conflict of laws can no longer cope with the increasing interference of state policies in the field of transnational litigation. Of course, European legal theory has been more loath than American scholarship to embrace the idea tha at private law can also serve as a regulatory tool, which explains the poor reception of governmental interests analysis this side of the Atlantic I0 But, as it has been pointed out, fields such as antitrust, securities, banking law export controls, products liability or environmental regulation, which can all affect private transactions, directly or ind irectly, involve interests of an undeniably different order from those premised by trad itional conflicts methodology, introducing concerns previously identified as belonging to the field of public interests and as such beyond the pale of choice of law. In its strictest expression, the latter has been shielded from political concerns by the public law taboo, 2 which led courts to decline to adjud icate other states interests, at least when they give rise to the direct enforcement of foreign public rights. 3 The progressive emergence of an intermed iate category of semi-public, internationally mandatory provisions, or ' lois de police, has contributed somewhat to bridge the methodological gap; while remaining subject to specific unilateral methodology, foreign economic regulation has become amenable to application in domestic courts in private law litigation. 4 Beyond this concession, however, the conflict of laws deals exclusively with private law relationships': governments, it is thought do not care directly about outcomes. 5 However, after losing its for example, in France, the Preface to Grands arrets de lajurisprudence de droit international prive, by B Ancel and Y Lequette, rejecting as corruptive the instrumentalisation of private intemational law by European Community law or human rights ideology ) However, even prior to this clear challenge to sovere ignty-based heories of multilateralism of which the most characteristic is to be found in the work of Etienne bartin (Principes de droit international prive selon la loi et la jurisprudence francaises, 3 vols, Paris, 1930, 1932, 1935), the conflict of laws was, paradoxically, considered to be limited to private relationships. This is clearly a legacy of Von Savignys Treatise of Roman Law(vol vill) 9 That tort law for products liability, for instance, can be used to serve state interests(for instance, in protecting manufacturers or victims)is as banal in the Us(see Hay, Conflicts of Laws and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 GeoL R 617)as it is recent in the EU(see, for example, Jane Stapleton Three Problems with the New Products Liability, Essays for Patrick Atiyah, Cane and Stapleton 1991, 291) Newer still is the idea that the private law of contract can be used to regulate markets, through consumer protection, for example(see Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, OUP 1999) A characteristic expression of the refusal to accept that state interests can be found in private law can be found in Gerhards Kegels The Crisis of the Conflict of Laws, Rec Cours Acad La Haye, 1964, t 112, 91 I1 Russell J Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securit ies Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a"Choice-of-Law Approach, 70 Tex L Rev 1799(1992) hilip J McConnaughy, "Reviving the "Public Law Taboo"in International Conflict of Laws, 35 Stan J Int7L255; William S Dodge, Extraterritoraility and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism.39 Harv Int1J10 FA Mann, The Intermational Enforcement of Public Rights", published in translation in 77 Rev crit dr internatpr 1(1988) The stimulus has been article 7$ l of the Rome Convention, which prov ides for the operation of foreign mandatory laws which override party choice of law. A similar provision is made in the Hague Agency of foreign public law could arguably be considered a case of incidental application(as both the United Kingrce Convention, 1978, article 16. But these texts concern cla ims initially framed in contract, so that the interfere and Germany argue, in opting out of article 7$1). On such incidental application of foreign public law, see H Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 Tex Int7LJ429(1995) Kegel, The Crisis of the Conflict of Lawsconflict of laws can no longer cope with the increasing interference of state policies in the field of transnational litigation. Of course, European legal theory has been more loath than American scholarship to embrace the idea that private law can also serve as a regulatory tool,9 which explains the poor reception of governmental interests analysis this side of the Atlantic.10 But, as it has been pointed out, fields such as antitrust, securities, banking law, export controls, products liability or environmental regulation, which can all affect private transactions, directly or indirectly, involve interests of an undeniably different order from those premised by traditional conflicts methodology,11 introducing concerns previously identified as belonging to the field of public interests and as such beyond the pale of choice of law. In its strictest expression, the latter has been shielded from political concerns by the ‘public law taboo’,12 which led courts to decline to adjudicate other states’ interests, at least when they give rise to the direct enforcement of foreign public rights.13 The progressive emergence of an intermediate category of semi-public, internationally mandatory provisions, or ‘lois de police’, has contributed somewhat to bridge the methodological gap; while remaining subject to specific unilateral methodology, foreign economic regulation has become amenable to application in domestic courts in private law litigation.14 Beyond this concession, however, the conflict of laws deals exclusively with ‘private law relationships’; governments, it is thought, do not care directly about outcomes.15 However, after losing its for example, in France, the Preface to Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence de droit international privé, by B Ancel and Y Lequette, rejecting as corruptive the instrumentalisation of private international law by European Community law or human rights ideology). However, even prior to this clear challenge to sovere ignty-based theories of multilateralism, of which the most characteristic is to be found in the work of Etienne Bartin (Principes de droit international privé selon la loi et la jurisprudence françaises, 3 vols, Paris, 1930, 1932, 1935), the conflict of laws was, paradoxically, considered to be limited to private relationships. This is clearly a legacy of Von Savigny’s Treatise of Roman Law (vol VIII). 9 That tort law for products liability, for instance, can be used to serve state interests (for instance, in protecting manufacturers or victims) is as banal in the US (see Hay, ‘Conflicts of Laws and State Competition in the Product Liability System’, 80 Geo L R 617) as it is recent in the EU (see, for example, Jane Stapleton, ‘Three Problems with the New Products Liability’, Essays for Patrick Atiyah, Cane and Stapleton 1991, 291). Newer still is the idea that the private law of contract can be used to regulate markets, through consumer protection, for example (see Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, OUP 1999). 10 A characteristic expression of the refusal to accept that state interests can be found in private law can be found in Gerhard’s Kegel’s ‘The Crisis of the Conflict of Laws’, Rec Cours Acad La Haye, 1964, t 112, 91. 11 Russell J Weintraub, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Approach’, 70 Tex L Rev 1799 (1992). 12 Philip J McConnaughy, ‘Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws’, 35 Stan J Int’l L 255; William S Dodge, ‘Extraterritoraility and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism’, 39 Harv Int’l J 101. 13 FA Mann, ‘The International Enforcement of “Public Rights”’, published in translation in 77 Rev crit dr internat pr 1 (1988). 14 The stimulus has been article 7 § 1 of the Rome Convention, which provides for the operation of foreign mandatory laws which override party choice of law. A similar provision is made in the Hague Agency Convention, 1978, article 16. But these texts concern claims initially framed in contract, so that the interference of foreign public law could arguably be considered a case of incidental application (as both the United Kingdom and Germany argue, in opting out of article 7 § 1). On such incidental application of foreign public law, see H Baade, ‘The Operation of Foreign Public Law’, 30 Tex Int’l L J 429 (1995). 15 Kegel, ‘The Crisis of the Conflict of Laws’