IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 695 onding iati ons in memory cven en a person docs model als ople.mere k cial det negative reacti oward th eotype is co nsidered inac wing th me attitudes from m (1)showed that im lout-goptohcctcntthtTrcspondcntswc ions by others (cf. e analyses:see Cacioppo,Petty,Feinstein, Jarvis 96. recent ions of the in-group on the ass ative level but to m milar vein. lysis by Hofma ang spor neity in the co Cognitive Consistency According to the APe mode ing (Gawronski,Strack. the APE sults from tha the as and the appli n2003 tions a t with each other when both are and f th ositional thinking by in how many )It is imporant o o 99).More extensive elaboration generally impliesc nt that any of itions is inc he auto respons oration is likely that inconsistency (Gawronski. the ex member automatically activates valuative iudgm ts (e.g.Florack et al,2001:Hofmann et al. to a minority 2005:sce also Shiv&N wis.2004 itive elab not ine itabl yreduce the relation betwee Atrcan Ame only if additi ally c n the cSndcscrbcdsncegationGibe d)supp atter proces on (Fes 957)or man.003:Dovidi ingis the mediating ion.Moreover,if additio d evaluative outcome ns confirm th ubjective validity of one c affective reaction.the rela Cognitive Elaboration The term logical consistency is intended to refer more broadh Cognitive elaboration.or the degree of active thought devoted to to be ad tion as true or false. We argue that mere knowledge of a propo￾sition endorsed by other people can contribute to the activation of corresponding associations in memory even when a person does not believe in the validity of that proposition (Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003). For example, mere knowledge of a cultural stereotype may lead to automatic negative reactions toward the members of a disadvantaged minority group even when the ste￾reotype is considered inaccurate (Devine, 1989). This assumption is supported by research showing that members of disadvantaged minority groups often exhibit automatic negative reactions toward their own in-group, particularly when they perceive the majority group to exhibit a high level of negativity against the minority group (e.g., Livingston, 2002). It is important to note that such automatic negativity against the in-group is often rejected on the propositional level, which leads to negative (rather than positive) correlations between personally endorsed evaluations and evalua￾tions by others (cf. Heider, 1958). That is, higher levels of per￾ceived negativity from out-groups lead to more negative evalua￾tions of the in-group on the associative level but to more positive evaluations on the propositional level (Livingston, 2002). Cognitive Consistency According to the APE model, cognitive consistency is exclu￾sively a concern of propositional reasoning (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press). In particular, we argue that consistency results from a propositional process of consistency assessment that is based on the assignment of truth values and the application of syllogistic rules and logical principles.6 From a general perspec￾tive, two propositions are consistent with each other when both are regarded as true and one does not imply the opposite of the other. In contrast, two propositions are inconsistent when both are re￾garded as true and one follows from the opposite of the other (see Festinger, 1957). It is important to note that, because (in)consis￾tency between two propositions cannot even be defined without an assignment of truth values, people have to resolve inconsistency by means of propositional reasoning—that is, either by changing the truth value of one proposition or by finding an additional propo￾sition that resolves the inconsistency (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press; Kruglanski, 1989). For example, if expo￾sure to a minority member automatically activates negative asso￾ciations, people either may reject the propositional implication of these associations because of its inconsistency with other accepted propositions (see above) or may find an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (e.g., “This African American person was unfriendly”). Whereas the former process refers to what has been described as negation (Gilbert, 1991), suppression (Wegner, 1994), and hierarchical inhibition (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998), the latter process may be described as rationalization (Festinger, 1957) or justification (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). The important point is that whenever cognitive consistency issues arise, propositional reasoning is the mediating mechanism underlying the obtained evaluative outcomes. Cognitive Elaboration Cognitive elaboration, or the degree of active thought devoted to an attitude object, has long been assumed to be of paramount importance in attitude change (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). As with other models of implicit and explicit atti￾tudes (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000), the APE model also implies a crucial role of cognitive elaboration. Fazio and Olson (2003), for example, argued that cognitive elaboration is a crucial determinant of people’s success in suppressing the influ￾ence of automatic attitudes on evaluative judgments. In a similar vein, Wilson et al. (2000) argued that cognitive elaboration is a crucial determinant of people’s success in retrieving their explicit attitudes from memory. Thus, both models imply that the correla￾tion between implicit and explicit evaluations should decrease as a function of increasing cognitive elaboration. Consistent with this assumption, Florack, Scarabis, and Bless (2001) showed that im￾plicit racial prejudice as measured by the IAT was more strongly related to deliberative judgments about members of the relevant racial out-group to the extent that respondents were low in need for cognition (i.e., had a low dispositional tendency to engage in deliberative analyses; see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). In a similar vein, a recent meta-analysis by Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, and Schmitt (2005) showed that correlations between the IAT and explicit measures significantly increased as a function of increasing spontaneity in the course of making a judgment. The APE model similarly posits that increased elaboration often reduces the correlation between explicit and implicit attitudes. However, the APE model differs from previous accounts with regard to its assumptions about the underlying processes. As we have noted, these earlier accounts argued that cognitive elaboration influences success in suppressing automatic evaluations (Fazio & Olson, 2003) or in retrieving explicit attitudes from memory (Wil￾son et al., 2000). In contrast to these models, the APE model assumes that cognitive elaboration affects the complexity of prop￾ositional thinking by influencing how many judgment-relevant propositions one considers in addition to one’s automatic affective reaction (see Albarracı´n & Wyer, 2000; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). More extensive elaboration generally implies considering a greater number of propositions about the attitude object. To the extent that any of these additional propositions is inconsistent with the automatic evaluative response, the extra elaboration is likely to reduce the correlation between automatic affective reactions and evaluative judgments (e.g., Florack et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2005; see also Shiv & Nowlis, 2004). It is important to note, however, that increased cognitive elab￾oration does not inevitably reduce the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes. According to the APE model, cognitive elabo￾ration should reduce the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes only if additionally considered propositions question the validity of one’s automatic affective reaction as a basis for an evaluative judgment (see Judd & Lusk, 1984). However, if addi￾tionally considered propositions do not question the validity of one’s automatic affective reaction, the relation between explicit and implicit attitudes should be unaffected by cognitive elabora￾tion. Moreover, if additionally considered propositions confirm the subjective validity of one’s automatic affective reaction, the rela- 6 The term logical consistency is intended to refer more broadly to subjective consistency resulting from any kind of inferential rule that is considered to be valid, rather than to strict logical consistency in terms of normative syllogistic rules. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 695