-a-vis its economic rivals.39 It should also be noted that for the purposes of this study,the latter two objec- tions are conceptually irrelevant.Assume for the moment that the objections are 33.As to whether military statecraft is not an option in low-politics cases,history provides several counterexamples.Great Britain used its naval power in its trade war with the Hanseatic League during the fifteenth century:in the seventeenth century,Great Britain used force again to advance commercial interests against the Netherlands.See Conybeare 1987,105,133.In the nineteenth century,the United States used the threat of naval power to successfully compel Japan into opening its market to Ameri- can goods.Iraq invaded Kuwait because of conflicts over oil prices and debt repayment.In 1995,a Canadian naval vessel fired at and seized a Spanish trawler to gain the upper hand in a dispute over fishing rights.See DeSombre 2000,5.Force may not be used in most modern economic disputes,but that does not preclude the possibility of its use. 34.Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott 1990,84-85. 35.It is not surprising that in response to U.S.economic coercion regarding China's lax enforce- ment of intellectual property rights,Beijing invoked sovereignty language very similar to its response to American criticisms and threats about China's human rights situation.See Chien-Hale 1997. 36.Krasner 1999.At least some of the low-politics cases are identical to the high-politics cases. Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott include U.S.demands for a target state to improve its human rights re- gime.Given that in 1988,Congress expanded its definition of human rights to include core labor stan- dards,the distinction between the high politics of human rights and the low politics of labor regulation has disappeared. 37.Pape1997,96. 38.See Waltz 1979;Grieco 1990;Gowa 1994;Mastanduno 1998;and Skalnes 2000. 39.See Goldstein 1993:Bayard and Elliott 1994:and Noland 1997.Economic Coercion 651 stitute for military statecraft, then the conceptual distinction between the high￾politics and low-politics cases falls apart.33 The other two objections-high-politics cases involve greater stakes and more zero-sum bargaining-can be challenged on substantive and conceptual grounds. Certainly, demands regarding territorial disputes are more important than regula￾tions governing tuna drift nets. However, demands of that magnitude are a rare phenomenon even within the category of "high politics." A majority of the cases in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott consist of the sender requesting "modest changes" in target Furthermore, this criticism underestimates the demands that are made in matters of low politics. Asking states to alter their domestic laws or regulations is an intrinsically political demand, equivalent to asking nation-states to alter their human rights regime or other internal political arrangement^.^^ These demands violate Westphalian sovereignty-the exclusion of external ac￾tors from domestic authority structures-and as such, represent a significant po￾litical demand.36 The final criticism is that because states care only about wealth maximization in low-politics disputes, they will respond more readily to sanctions than in high￾politics disputes.37 The premise behind this critique-that states care only about absolute gains in disputes over economic or regulatory issues-does not rest on solid conceptual footing. Some prominent international relations theorists argue that states care about their relative economic position as much as wealth maximi- ~ation.~' At a minimum, the history of the Section 301 mechanism indicates that the United States strengthens and uses this sanctions mechanism when it wants to maximize its relative position vis-a-vis its economic rivals.39 It should also be noted that for the purposes of this study, the latter two objec￾tions are conceptually irrelevant. Assume for the moment that the objections are 33. As to whether military statecraft is not an option in low-politics cases, history provides several counterexamples. Great Britain used its naval power in its trade war with the Hanseatic League during the fifteenth century; in the seventeenth century, Great Britain used force again to advance commercial interests against the Netherlands. See Conybeare 1987, 105, 133. In the nineteenth century, the United States used the threat of naval power to successfully compel Japan into opening its market to Ameri￾can goods. Iraq invaded Kuwait because of conflicts over oil prices and debt repayment. In 1995, a Canadian naval vessel fired at and seized a Spanish trawler to gain the upper hand in a dispute over fishing rights. See DeSombre 2000, 5. Force may not be used in most modern economic disputes, but that does not preclude the possibility of its use. 34. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 84-85. 35. It is not surprising that in response to U.S. economic coercion regarding China's lax enforce￾ment of intellectual property rights, Beijing invoked sovereignty language very similar to its response to American criticisms and threats about China's human rights situation. See Chien-Hale 1997. 36. Krasner 1999. At least some of the low-politics cases are identical to the high-politics cases. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott include U.S. demands for a target state to improve its human rights re￾gime. Given that in 1988, Congress expanded its definition of human rights to include core labor stan￾dards, the distinction between the high politics of human rights and the low politics of labor regulation has disappeared. 37. Pape 1997, 96. 38. See Waltz 1979; Grieco 1990; Gowa 1994; Mastanduno 1998; and Skilnes 2000. 39. See Goldstein 1993; Bayard and Elliott 1994; and Noland 1997