historians have claimed him, Milsom has on severaloccasions emphasized Maitland, the lawyer. In fact, the legal history scholar needs to know something about both fields but this assertion leaves uncertain how much knowledge ofhistory is required by those scholars who emphasize law or knowledge of law by those whose scholarship is more contextual. For example, it is doubtful whether the latter need to know about the intricacies of pleading Perhaps, it depends on the issue being explored. However, whatever the scholarly orientation, some knowledge of legal institutions and doctrine, the legal process(in Milsom's words, "how law works">), contemporary context, and the historical nature of institutions are all necessary for competent legal history scholarship. The three categories into which these scholars fall in terms oftheir training and experience confirm this blending of knowledge. Some are lawyers with no formal training in history, others have advanced degrees in history, but no legal training; and the final group has formal training in both fields. The mixed backgrounds of the contributors to the future Oxford History of Laws of England are an apt illustration. Thus, a legal historian is distinct from both a lawyer and a historian. 6 If so, some reconsideration of the nature of legal history is in order. First, it seems unlikely that it should be characterized as law although some legal historians'perspective is distinctly legal. But legal history scholarship seems quite different than the typical doctrinal scholarship and courses that have be the traditional focus of the legal academy. Despite the pedigree of Maitland and his successors, I am reluctant to call it history as it requires a significant knowledge of law and legal institutions, at both conceptual and practical levels. Moreover, it seems to be more than just another kind of history. Law is more of a formal discipline than seems to be true of the adjectival"others, social and political, although 52. See Geoffrey R. Elton, F.W. Maitland 19-55(1985). Elton made him a"patron saint. " See id. at 97-103 See e. g, S.F.C. Milsom, Maitland, supra note 51; Milsom, 'Pollock and Maitland, supra note 46: S.F.C. Milsom, y. Maitland, in Studies in the History of the Common Law 261, 267-73 (1985) 4. See Milsom, Pollock and Maitland, supra note 46, at 252 55. Of the 11 identified contributors, four have formal training only in history, six only in law, and one in both fields narrow. See Calvin Woodward, History, Legal History and Legal Education, 53 Va. L. Rev. 89, 99-113, 120-21. hinking it too 56. One rather idiosyncratic commentator bemoaned Maitlands influence on the study of legal histor52. See Geoffrey R. Elton, F.W. Maitland 19-55 (1985). Elton made him a “patron saint.” See id. at 97-103. 53. See, e.g., S.F.C. Milsom, Maitland, supra note 51; Milsom, ‘Pollock and Maitland’, supra note 46; S.F.C. Milsom, F.W. Maitland, in Studies in the History of the Common Law 261, 267-73 (1985). 54. See Milsom, Pollock and Maitland’, supra note 46, at 252. 55. Of the 11 identified contributors, four have formal training only in history, six only in law, and one in both fields. 56. One rather idiosyncratic commentator bemoaned Maitland’s influence on the study of legal history, thinking it too narrow. See Calvin Woodward, History, Legal History and Legal Education, 53 Va. L. Rev. 89, 99-113, 120-21. 10 historians have claimed him,52 Milsomhas onseveraloccasions emphasized Maitland, the lawyer.53 Infact, the legalhistoryscholar needsto knowsomething about bothfields.But this assertionleaves uncertain how muchknowledge ofhistoryisrequired bythose scholars who emphasize lawor knowledge oflawbythose whose scholarship is more contextual. For example, it is doubtful whether the latter need to know about the intricacies of pleading. Perhaps, it depends on the issue being explored. However, whatever the scholarly orientation, some knowledge of legal institutions and doctrine, the legal process (in Milsom’s words, “howlawworks”54), contemporarycontext,and the historicalnature ofinstitutions are allnecessary for competent legalhistory scholarship. The three categories into which these scholars fall interms oftheir training and experience confirm this blending of knowledge. Some are lawyers with no formal training in history; others have advanced degrees in history, but no legal training; and the final group has formal training in both fields. The mixed backgrounds of the contributors to the future Oxford History of Laws of England are an apt illustration.55 Thus, a legal historian is distinct from both a lawyer and a historian.56 If so, some reconsideration of the nature of legal history is in order. First, it seems unlikely that it should be characterized as law although some legal historians’ perspective is distinctly legal. But legal history scholarship seems quite different than the typical doctrinal scholarship and courses that have been the traditional focus of the legal academy. Despite the pedigree of Maitland and his successors, I am reluctant to call it history as it requires a significant knowledge of law and legal institutions, at both conceptual and practical levels. Moreover, it seems to be more than just another kind of history. Law is more of a formal discipline than seems to be true of the adjectival “others,” social and political, although