formation of the philosophy of praxis in the Frankfurt School. Adorno, As noted above, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were deeply influ- Horkheimer and Marcuse are influenced by Marx and Lukacs philosophy of enced by Lukacs' version of the philosophy of praxis. They seized on his ith which they were familiar quite early. However, there is a deeper concept of reification which, in combination with other sources, became the connection; even where they write without reference to these sources, they basis of their critique of positivism and their dialectical reformulation of operate within the logic of the philosophy of praxis. That logic requires that Marxist theory. Somewhat later, in the period after World War II, French philosophical abstractions be traced back to their roots in concrete social Marxism came under the influence of the early Lukacs as a whole generati conditions. And once those conditions have been identified, the hypothetical of social theorists sought radical alternatives to the dominant Stalinist ortho- construction of their revolutionary transformation rebounds back on the loxy. The most famous text of this trend is Maurice Merleau-Ponry's Adven- philosophical concepts and shows how their contradictions can be resolved tures of the Dialecti, which first introduced the term "Western Marxism"to But the transcendence of describe the tradition stemming from History and Class Consciousness. The by the historical situation of the Frankfurt School which is very different from French were primarily interested in Lukacs' concept of praxis and his theory of the revolutionary context that forms the background of Lukacs formulations. class consciousness. They saw in these ideas an alternative to the official Although the Frankfurt School works in a period of revolutionary decline and Marxist dogma of the party as surrogate subject of the revolution. With reaction, it remains bound by the demands of philosophy of praxis. Its focus Lukacs they reaffirmed the primacy of working class praxis, articulated ideo- shifts from the specific consequences of capitalism toward the more general gically by the party but not replaced by it. problem of the domination of nature and the structure of modern experience, I had the good fortune to study with representatives of both these schools d to be the source of the failure of the revolut of thought, with Herbert Marcuse and Lucien Goldmann. Starting out from There are two possible outcomes: either the resolution of the antinomies the disparate traditions and emphases they represent, I pro a new interpre- through social transformation is treated as a utopian demand, devaluing social tation designed to reestablish the unity of Lukacs' early Marxism. This back- reality by contrast, or a new agent of revolution is discovered able to carry ground may help to explain the difference between my approach to Lukacs through the project of social transformation. These alternatives correspond and that of scholars widely read in the English speaking world such as Leszek roughly to the difference between Adorno and Marcuse's late work In Adorno Kolakowski, Gareth Stedman Jones and George Lichtheim, who condemn the historical thesis of the philosophy of praxis serves primarily to provide an theory of reification as irrationalist and the theory of class consciousness independent point of view for social critique. Marcuse eventually finds hope Stalinist. These very negative evaluations square neither with the content no ful signs in the New Left. He sees the social movements of the 1960s and70s he intellectual impact of Lukacs text. ot as a new agent of revolution but as prefiguring an emancipatory mode of When Lukacs is compared, not with Bergson or Stalin, but with Marx's perience. Revolution in an advanced society is at least possible in principle I works and the Frankfurt School, a very different picture on the basis of a generalization of this new way of experiencing the world. emerges. Like the early Marx, the early Marxist Lukacs is a critic of the"alien- This is sufficient for Marcuse to construct a final version of the philosophy of ation of reason"in modern capitalist society. But that critique is by no means praxis in which the transformation of technology plays a central role. Their irrationalist; rather, it aims at the establishment of a dialectical paradigm of versions of philosophy of praxis are discussed in the concluding chapters of rationality suited to the task of social self-understanding and human libera- his book. tion. Such a dialectical rationality can be of no service to authoritarian re- gimes, but only to a socialist culture of self-rule. Not the least important dimension of these philosophers of praxis is the contribution they make to defining the broad outlines of such a culture.formation of the philosophy of praxis in the Frankfurt School. Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse are influenced by Marx and Lukács’ philosophy of praxis with which they were familiar quite early. However, there is a deeper connection; even where they write without reference to these sources, they operate within the logic of the philosophy of praxis. That logic requires that philosophical abstractions be traced back to their roots in concrete social conditions. And once those conditions have been identified, the hypothetical construction of their revolutionary transformation rebounds back on the philosophical concepts and shows how their contradictions can be resolved. But the transcendence of philosophy through social practice is frustrated by the historical situation of the Frankfurt School which is very different from the revolutionary context that forms the background of Lukács’ formulations. Although the Frankfurt School works in a period of revolutionary decline and reaction, it remains bound by the demands of philosophy of praxis. Its focus shifts from the specific consequences of capitalism toward the more general problem of the domination of nature and the structure of modern experience, presumed to be the source of the failure of the revolution. There are two possible outcomes: either the resolution of the antinomies through social transformation is treated as a utopian demand, devaluing social reality by contrast, or a new agent of revolution is discovered able to carry through the project of social transformation. These alternatives correspond roughly to the difference between Adorno and Marcuse’s late work. In Adorno the historical thesis of the philosophy of praxis serves primarily to provide an independent point of view for social critique. Marcuse eventually finds hope￾ful signs in the New Left. He sees the social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s not as a new agent of revolution but as prefiguring an emancipatory mode of experience. Revolution in an advanced society is at least possible in principle on the basis of a generalization of this new way of experiencing the world. This is sufficient for Marcuse to construct a final version of the philosophy of praxis in which the transformation of technology plays a central role. Their versions of philosophy of praxis are discussed in the concluding chapters of this book. *** As noted above, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse were deeply influ￾enced by Lukács’ version of the philosophy of praxis. They seized on his concept of reification which, in combination with other sources, became the basis of their critique of positivism and their dialectical reformulation of Marxist theory. Somewhat later, in the period after World War II, French Marxism came under the influence of the early Lukács as a whole generation of social theorists sought radical alternatives to the dominant Stalinist ortho￾doxy. The most famous text of this trend is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Adven￾tures of the Dialectic, which first introduced the term "Western Marxism" to describe the tradition stemming from History and Class Consciousness. The French were primarily interested in Lukács’ concept of praxis and his theory of class consciousness. They saw in these ideas an alternative to the official Marxist dogma of the party as surrogate subject of the revolution. With Lukács they reaffirmed the primacy of working class praxis, articulated ideo￾logically by the party but not replaced by it. I had the good fortune to study with representatives of both these schools of thought, with Herbert Marcuse and Lucien Goldmann. Starting out from the disparate traditions and emphases they represent, I propose a new interpre￾tation designed to reestablish the unity of Lukács’ early Marxism. This back￾ground may help to explain the difference between my approach to Lukács and that of scholars widely read in the English speaking world such as Leszek Kolakowski, Gareth Stedman Jones and George Lichtheim, who condemn the theory of reification as irrationalist and the theory of class consciousness as Stalinist. These very negative evaluations square neither with the content nor the intellectual impact of Lukács’ text. When Lukács is compared, not with Bergson or Stalin, but with Marx's early philosophical works and the Frankfurt School, a very different picture emerges. Like the early Marx, the early Marxist Lukács is a critic of the "alien￾ation of reason" in modern capitalist society. But that critique is by no means irrationalist; rather, it aims at the establishment of a dialectical paradigm of rationality suited to the task of social self-understanding and human libera￾tion. Such a dialectical rationality can be of no service to authoritarian re￾gimes, but only to a socialist culture of self-rule. Not the least important dimension of these philosophers of praxis is the contribution they make to defining the broad outlines of such a culture