Katerina Tertytchnaya et al. incumbent performance and thus reward or punish the Singer 2012:Pfutze 2014:O'Mahony 2013:Ahmed incumbent less for changes in remittances.Although in 2012;Escriba-Folch,Meseguer,and Wright 2015; a volatile economic environment like Kyrgyzstan,the Leblang 2017),only a handful of studies have exam- competency signal is small,and it may still be rational ined how the receipt of remittances might condition the to hold the incumbent to account for economic perfor- economic vote at the individual level(Bravo 2012:Ger- mance driven by exogenous events,those who are more mano 2013;Ahmed 2017).So far,no work has explored informed are less likely to do so because they realize the dynamics of remittances.Our study is the first study that the incumbent is not responsible for changes in to explore how changes in remittances at the individual remitted income. level might affect changes in incumbent support. We examine these expectations by regressing Second,our findings suggest that while the receipt of changes in trust in the president on changes in the remittances does indeed bolster support for the incum- amount of remitted income received,as we do in bent all else equal as existing work suggests,this works Table 2,but interact the changes in the amount of to the incumbent's disadvantage when remittances de- remitted income with people's access to political infor- cline.Remittances are not a constant and they generate mation.We capture access to political information by dynamic attitudes and political behavior in response relying on a set of questions asking respondents if they to their own dynamism.Our findings may account for consult different news sources.such as radio.TV or the some of the conflicting evidence in the literature thus internet,or rely on family or friends to learn about the far.Some empirical work suggests that remittances can situation in their community,Kyrgyzstan or the world. prolong the stability of authoritarian regimes(Ahmed We create an additive scale ranging from 1 to 4,where 2012)while other work shows that they might hin- 1 indicates that they use none or only one of these der longevity (Escriba-Folch.Meseguer,and Wright sources and 4 indicates that they rely on four or more. 2015).This study suggests that in order to better under- Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of changes in the stand the relationship between remittances and regime amount of remitted income for people at different lev- longevity it is crucial to consider fluctuations in the vol- els of political information (full results are presented in ume and frequency of remittances. Table B.3 and robustness checks in Table C.16 and Fig- Our ability to model these types of changes in re- ure C.1 in the SI).The results suggest that attribution mittance flows,thanks to the four-wave panel study of responsibility for changes in remittances is declining from Kyrgyzstan,will also be relevant for work on as political sophistication increases.These findings are competence models in economic voting (e.g.Stigler largely in line with the misattribution mechanism. 1973;Duch and Stevenson 2008;Campello and Zucco 2016).This work has focused on ascertaining in what contexts voters might be able to parse out the differ- CONCLUSION ence between economic outcomes driven by the com- petence of their leaders,compared to economic out- Remittances are now one of the largest flows of cap- comes driven by exogenous global forces.One of the ital to developing world economies,in some cases. big issues facing this work has been the identification of outstripping FDI,portfolio capital and overseas de- misattribution effects(Campello and Zucco 2016).Re- velopment assistance and for many households,they mittances,given they are largely a private fiscal transfer represent a crucial economic lifeline.In this study,we shaped by economic conditions elsewhere,are a par- contribute to an emerging literature concerned with ticularly neat way to test misattribution.Although ex- the effect of remittances on individual political atti- ogenous shocks may be the only source of informa- tudes and political behavior(Meseguer,Lavezzolo,and tion about incumbent competence for rational voters in Aparicio 2016;Germano 2013;Bravo 2012;Ahmed volatile contexts,the type of misattribution we examine 2017).Taking our cue from recent work on the relation- here will still have implications for the economic vote ship between remittances and the economic vote (Ger as a mechanism of accountability and as such,it will mano 2010;Bravo 2012)and on misattribution and have important normative ramifications economic voting in the developing world (Campello From a more general perspective,we think this point and Zucco 2016),we argued that when remittances highlights the precarious equilibrium that remittances change,recipients will attribute the change in their can generate.When evaluations of the government economic situation to the incumbent.We are able to at home respond to fluctuations in remitted income identify this mechanism by modeling changes in remit- largely driven by events and developments abroad, tances on changes in economic evaluations and sup- accountability mechanisms,which are rudimentary in port for the incumbent using a unique four-wave panel many remittance-dependent economies could erode study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010-2013.We sup- even further.When countercyclical (Yang and Choi plemented this data with cross-national survey evi- 2007),remittances could bolster trust in incumbents dence from 28 countries from 2010. even when economic performance at home is poor We believe that our findings are important for a They may also encourage governments to reduce so- L number of different bodies of work.First.we know cial safety nets and increase patronage (Ahmed 2012). little about the political effects of remittances.While On the other hand,declines in remittances,and related there is a growing literature on the effect of remit- economic grievances among recipients,may result in tances on public policy at the macro level (e.g.Abdih greater electoral punishment for events incumbents do et al.2012;Tyburski 2012;Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; not fully control 772Katerina Tertytchnaya et al. incumbent performance and thus reward or punish