Intervention ably increased from the garrison then being withdrawn from Tientsin,and by the middle of the year the regular British force there numbered about two thousand five hundred.With other additions the total force available was probably in the region of four thousand.24 In the circumstances this was cer- tainly a formidable force,especially when the great superiority of its arms and training are taken into account.But it was not of a size,nor was it ever intended,to be used much beyond the defence of Shanghai and its immediate vicinity.In fact one of the arguments used by Rear-Admiral Hope in favour of defending a radius around Shanghai rather than simply the city itself was that it would take fewer troops,using them in flying columns to support Chinese garrisons,than to man walls four and a half miles in extent.The object was to keep the size of the force needed at Shanghai as small as possible.25 The British military commander in China during most of 1862,Brig.-Gen.Staveley,was authorized to send for additional troops from India if he felt it absolutely necessary,but he was certainly not encouraged to do so.When he did call for them, upon what the War Office regarded as the inadequate ground that Indian troops stood the Shanghai climate better than British,he was reprimanded and told that it was the opinion of the government that 'the British military forces at Shanghae may safely be reduced'.26 In March 1863,over twelve months before the capture of Nanking,Bruce also urged upon him the desirability of making arrangements with the Chinese authorities for the defence of the port 'which would gradually enable us to reduce the number of troops at Shanghae,and consequently the expenses of the occupation;for I look with dread at the conse- quences of the financial difficulties that must result from the present state of expenditure'.27 In the middle of 1863,by which time the threat to Shanghai was safely past,the British force there was reduced to about fifteen hundred.The British forces maintained at Shanghai during 1862-63 were never capable of an extensive campaign against the rebellion. The occasions on which regular British naval and military forces were engaged in direct action against the rebels were confined to the year 1862.The manner in which these engage- ments were first undertaken illustrates the quite unplanned nature of the change in British policy in the first part of that 119r汔 莎纟rV召 't莎 氵o″ ably horeased from t缸 e garrison then bong withdrawn from Tientsin, and by the ⅡⅡddle of the ycar the regu1ar British force there numbered about two thousand flve hundred, With other additons thc total force avallable was probab1y in the region of four thousand。 2‘ Ill the circumstances t⒕ is was cerˉ tahIy a form姒 able force,鸲 peo斑ly whe且 the great supero⒒ ty of its arms and trai丑hg are1ti【 l1ke⒚ i狃to account.Butit was not of a size,⒑ or was it ever intended,to bc used1nuch beyOnd the defc殂ce of shan窿⒙i and扭s immedate vicinity.In fact one of the aFguments used by RearˉAdlniral Hope iI1 favour of defcndhg a radus arOL【nd Shallgh碰 rather than simply the G“y⒒self was that⒒ would take fewer troops,us血g them in Ⅱ】 w馘`1ing columns to support Chhese garroons,than to man ls four and a har miles in cxtent。 The o凵ect Was to keep the size ofthe force needed at shanghai as sma11as possibIe.25 The British Ⅱ1ilitary co【 n1nander in China during most of 1862,Brig.Gen.Staveley,、 vas authorized to send for additiona1 troops from Indh if he felt it absolutely necessary,but he was certaⅡⅡy not encouraged to do so。 When he did ca1l for them, upo众 lvhat the War0丘ce regarded as the iⅡ adequate ground that Indian troops stood the shanghai climate better than Br扭ish,he lvas repr血nanded and told thatit was the opinion of the goverxlment钅Ⅱat ‘the British mⅡ ⒒ary forces at Shanghae may safely be roduced’ 。26In March I863,over twe1Ⅴe months before t缸 e capture of Nankhg,Bruce aIso urged upon hhn the desirabⅡ妣y ofmaking arrangements v注th the Chhese authorities for the defence ofthe port‘ which、Ⅳould gradua11y enab1e us to reducc the number oftroops at shanghae,and consequently the expe⒑ses of the Occupation;for I look、Ⅳith dread at the cOnseˉ quences of the盘 nancia1dⅡ ncu⒒ies t⒖at must resu1t froⅡ 1the presemt state of expenditure’ ,27In the Iniddle of1863,by wboch thne the threat to shanghai was safely past,the British force there xvas reduced to about fifteen hundrcd,The Br⒒ ish forces mahtaiⅡed at shanghai duri且 g1862-63、vere never capab1e of an extensive campaign agahst the rebe1Ⅱ on. Thc OccasiO⒑ s on which regular Br如 ish naval and mⅡ ⒒ary forces were e⒔gaged h direct action agahst the rebels were comfmed to the year1862,The manner in which thesc cngageˉ ments Were nrst undertake且 illustrates the qu⒒ e unplanned nature of the change in Br“ ish po⒒cy im伍e且rst part of that 119