contrasted law and history and found that their material, their method, and their logic were incompatible. 4> He noted that history involved comparison, but lawyers focus only on their own system; history requires evidences and law depends on authority and thus there is the temptation to confuse the logic ofevidence and the "logic of authority, and lawyers are orthodox, which would be a contradiction in terms for a historian. 6 The Maitland legacy has persisted in this view as John Baker recently explicitly stated. 47 Plucknett said Maitland was"at heart a historian and that his mission was to separate law and lega history so that the latter not become "the handmaid of dogma. 9 Plucknett said that"once the professor of law embarks upon legal history he has become a historian, for legal history is not law, but history >0 The djectival word, "legal"reinforces this conclusion, suggesting that the enterprise is a kind of history, like political or social or economic history But to characterize the enterprise as history rather than law does not necessarily make its practitioners historians. Maitland believed that thorough training in modern law was indispensable to be a good legal historian. Although his memorial tablet in Westminster Abbey calls him a historian and 45. See T F.T. Plucknett, Maitland: Law and History, reprinted in Early English Legal Literature 13(1958). Plucknett himself said that" the completely opposite aims and methods of the lawyer and the legal historian are inherent in the very natures of history and of English law. See id at 14 46. See Maitland, Why the History of English Law is not Written, supra note 44, at 488-92 Milsom believes that Plucknett misunderstood. See S.F. C. Milsom, 'Pollock and Maitland: A Lawwyer's Retrospective, in 89 Proceedings of the British Academy, The History of English Law: Centenary Essays on ' Pollock and Maitland 252& n. 39(John Hudson ed, 1996) 47. See Baker, sunra note 43, at 66. Nor is Milsom's treatment of the legal history inconsistent although his more legal approach may confuse historians. See Hector L. McQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland 11(1993): John Hudson, Milsom's Legal Structure: Interpreting Twelth-Century Lan, 19 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 47(1991) 48. See Plucknett, supra note 45, at 7 49. See Plucknett, supra note 45, at 17. Maitland initially expressed that fear. See maitland, supra note 44, at 492 50. See id. at 14. John Reid asserted that lawyers and historians interpretations of the past are incompatible. See reid, supra note 38. at 19 51. See id. at 493. He believed that the of legal history falls to the ground between two schools, but that there is very little room"for teaching it in law See id. at 494-95. Plucknett seemed to disagree with this. See Plucknett, supra note 45, at 13-14, 17-18. Pluckne ments prompted a harsh reaction from Milsom. See milsom, supra note 46. at 252 n 39: S F C. Milsom. Maitland. dge lj.265,267-68(2001)45. See T.F.T. Plucknett, Maitland: Law and History, reprinted in Early English Legal Literature 13 (1958). Plucknett himself said that “the completely opposite aims and methods of the lawyer and the legal historian are inherent in the very natures of history and of English law.” See id. at 14. 46. See Maitland, Why the History of English Law is not Written, supra note 44, at 488-92. Milsom believes that Plucknett caused some of these views to be misunderstood. See S.F.C. Milsom, ‘Pollock and Maitland’: A Lawyer’s Retrospective, in 89 Proceedings of the British Academy, The History of English Law: Centenary Essays on ‘Pollock and Maitland 252 & n.39 (John Hudson ed., 1996); 47. See Baker, supra note 43, at 66. Nor is Milsom’s treatment of the legal history inconsistent although his more legal approach may confuse historians. See Hector L. McQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland 11 (1993); John Hudson, Milsom’s Legal Structure: Interpreting Twelth-Century Law, 19 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 47(1991). 48. See Plucknett,supra note 45, at 7. 49. See Plucknett,supra note 45, at 17. Maitland initially expressed that fear. See Maitland, supra note 44, at 492. 50. See id. at 14. John Reid asserted that lawyers’ and historians’ interpretations of the past are incompatible. See Reid, supra note 38, at 195. 51. See id. at 493. He believed that the teaching of legal history “falls to the ground between two schools,” but that there is very “little room” for teaching it in law schools. See id. at 494-95. Plucknett seemed to disagree with this. See Plucknett, supra note 45, at 13-14, 17-18. Plucknett’s comments prompted a harsh reaction from Milsom. See Milsom, supra note 46, at 252 n.39; S.F.C. Milsom, Maitland, 60 Cambridge L.J. 265, 267-68 (2001). 9 contrasted lawand historyand found that “their material, theirmethod,and theirlogic were incompatible.”45 He noted that history involved comparison, but lawyers focus only on their own system; history requires evidences and lawdepends onauthorityand thus there is the temptation to confuse “the logic of evidence” and the “logic of authority;”and lawyers are orthodox, which would be a contradiction in terms for a historian.46 The Maitland legacy has persisted in this view as John Baker recently explicitly stated.47 Plucknett said Maitland was “at heart a historian”48 and that his mission was to separate law and legal history so that the latter not become “the handmaid of dogma.”49 Plucknett said that “once the professor oflawembarks uponlegalhistoryhe has become a historian, forlegalhistoryis not law, but history.”50 The adjectival word, “legal” reinforces this conclusion, suggesting that the enterprise is a kind of history, like political or social or economic history. But to characterize the enterprise as history rather than law does not necessarily make its practitioners historians. Maitland believed that thorough training in modern law wasindispensable to be a good legal historian.51 Although his memorial tablet in Westminster Abbey calls him a historian and