When the Money Stops FIGURE 4.The effect on changes in remittances on changes in trust in the president by access to political information 0.2 90 0.1 20 Share of Respondents 0.0 0 -0.1 2 3 Political Information 'asn Notes:The figure presents the marginal effect of changes in the amount of remittances on changes in trust in the president at differen levels of access to political information with 95 percent confidence intervals based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects.For full results see Table B.3 and for robustness checks see Table C.15 and Figure C.1 in the SI.Source:Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey,2010-2013. actively seek something from the government,in the to financially support development projects in their city case of increases in remittances,recipients are not seek- or region of origin and which are very common in the ing compensation from the government and hence the Americas,would actually bias the results of our regres- extent of government preparedness will remain unob- sions downward,given their primary activity of sup- served.As such,evidence that fluctuations in remit- porting local health and education projects (Orozco tances ameliorate trust would seem to be an example and Rouse 2013).In general however,such groups are of misattribution not active in Kyrgyzstan or in our larger sample.5 More- Second,we find little empirical support for the argu- over,analysis relying on evidence from the LiTS sur- ment that households that experience a decline in re- veys suggests that satisfaction with welfare provisions mittances become less satisfied with public safety nets, does not moderate attributions of responsibility for de- in the form of welfare provision or public goods.When clines in remittances (see Table D.5 in the SI). remittances decline.as Acevedo(2016)has suggested Next,we examine whether political information, recipients may actually increase their demand for pub- which is crucial for blame attribution (e.g.Gomez and lic safety nets and if the quality of public services dis- Wilson 2001;De Vries and Giger 2014),moderates the appoint,a recipient who experiences a reduction in relationship between remittances and support for the remittances might sanction an incumbent to a greater president.Based on the treatment responsibility mech- degree than someone who has not experienced such a anism,one would expect those who are most informed decline.In the 2013 wave of the LiK survey,respon- to be most likely to sanction the incumbent.Those who dents were asked how satisfied they are with the public are more informed are more likely to have developed services in the country.The answer categories ranged some pre-shock evaluation of the government.As a re- from 1)very dissatisfied'to 4)'very satisfied:We re- sult,they are also more likely to be able to use the in- gressed people's satisfaction with public service provi- formation from the incumbent's response to an exoge- sion on our three different measures of changes in re- nous shock to update their post-shock assessment of mittances,and the results are presented in Table D.3 in this incumbent.The opposite should hold for the misat- the SI(for robustness checks see Table D.4).We find no tribution mechanism.People with more political infor- relationship between changes in remitted income and mation should be better able to identify the merits of satisfaction with public service provision. The existence of Hometown Associations (HTAs) 6 Of the 28 countries in the 2010 LiTS Survey,only Moldova and organizations that allow migrants from the same region Albania appear to have active HTAs. 771When the Money Stops FIGURE 4. The effect on changes in remittances on changes in trust in the president by access to political information Notes: The figure presents the marginal effect of changes in the amount of remittances on changes in trust in the president at different levels of access to political information with 95 percent confidence intervals based on a panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. For full results see Table B.3 and for robustness checks see Table C.15 and Figure C.1 in the SI. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010–2013. actively seek something from the government, in the case of increases in remittances, recipients are not seek￾ing compensation from the government and hence the extent of government preparedness will remain unob￾served. As such, evidence that fluctuations in remit￾tances ameliorate trust would seem to be an example of misattribution. Second, we find little empirical support for the argu￾ment that households that experience a decline in re￾mittances become less satisfied with public safety nets, in the form of welfare provision or public goods. When remittances decline, as Acevedo (2016) has suggested, recipients may actually increase their demand for pub￾lic safety nets and if the quality of public services dis￾appoint, a recipient who experiences a reduction in remittances might sanction an incumbent to a greater degree than someone who has not experienced such a decline. In the 2013 wave of the LiK survey, respon￾dents were asked how satisfied they are with the public services in the country. The answer categories ranged from 1) ‘very dissatisfied’ to 4) ‘very satisfied’. We re￾gressed people’s satisfaction with public service provi￾sion on our three different measures of changes in re￾mittances, and the results are presented in Table D.3 in the SI (for robustness checks see Table D.4).We find no relationship between changes in remitted income and satisfaction with public service provision. The existence of Hometown Associations (HTAs), organizations that allow migrants from the same region to financially support development projects in their city or region of origin and which are very common in the Americas, would actually bias the results of our regres￾sions downward, given their primary activity of sup￾porting local health and education projects (Orozco and Rouse 2013). In general however, such groups are not active in Kyrgyzstan or in our larger sample.6 More￾over, analysis relying on evidence from the LiTS sur￾veys suggests that satisfaction with welfare provisions does not moderate attributions of responsibility for de￾clines in remittances (see Table D.5 in the SI). Next, we examine whether political information, which is crucial for blame attribution (e.g. Gomez and Wilson 2001; De Vries and Giger 2014), moderates the relationship between remittances and support for the president. Based on the treatment responsibility mech￾anism, one would expect those who are most informed to be most likely to sanction the incumbent. Those who are more informed are more likely to have developed some pre-shock evaluation of the government. As a re￾sult, they are also more likely to be able to use the in￾formation from the incumbent’s response to an exoge￾nous shock to update their post-shock assessment of this incumbent.The opposite should hold for the misat￾tribution mechanism. People with more political infor￾mation should be better able to identify the merits of 6 Of the 28 countries in the 2010 LiTS Survey, only Moldova and Albania appear to have active HTAs. 771 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000485