economic history may be closer. But if English legal history is neither history nor law and is different from the "law ands how should one characterize it? perhaps the answer is that it is a distinct intellectual endeavor, separate frombothlaw and history, but one that combines the methodology, objectives, insights. and knowledge of both law and history IV. Expanding the Interdisciplinary Interface:English Legal History and Whatever its nature, would a greater connection between legal history with other disciplines be intellectually beneficial? The possible complementary interests of philosophy, literature, and economics will be considered A. Legal History and philosophy Most legal history scholarship is not conceptual. The legal history tradition has tended to be jurisprudentially agnostic, eschewing philosophical questions. In The Law's Two Bodies, John Baker said I am not trying to reinvent legal realism, still less to invent any new kind of-ism, and I am not keen to become involved in deep jurisprudential questions about whether law can logically be derived from cases alone.. 8 Maitland said, "As to philosophy, that is no affair of mine. "9 But legal history scholarsh raises interesting jurisprudential questions. Two noted legal historians, Brian Simpson and Morris Arnold, have explored such questions o One interesting topic is the nature of law, a primary jurisprudential topic. The work of lega 57. Some treat economic history as a branch of economics, not history. See. e.g, Ron Harris, The Encounters of History and Legal History, 4 Theoretical Inquiries in Law No. 2(2003)(forthcoming/ on Harris. The Encounters of Economic Economic History and Legal History, 21 Law Hist Rev.(2003)forthcoming); 58. See John H. Baker, The Laws Two Bodies 1-2(2001) 59. See Ill Collected Papers of Frederic william 4, supra note 44, at 319, quoted in David runc Maitland Ind the Real Personality of Associations, in nd the Personality of the State 89-123(1997). As Runciman notes, Maitlands introduction to Gierke's book on medieval political theor series of articles on organized group ersonality did venture into jurisprudence, despite Maitland's"conscious ignorance and unfeigned humility" on the subject. See lll Collected Papers, supra at 319. Maitland referred to continental legal and political theory as well as Austin and Hobbes. See Frederic William Maitland, Introduction, Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages vil-xIv (1958) 60. See Morris Arnold, Toward an Ideology of the early English La of obligations, 5 Law Hist. Rev. 505(1987) A W B Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, reprinted in Legal History and Legal Theory 359(1987)57. Some treat economic history as a branch of economics, not history. See, e.g., Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. (2003)(forthcoming); Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 4 Theoretical Inquiries in Law No. 2 (2003) (forthcoming). 58. See John H. Baker, The Law’s Two Bodies 1-2 (2001). 59. See III Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, supra note 44, at 319, quoted in David Runciman, Maitland and the Real Personality of Associations, in Pluralism and the Personality of the State 89-123 (1997). As Runciman notes, Maitland’s introduction to Gierke’s book on medieval political theory and a series of articles on organized group personality did venture into jurisprudence, despite Maitland’s “conscious ignorance and unfeigned humility” on the subject. See III Collected Papers, supra at 319. Maitland referred to continental legal and political theory as well as Austin and Hobbes. See Frederic William Maitland, Introduction, Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages vii-xlv (1958). 60. See Morris Arnold, Toward an Ideology of the Early English Law of Obligations, 5 Law & Hist. Rev. 505 (1987); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, reprinted in Legal History and Legal Theory 359 (1987). 11 economic history may be closer.57 But ifEnglishlegalhistoryis neither historynorlawand is different from the “law ands,” how should one characterize it? Perhaps the answer is that it is a distinct intellectual endeavor,separate frombothlawand history, but one that combinesthe methodology, objectives, insights, and knowledge of both law and history. IV. Expanding the Interdisciplinary Interface: “English Legal History and” Whatever its nature, would a greater connection between legal history with other disciplines be intellectually beneficial? The possible complementaryinterests ofphilosophy, literature, and economics will be considered. A. Legal History and Philosophy Most legal history scholarship is not conceptual. The legal history tradition has tended to be jurisprudentially agnostic, eschewing philosophical questions. In The Law’s Two Bodies,JohnBakersaid “I am not trying to reinvent legal realism, still less to invent any new kind of -ism, and I am not keen to become involved indeep jurisprudential questions about whether law can logically be derived from cases alone . . . . 58 Maitland said, “As to philosophy, that is no affair of mine.”59 But legal history scholarship raises interesting jurisprudential questions. Two noted legalhistorians,BrianSimpson and Morris Arnold, have explored such questions.60 One interesting topic is the nature of law, a primary jurisprudential topic. The work of legal