neutrality'in the 1970s by allowing in result-selective considerations in private law, b choice of law also seems destined to lose the "innocence which once served to keep it distinct from international politics 2. The additional challenge of market integration for European conflicts theory. Tod Member States of the European Union are also facing the fact that a federal or integrated political structure bears necessarily on the way in which conflicts between the laws of component units are perceived and solved, and that allocation of legislative jurisdiction within such a structure does indeed give rise to governmental concerns. Indeed, while efforts to approximate national legislations might seem to de-dramatise the conflict of laws the creation of a closer community seems paradoxically to focus more attention on state interests; issues of regulatory power within the internal market become central to the function of the conflict of laws, while political theories of choice of law seem bound to flourish. 8 The novelty from a European stand point lies not only, once again, in the blurring of the public/private divide and the inadequacy of the trad itional private interest paradigm to explain the transformations induced by new quasi-federalist concerns, but also in the need for dual choice of law system, geared on the one hand to dealing with cross-border activities within the internal market, on the other to defining the scope of Community regulation vis-a- vis the law of third states. 19 Such a cleavage between interstate and international conflicts-or rather, between conflicts subject to state or federal authority 20-has long existed in the United States, the former being to a certain degree constitutionalised. I The latter, formulated The belief widely held in Europe that govemments do not have a direct stake in outcomes in conflicts cases does not mean that legislators do not show concern forthe implementation of substantive policies in private law. This gives rise to alternative choice of law rules, such as those designed to promote the interest of he child in the field of fam ily relationships(for example, articles 311-16 to 311-18 of the French civil code) 17 Thus, mutual recognition and the home country rule tend to frame choice of law asa political issue, as is apparent from the study by Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study of'the Relationships between the freedoms. OUP 2002 Fundamental nights ideology will no doubt be the vehicle of such an approach within Europe. For ar example of the way in which various rights impact on the conflict of laws in the field of family law, see A Bucher, ' La famille en droit intemational prive, 283 Rec Cours Acad La Haye 9-186(2000). It may be, on the other hand, that a polit ical theory of negative rights, such as the one proposed by Lea brilmayer (Rights, Fairness and Choice ofLaw,,98 Yale /1277(1989)is unnecessary in the European Union, because of guarantees built into European conflict of laws or judicial jurisdiction to ensure freedom from unfair surprise or interference. Fundamental freedoms and the principle of proportionality may serve a similar end At present, this system is particularly complex as decision-making in both these fields is multi-level Not all the choice of law rules of the Mem ber States in fields which might affect the work ing of the internal market are harmonised as yet, and conflicts with third states are subject to community law only to the extent that it prohibits opting-out of harmonised protection. See on this last aspect, P Lagarde, Heurs et ma heurs de la protection internationale du consommateur dans IUnion europeenne, in Le contrat au debut du xXleme siecle explains that the real distinction between the Second Restatement on the Conflict of Laws and the lhiyl1) Lea Brilmayer( The Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 50 Law Contemp Probs 11) Restatement on Foreign Relations lies in the existence or not of federalregulation. Thus, some intermational conflicts are subject to choice of law under the Second restatement, when they arise in a field such as tort which is not subject to federal legislation. On the other hand, when a claim is governed by federal regulation federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction, and approach conflict of laws situations in terms of "prescriptive jurisdiction The current state of the law on this point results from Allstate Insurance v Hague, 1981, 101S Ct 633‘neutrality’ in the 1970s by allowing in result-selective considerations in private law,16 choice of law also seems destined to lose the ‘innocence’ which once served to keep it distinct from international politics. 2. The additional challenge of market integration for European conflicts theory. Today, Member States of the European Union are also facing the fact that a federal or integrated political structure bears necessarily on the way in which conflicts between the laws of component units are perceived and solved, and that allocation of legislative jurisdiction within such a structure does indeed give rise to governmental concerns.17 Indeed, while efforts to approximate national legislations might seem to de-dramatise the conflict of laws, the creation of a closer community seems paradoxically to focus more attention on state interests; issues of regulatory power within the internal market become central to the function of the conflict of laws, while political theories of choice of law seem bound to flourish.18 The novelty from a European standpoint lies not only, once again, in the blurring of the public/private divide and the inadequacy of the traditional private interest paradigm to explain the transformations induced by new quasi-federalist concerns, but also in the need for a dual choice of law system, geared on the one hand to dealing with cross-border activities within the internal market, on the other to defining the scope of Community regulation vis-à- vis the law of third states.19 Such a cleavage between interstate and international conflicts - or rather, between conflicts subject to state or federal authority20 - has long existed in the United States, the former being to a certain degree constitutionalised.21 The latter, formulated in 16 The belief widely held in Europe that governments do not have a direct stake in outcomes in conflicts cases does not mean that legislators do not show concern for the implementation of substantive policies in private law. This gives rise to alternative choice of law rules, such as those designed to promote the interest of the child in the field of family relationships (for example, articles 311-16 to 311-18 of the French civil code). 17 Thus, mutual recognition and the home country rule tend to frame choice of law as a political issue, as is apparent from the study by Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study of the Relationships between the Freedoms, OUP 2002. 18 Fundamental rights ideology will no doubt be the vehicle of such an approach within Europe. For an example of the way in which various rights impact on the conflict of laws in the field of family law, see A Bucher, ‘La famille en droit international privé’, 283 Rec Cours Acad La Haye 9-186 (2000). It may be, on the other hand, that a political theory of negative rights, such as the one proposed by Lea Brilmayer (‘Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law’, 98 Yale LJ 1277 (1989)) is unnecessary in the European Union, because of guarantees built into European conflict of laws or judicial jurisdiction to ensure freedom from unfair surprise or interference. Fundamental freedoms and the principle of proportionality may serve a similar end. 19 At present, this system is particularly complex as decision-making in both these fields is multi-level. Not all the choice of law rules of the Member States in fields which might affect the working of the interna l market are harmonised as yet, and conflicts with third states are subject to community law only to the extent that it prohibits opting-out of harmonised protection. See on this last aspect, P Lagarde, ‘Heurs et malheurs de la protection internationale du consommateur dans l’Union européenne, in Le contrat au début du XXIème siècle. Etudes offertes à Jacques Ghestin’, LGDJ 2000, 511. 20 Lea Brilmayer (‘The Extraterritorial Application of American Law’, 50 Law & Contemp Probs 11) explains that the real distinction between the Second Restatement on the Conflict of Laws and the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations lies in the existence or not of federal regulation. Thus, some international conflicts are subject to choice of law under the Second Restatement, when they arise in a field such as tort, which is not subject to federal legislation. On the other hand, when a claim is governed by federal regulation, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction, and approach conflict of laws situations in terms of ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’. 21 The current state of the law on this point results from Allstate Insurance v Hague, 1981, 101 S Ct 633