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The Stable Matching Problem Perfect matching:everyone is matched monogamously. Each man gets exactly one woman. Each woman gets exactly one man. Stability:no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action. In matching M,an unmatched pair m-w is unstable if man m and woman w prefer each other to current partners. Unstable pair m-w could each improve by eloping. Stable matching:perfect matching with no unstable pairs. Stable matching problem.Given the preference lists of n men and n women,find a stable matching if one exists. 55 The Stable Matching Problem Perfect matching: everyone is matched monogamously.  Each man gets exactly one woman.  Each woman gets exactly one man. Stability: no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.  In matching M, an unmatched pair m-w is unstable if man m and woman w prefer each other to current partners.  Unstable pair m-w could each improve by eloping. Stable matching: perfect matching with no unstable pairs. Stable matching problem. Given the preference lists of n men and n women, find a stable matching if one exists
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