Adam Michael Auerbach and Tarig Thachil concern is distributive:how likely is a broker to chan- theoretical framework for understanding those pref- nel secured benefits to a client's household?We fo- erences centered on the distributive and efficacy con- cus on shared partisan or ethnic identities between the cerns of clients. broker and client as determinants of these distributive Our results,interpreted through this distinction be- expectations. tween efficacy and distributive concerns,are also the- Empirically,we examine client preferences for bro- oretically significant.First,our findings challenge con- kers through a study of a substantively important ventional wisdom on Asian and African politics that class of intermediaries:informal slum leaders.Poor anticipates distributive expectations based on coeth- urban neighborhoods are iconic settings for theories nicity will overwhelmingly shape political preferences of clientelism,making them especially important are- (Chandra 2004:Posner 2005).While clients do prefer nas to examine (Stokes 1995,Auyero 2000).Slums coethnics,we find they value certain nonethnic indica- are estimated to house approximately 850 million peo- tors of a slum leader's efficacy,particularly their educa- ple worldwide,making their leaders central figures in tion,even more highly.We also find,contra some prior the distributive politics of developing cities.?For res- studies,that the benefits for good performance do not idents,slum leaders are focal points for fighting evic- exclusively accrue to coethnics(Adida et al.2017;Carl- tion and demanding development.For politicians,they son 2015).Indeed,we find capability and connectivity are uniquely positioned to influence residents,encour- can even compensate for a lack of coethnicity.This lat- age turnout,and organize rallies.Through a combined ter finding is especially important,given that our bro- three years of qualitative fieldwork in Indian slums,we ker survey reveals the supply of coethnic brokers in di- found settlement leadership to be contested,multifo- verse slum settlements is more constrained than that of cal,and rapidly constructed to push back against evic- capable brokers. tion and claim public services.In such competitive bro- Second.our findings on education suggest varia- 上二 kerage environments,Indian slum residents wield sig- tion in broker efficacy for their clients should receive nificant agency and choice in selecting whom they ap- greater attention in models of clientelism.Extant stud- proach for problem-solving. ies have focused on conceptualizing broker efficacy To assess the relative salience of efficacy and dis- from the perspective of parties(Camp 2015;Larreguy, tributive concerns in shaping slum resident prefer- Marshall,and Querubin 2016).Variation in client- ences for brokers,we conducted an ethnographically facing efficacy is further obscured by a preoccupation informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 indi- with top-down,episodic forms of distributive politics viduals across 110 slums in two north Indian cities such as vote buying.Such activities mute the impor- Survey respondents were asked to choose between tance of individual skills in advancing client claims,a two hypothetical candidates running for the informal primary role brokers play between elections.Our find- position of slum president (adyaksh).We use ethno- ings support recent calls for paying greater attention to graphic insights to operationalize contextual indicators such everyday lobbying roles,and not simply a brokers' of each candidate's ethnicity and partisanship,their episodic roles as dispensers of election-time handouts claim-making capability,and their connectivity to both (Berenschot 2010:Nichter 2014:Bussell 2018:Kruks- local bureaucrats and the incumbent party.A paral- Wisner 2018). lel experiment asked respondents to choose between Empirically,our study provides the first systematic S5.501g two hypothetical residents as potential neighbors,al- analysis,to our knowledge,of client preferences for lowing us to distinguish political preferences for lead- brokers.We hope to spark a research agenda on the ers from social preferences for neighbors.Finally,we determinants of client preferences for informal lead- subject our experimental findings to further scrutiny ers across varied national and local contexts.We also using data from a survey of 629 slum leaders,whom seek to contribute to our empirical understanding of we surveyed across our 110 settlements.Specifically,we distributive politics within urban slums and migrant assess whether client-preferred traits distinguish actual communities,an understudied electorate that is prolif- slum leaders from ordinary residents erating across much of the developing world(Thachil This paper advances the study of distributive,eth- 2017).3 In this arena,we present evidence from the first nic,and urban politics.Theoretically,we draw atten- large and representative survey of slum leaders ever tion to the neglected phenomenon of broker selection conducted by clients.We build on important work showing that clients often have nontrivial agency (Auyero 2000) ranging from initiating requests for services (Nichter CLIENT PREFERENCES MATTER and Peress 2017)to defecting from nonresponsive ma- Conventional models of clientelism afford little agency chines (Taylor-Robinson 2010).We extend this schol- to poor voters in selecting the brokers they seek help arship by arguing clients can also shape who staffs from and follow.Influential studies assume the pres- the local machine,especially in competitive brokerage ence of brokers without probing the nature of their conditions.When clients can exercise choice in broker support(Stokes 2005;Nichter 2008),or analyze how selection,we argue it is important to analyze their pref- parties select brokers to include within their orga- erences for specific broker attributes.We provide a nizational networks (Camp 2015;Szwarcberg 2015; United Nations (2015,2).Officially,65 million people in India re- See Post(2018)for a larger discussion on urban politics in the de- side in urban slums(2011 Census of India). veloping world. 