THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM That is to say,they not only speak on behalf of dominant factions,but also assist in the construction of the long-term interest of capital by providing a relatively autonomous 'reading'of the conditions of accumulation.This is what J.Marcus Fleming of the International Monetary Fund called the IMF's 'system of guidance'(Fleming,1975:276).In this spirit,open Marxism gives much meaning to great concords such as the Plaza and Louvres Agreements of the mid-1980s,which are seen as an expression of a politically constructed general interest (Gill and Law,1988:177-8). Episodes like Thatcherism are captured unambiguously as national manifestations of global strategies(Overbeek,1990:141-75).In the East and the West,restructuring is 'global perestroika',a revolution from above (Cox,1992:26). Yet,the process whereby systems of guidance and codes of discipline are constructed,the critical 'reading'on which so much depends,is not at all problematized in open Marxism.Rather,the political picture pre- sented by open Marxism reflects Christian Palloix's analysis of the unity of the circuits of social capital in the world economy(Van der Pijl,1989; Palloix,1975).Just as Palloix wrote of states as national landing points for international reproduction(Palloix,1977:198),open Marxism speaks of transnational strategies'applied'and 'translated'nationally(Van der Pijl, 1989:4,7),and of national politics as'contained'within parameters set by an elite reading of the conditions of accumulation(Gill et al.,1992:16). In the end,open Marxism is the political companion that Cox had sought(Cox,1981a:73)to the CEREM's study of the transnationalization of monetary and financial circuits(Michalet,1979).The political unity of transnational fractions of capital is taken as a given,and structural literacy ('clairvoyance'in Gramsci's terminology,[1971:113],and 'highly developed consciousness'for Gill [1900a:89])as the glue holding trans- national capital together.The internationalization of the state(Cox,1985: 230-3),and of political authority (Gill and Law,1988:90-1),are repres- ented as literal political expressions of the globalization of production and finance(Gill et al.,1992:8),and the unproblematized 'sociological corollary to the internationalization of capital'(Gill,1990a:37).In this context,states are but 'conduits between world-economy trends and the domestic economy...agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding'with the unambiguous task of adapting national economies to 'the perceived exigencies of the world economy'(Cox, 1991b:337). The distinction between cliques and fractions of capital can only serve as a starting point to historical analysis,having little consequence itself. However,the failure to distinguish from the start between structurally rooted fraction of capital and political cliques and alliances,is revealing of open Marxism's apriorism.The transnational unity of a neo-liberal 113 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM That is to say, they not only speak on behalf of dominant factions, but also assist in the construction of the long-term interest of capital by providing a relatively autonomous 'reading' of the conditions of accumulation. This is what J. Marcus Fleming of the International Monetary Fund called the IMF's 'system of guidance' (Fleming, 1975: 276). In this spirit, open Marxism gives much meaning to great concords such as the Plaza and Louvres Agreements of the mid-1980s, which are seen as an expression of a politically constructed general interest (Gill and Law, 1988: 177-8). Episodes like Thatcherism are captured unambiguously as national manifestations of global strategies (Overbeek, 1990: 141-75). In the East and the West, restructuring is 'global perestroika', a revolution from above (Cox, 1992: 26). Yet, the process whereby systems of guidance and codes of discipline are constructed, the critical 'reading' on which so much depends, is not at all problematized in open Marxism. Rather, the political picture pre￾sented by open Marxism reflects Christian Palloix's analysis of the unity of the circuits of social capital in the world economy (Van der Pijl, 1989; Palloix, 1975). Just as Palloix wrote of states as national landing points for international reproduction (Palloix, 1977: 198), open Marxism speaks of transnational strategies 'applied' and 'translated' nationally (Van der Pijl, 1989: 4,7), and of national politics as 'contained' within parameters set by an elite reading of the conditions of accumulation (Gill et al., 1992: 16). In the end, open Marxism is the political companion that Cox had sought (Cox, 1981a: 73) to the CEREM's study of the transnationalization of monetary and financial circuits (Michalet, 1979).8 The political unity of transnational fractions of capital is taken as a given, and structural literacy ('clairvoyance' in Gramsci's terminology, [1971: 113], and 'highly developed consciousness' for Gill [1900a: 89]) as the glue holding trans￾national capital together. The internationalization of the state (Cox, 1985: 230-3), and of political authority (Gill and Law, 1988: 90-1), are repres￾ented as literal political expressions of the globalization of production and finance (Gill et al., 1992: 8), and the unproblematized 'sociological corollary to the internationalization of capital' (Gill, 1990a: 37). In this context, states are but 'conduits between world-economy trends and the domestic economy . .. agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding' with the unambiguous task of adapting national economies to 'the perceived exigencies of the world economy' (Cox, 1991b: 337). The distinction between cliques and fractions of capital can only serve as a starting point to historical analysis, having little consequence itself. However, the failure to distinguish from the start between structurally rooted fraction of capital and political cliques and alliances, is revealing of open Marxism's apriorism. The transnational unity of a neo-liberal 113 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions