International Security 17:1 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans.First,the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel.Second,without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy.Third,the clearest Chinese warn- ing came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance.American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere.After the North Korean attack on the South,Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion.The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel,the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949,assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide.Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way:"In the longer run,if we should succeed in reoccupying the South,the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise.This would be a hard task for us to take on,and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country.I could not see the end of it."19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained:the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels,but the most significant Ko- rean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19.Acheson paraphrased a July 10,1950,letter to Paul Nitze;Present at the Creation,pp.450- 451.The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geograph- ically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense,and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures.See Foot, The Wrong War,pp.71-72;and John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace:Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York:Oxford University Press,1987),p.99. 20.The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea.After the initial North Korean attack on the South,the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion.After the November Chinese counteroffensive in North Korea,it jumped an additional $17 billion.See Paul Y.Hammond,"NSC 68:Prologue to Rearmament,"in Warner R.Schilling, Paul Y.Hammond,and Glenn H.Snyder,Strategy,Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press,1962),pp.351-363.Just before the Chinese counteroffensive,Truman said that the ability of the administration to push the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 17:1 | 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans. First, the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel. Second, without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy. Third, the clearest Chinese warn￾ing came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance. American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere. After the North Korean attack on the South, Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion. The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel, the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949, assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide. Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way: "In the longer run, if we should succeed in reoccupying the South, the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise. This would be a hard task for us to take on, and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country. I could not see the end of it."'19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained: the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels, but the most significant Ko￾rean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19. Acheson paraphrased aJuly 10, 1950, letter to Paul Nitze; Present at the Creation, pp. 450- 451. The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geograph￾ically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense, and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures. See Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 71-72; and John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 99. 20. The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea. After the initial North Korean attack on the South, the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion. After the November Chinese counteroffensiven North Korea, it jumped an additional $17 billion. See Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC 68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 351-363. Just before the Chinese counteroffensive, Truman said that the ability of the administration topush the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions