terms of isdiction, are subject to the supposed constraints of public international law or comity; 2 they involve defining the international reach of federal economic legislation, and, when a claim is not supported by the latter, leave no room for the enforcement of foreign public law. 23 3. New perspectives: Economic theory of choice of law in a market setting. Thus, the European perspective on the conflict of laws is being reshaped by the pressures wrought by globalisation and by internal market integration, which both, for different reasons, challenge the private law model and focus attention on the political importance of ensuring the proper allocation of regulatory authority. The thesis of this paper is, very simply, that an economic analysis of the relationship between law and the market might be used to clarify the function of choice of law in both a global and an internal market setting, and highlight some of the transformations to which the new economic and institutional environment transforms trad itional theory. It draws on recent US scholarship, which has suggested that economic analysis could provide renewed foundations for choice of law, 24 although its conclusions may differ from these proposals in many respects. 25 In common with them, however, it relies on Phillips Petroleum v Shutts, 1985, 105 S Ct 2965, Sun Oil v Wortman, 1988, 108 S Ct 2117. There is debate as to whether, in fact, constitutional constra ints also extend to the exercise of jurisdiction, at least judicial jurisdiction, in the international arena(see Brilmayer Norchi, "Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv L Rev 1217). On the impact of federa lism on US conflicts, see Robert Sedler, 'American Federalism, State Sovereignty and the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law, in Law and Justice in a Multi-state World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T von Mehren, Transnational Publishers 2002 See Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law 1987. Sect 403 and Andreas F Lowenfeld International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness, 17. For a critique of the way in which comity rhetoric has been used by the courts, sometimes as a bridge between law and politics and sometimes as a wall, see again Joel R Paul, Com ity in International Law Indeed, in the absence of a federal question arising from the applicability of federal legislation, the federalcourts lack subject-matter jurisdiction Andrew Guzman, 'Choice of Law. This text is heralded as a compelling framework for all future scholarship'by Paul B Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, at 969. Among the abundant, previous literature, see Michael Solimine, 'An Econom ic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 Ga L Rev 949(1989); Erin O'Hara Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in the Choice of Law, 67 Chi L Rev 1151(2000); Michael Whincop Mary Keyes, "Putting the Private Back into International Law. Default Rules and the Proper Law of Contract, 21 Melbourne UL Rev 515(1998); Michael Whincop Mary Keyes Towards an Econom ic Theory of Private International Law, 25 Australian ournaloflegal Philosophy 10 (2000); Joel P Trachtman, "Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility,26 Vand Transnat7L975(1994); Joel P Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisd iction and Choice of law, 42 Va/Int7L 1(2001); see, from a European perspective, H Muir Watt, "Law and Economics" Quel apport pour le droit international prive,, in Le contrat au debut du xxleme siecle. Etudes ofertes a Jacques Ghestin 685 Particularly as far as it seems to encourage excessive deregulation and"privatisation'of the conflict of laws. There is, however, disagreement within this new movement as to the extent to which deregulation and privatisation should be encoura ged. See, on the one hand, Erin OHara larry Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency, Michael Whincop Mary Keyes, "Putting the Private Back,, and on the other hand, critical of excessive privatisation, Andrew Guzman, "Choice of Lawand Joel P Trachtman, " Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction. In many cases, too, economic analysis appears to reinvent the wheel, through insufficient attention to traditional conflicts theory. On the benefit the law and economics movement in choice of law might ga in from comparative analysis, see Jan Kropholler Jan von Hein, From Approach to Rule Orientation in American Tort Conflicts, Law and ustice in a Multi-state World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, 317. This applies, in particular, to the idea that the welfare of individuals, not sovereignty, is the right yardstick for the conflict of lawsterms of ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’, are subject to the supposed constraints of public international law or comity;22 they involve defining the international reach of federal economic legislation, and, when a claim is not supported by the latter, leave no room for the enforcement of foreign public law.23 3. New perspectives: Economic theory of choice of law in a market setting. Thus, the European perspective on the conflict of laws is being reshaped by the pressures wrought by globalisation and by internal market integration, which both, for different reasons, challenge the private law model and focus attention on the political importance of ensuring the proper allocation of regulatory authority. The thesis of this paper is, very simply, that an economic analysis of the relationship between law and the market might be used to clarify the function of choice of law in both a global and an internal market setting, and highlight some of the transformations to which the new economic and institutional environment transforms traditional theory. It draws on recent US scholarship, which has suggested that economic analysis could provide renewed foundations for choice of law,24 although its conclusions may differ from these proposals in many respects.25 In common with them, however, it relies on Phillips Petroleum v Shutts, 1985, 105 S Ct 2965, Sun Oil v Wortman, 1988, 108 S Ct 2117. There is debate as to whether, in fact, constitutional constraints also extend to the exercise of jurisdiction, at least judicial jurisdiction, in the international arena (see Brilmayer & Norchi, ‘Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process’, 105 Harv L Rev 1217). On the impact of federalism on US conflicts, see Robert Sedler, ‘American Federalism, State Sovereignty and the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law’, in Law and Justice in a Multi-state World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, Transnational Publishers 2002. 22 See Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, 1987, Sect 403 and Andreas F Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness, 17. For a critique of the way in which comity rhetoric has been used by the courts, sometimes as a bridge between law and politics and sometimes as a wall, see again Joel R Paul, ‘Comity in International Law’. 23 Indeed, in the absence of a federal question arising from the applicability of federal legislation, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction. 24 Andrew Guzman, ‘Choice of Law’. This text is heralded as ‘a compelling framework for all future scholarship’ by Paul B Stephan, ‘The Political Economy of Choice of Law’, at 969. Among the abundant, previous literature, see Michael Solimine, ‘An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law’, 24 Ga L Rev 949 (1989); Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, ‘From Politics to Efficiency in the Choice of Law’, 67 U Chi L Rev 1151 (2000); Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, ‘Putting the Private Back into International Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of Contract’, 21 Melbourne U L Rev 515 (1998); Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, ‘Towards an Economic Theory of Private International Law’, 25 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 10 (2000); Joel P Trachtman, ‘Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility’, 26 Vand J Transnat’l L 975 (1994); Joel P Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction and Choice of law’, 42 Va J Int’l L 1 (2001); see, from a European perspective, H. Muir Watt, ‘“Law and Economics”. Quel apport pour le droit international privé?’, in Le contrat au début du XXIème siècle. Etudes offertes à Jacques Ghestin, 685. 25 Particularly as far as it seems to encourage excessive deregulation and ‘privatisation’ of the conflict of laws. There is, however, disagreement within this new movement as to the extent to which deregulation and ‘privatisation’ should be encouraged. See, on the one hand, Erin O’Hara & Larry Ribstein, ‘From Politics to Efficiency’, Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, ‘Putting the Private Back’, and on the other hand, critical of excessive privatisation, Andrew Guzman, ‘Choice of Law’ and Joel P Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction’. In many cases, too, economic analysis appears to reinvent the wheel, through insufficient attention to traditional conflicts theory. On the benefit the law and economics movement in choice of law might gain from comparative analysis, see Jan Kropholler & Jan von Hein, ‘From Approach to Rule - Orientation in American Tort Conflicts’, Law and Justice in a Multi-state World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, 317. This applies, in particular, to the idea that the welfare of individuals, not sovereignty, is the right yardstick for the conflict of laws