the incumbent less for changes in remittances. Although in a volatile economic environment like Kyrgyzstan, the competency signal is small, and it may still be rational to hold the incumbent to account for economic perfor￾mance driven by exogenous events, those who are more informed are less likely to do so because they realize that the incumbent is not responsible for changes in remitted income. We examine these expectations by regressing changes in trust in the president on changes in the amount of remitted income received, as we do in Table 2, but interact the changes in the amount of remitted income with people’s access to political infor￾mation. We capture access to political information by relying on a set of questions asking respondents if they consult different news sources, such as radio, TV or the internet, or rely on family or friends to learn about the situation in their community, Kyrgyzstan or the world. We create an additive scale ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates that they use none or only one of these sources and 4 indicates that they rely on four or more. Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of changes in the amount of remitted income for people at different lev￾els of political information (full results are presented in Table B.3 and robustness checks in Table C.16 and Fig￾ure C.1 in the SI). The results suggest that attribution of responsibility for changes in remittances is declining as political sophistication increases. These findings are largely in line with the misattribution mechanism. CONCLUSION Remittances are now one of the largest flows of cap￾ital to developing world economies, in some cases, outstripping FDI, portfolio capital and overseas de￾velopment assistance and for many households, they represent a crucial economic lifeline. In this study, we contribute to an emerging literature concerned with the effect of remittances on individual political atti￾tudes and political behavior (Meseguer,Lavezzolo, and Aparicio 2016; Germano 2013; Bravo 2012; Ahmed 2017).Taking our cue from recent work on the relation￾ship between remittances and the economic vote (Ger￾mano 2010; Bravo 2012) and on misattribution and economic voting in the developing world (Campello and Zucco 2016), we argued that when remittances change, recipients will attribute the change in their economic situation to the incumbent. We are able to identify this mechanism by modeling changes in remit￾tances on changes in economic evaluations and sup￾port for the incumbent using a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010–2013. We sup￾plemented this data with cross-national survey evi￾dence from 28 countries from 2010. We believe that our findings are important for a number of different bodies of work. First, we know little about the political effects of remittances. While there is a growing literature on the effect of remit￾tances on public policy at the macro level (e.g. Abdih et al.2012;Tyburski 2012;Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Singer 2012; Pfutze 2014; O’Mahony 2013; Ahmed 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015; Leblang 2017), only a handful of studies have exam￾ined how the receipt of remittances might condition the economic vote at the individual level (Bravo 2012;Ger￾mano 2013;Ahmed 2017). So far, no work has explored the dynamics of remittances.Our study is the first study to explore how changes in remittances at the individual level might affect changes in incumbent support. Second, our findings suggest that while the receipt of remittances does indeed bolster support for the incum￾bent all else equal as existing work suggests, this works to the incumbent’s disadvantage when remittances de￾cline. Remittances are not a constant and they generate dynamic attitudes and political behavior in response to their own dynamism. Our findings may account for some of the conflicting evidence in the literature thus far. Some empirical work suggests that remittances can prolong the stability of authoritarian regimes (Ahmed 2012) while other work shows that they might hin￾der longevity (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015). This study suggests that in order to better under￾stand the relationship between remittances and regime longevity it is crucial to consider fluctuations in the vol￾ume and frequency of remittances. Our ability to model these types of changes in re￾mittance flows, thanks to the four-wave panel study from Kyrgyzstan, will also be relevant for work on competence models in economic voting (e.g. Stigler 1973; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Campello and Zucco 2016). This work has focused on ascertaining in what contexts voters might be able to parse out the differ￾ence between economic outcomes driven by the com￾petence of their leaders, compared to economic out￾comes driven by exogenous global forces. One of the big issues facing this work has been the identification of misattribution effects (Campello and Zucco 2016). Re￾mittances, given they are largely a private fiscal transfer shaped by economic conditions elsewhere, are a par￾ticularly neat way to test misattribution. Although ex￾ogenous shocks may be the only source of informa￾tion about incumbent competence for rational voters in volatile contexts, the type of misattribution we examine here will still have implications for the economic vote as a mechanism of accountability and as such, it will have important normative ramifications. From a more general perspective, we think this point highlights the precarious equilibrium that remittances can generate. When evaluations of the government at home respond to fluctuations in remitted income, largely driven by events and developments abroad, accountability mechanisms, which are rudimentary in many remittance-dependent economies could erode even further. When countercyclical (Yang and Choi 2007), remittances could bolster trust in incumbents even when economic performance at home is poor. They may also encourage governments to reduce so￾cial safety nets and increase patronage (Ahmed 2012). On the other hand, declines in remittances, and related economic grievances among recipients, may result in greater electoral punishment for events incumbents do not fully control. 772 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000485