640 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers.Their characteriza- tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat- able.It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought.It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it.But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant,hegemonic position in the field of international security studies.This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists,who have tended to regard themselves within the aca- demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter- lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized.There is a striking disjunction between the self- image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan Hansen.An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu- tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings But,beyond this perceptual disconnect,what does it mean to say that strate- gic studies was dominant and hegemonic?Strategic studies',suggest Buzan Hansen(2009:263),'called the shots'.Who called what shots?'Strategic studies'was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues.Moreover,the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge- nous group but are themselves divided along political,ideological,disciplin- ary,methodological,and theoretical lines-whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement.There was no coherent organized movement,no governing body,no single dominant institution,no subfield policymaking apparatus,nothing anywhere that 'called the shots'or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif- ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives.There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form-as indeed happened,a point definitively demon- strated in Buzan Hansen's book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012640 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 huge bodies of literature and to craft a coherent storyline out of a very messy intellectual map. But this is the story of the field as told by two European scholars who are viewing this history through the lens of the challengers. Their characteriza￾tion of the evolution of the field is accordingly both revealing and debat￾able. It reveals how traditional strategic studies is viewed by those who work within other schools of thought. It reveals how they see and define the field and the contending schools within it. But it is not the story as a traditionalist would tell it. What Does It Mean To Be Dominant? It is a core premise of the Buzan & Hansen interpretation that traditional strategic studies long occupied a dominant, hegemonic position in the field of international security studies. This does not accord with a common self-image among traditionalists, who have tended to regard themselves within the aca￾demic context as a small tribe of unfashionable and often unwelcome inter￾lopers who fit uneasily in conventional university departments and who often feel weak and marginalized. There is a striking disjunction between the self￾image of many traditionalists and the emphatic assertion of their supremacy by Buzan & Hansen. An American traditionalist would likely see the evolu￾tion of the field as involving a long and only partially successful struggle to establish strategic studies as a legitimate academic discipline in an academy inclined to dismiss its offerings as high journalism or mere policy jottings. But, beyond this perceptual disconnect, what does it mean to say that strate￾gic studies was dominant and hegemonic? ‘Strategic studies’, suggest Buzan & Hansen (2009: 263), ‘called the shots’. Who called what shots? ‘Strategic studies’ was simply a label applied to a loose collection of individuals and institutions who worked on a particular broadly related array of substantive issues. Moreover, the traditionalists have never been a unified or homoge￾nous group but are themselves divided along political, ideological, disciplin￾ary, methodological, and theoretical lines – whether hawks versus doves or offensive versus defensive realists or historians versus political scientists. This was not a single dominant scholarly community but a subfield marked by cleavages and internal disagreement. There was no coherent organized movement, no governing body, no single dominant institution, no subfield policymaking apparatus, nothing anywhere that ‘called the shots’ or that consciously made concerted efforts to prevent others from working on dif￾ferent arrays of issues from different perspectives. There was ample room for individuals to strike off in their own substantive direction or for alternative schools of thought to form – as indeed happened, a point definitively demon￾strated in Buzan & Hansen’s book. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012