776Adam Michael Auerbach and Tariq Thachil concern is distributive: how likely is a broker to chan￾nel secured benefits to a client’s household? We fo￾cus on shared partisan or ethnic identities between the broker and client as determinants of these distributive expectations. Empirically, we examine client preferences for bro￾kers through a study of a substantively important class of intermediaries: informal slum leaders. Poor urban neighborhoods are iconic settings for theories of clientelism, making them especially important are￾nas to examine (Stokes 1995, Auyero 2000). Slums are estimated to house approximately 850 million peo￾ple worldwide, making their leaders central figures in the distributive politics of developing cities.2 For res￾idents, slum leaders are focal points for fighting evic￾tion and demanding development. For politicians, they are uniquely positioned to influence residents, encour￾age turnout, and organize rallies. Through a combined three years of qualitative fieldwork in Indian slums, we found settlement leadership to be contested, multifo￾cal, and rapidly constructed to push back against evic￾tion and claim public services. In such competitive bro￾kerage environments, Indian slum residents wield sig￾nificant agency and choice in selecting whom they ap￾proach for problem-solving. To assess the relative salience of efficacy and dis￾tributive concerns in shaping slum resident prefer￾ences for brokers, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 indi￾viduals across 110 slums in two north Indian cities. Survey respondents were asked to choose between two hypothetical candidates running for the informal position of slum president (adyaksh). We use ethno￾graphic insights to operationalize contextual indicators of each candidate’s ethnicity and partisanship, their claim-making capability, and their connectivity to both local bureaucrats and the incumbent party. A paral￾lel experiment asked respondents to choose between two hypothetical residents as potential neighbors, al￾lowing us to distinguish political preferences for lead￾ers from social preferences for neighbors. Finally, we subject our experimental findings to further scrutiny using data from a survey of 629 slum leaders, whom we surveyed across our 110 settlements. Specifically, we assess whether client-preferred traits distinguish actual slum leaders from ordinary residents. This paper advances the study of distributive, eth￾nic, and urban politics. Theoretically, we draw atten￾tion to the neglected phenomenon of broker selection by clients. We build on important work showing that clients often have nontrivial agency (Auyero 2000), ranging from initiating requests for services (Nichter and Peress 2017) to defecting from nonresponsive ma￾chines (Taylor-Robinson 2010). We extend this schol￾arship by arguing clients can also shape who staffs the local machine, especially in competitive brokerage conditions. When clients can exercise choice in broker selection, we argue it is important to analyze their pref￾erences for specific broker attributes. We provide a 2 United Nations (2015, 2). Officially, 65 million people in India re￾side in urban slums (2011 Census of India). theoretical framework for understanding those pref￾erences centered on the distributive and efficacy con￾cerns of clients. Our results, interpreted through this distinction be￾tween efficacy and distributive concerns, are also the￾oretically significant. First, our findings challenge con￾ventional wisdom on Asian and African politics that anticipates distributive expectations based on coeth￾nicity will overwhelmingly shape political preferences (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). While clients do prefer coethnics, we find they value certain nonethnic indica￾tors of a slum leader’s efficacy, particularly their educa￾tion, even more highly. We also find, contra some prior studies, that the benefits for good performance do not exclusively accrue to coethnics (Adida et al. 2017; Carl￾son 2015). Indeed, we find capability and connectivity can even compensate for a lack of coethnicity. This lat￾ter finding is especially important, given that our bro￾ker survey reveals the supply of coethnic brokers in di￾verse slum settlements is more constrained than that of capable brokers. Second, our findings on education suggest varia￾tion in broker efficacy for their clients should receive greater attention in models of clientelism. Extant stud￾ies have focused on conceptualizing broker efficacy from the perspective of parties (Camp 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). Variation in client￾facing efficacy is further obscured by a preoccupation with top-down, episodic forms of distributive politics such as vote buying. Such activities mute the impor￾tance of individual skills in advancing client claims, a primary role brokers play between elections. Our find￾ings support recent calls for paying greater attention to such everyday lobbying roles, and not simply a brokers’ episodic roles as dispensers of election-time handouts (Berenschot 2010; Nichter 2014; Bussell 2018; Kruks￾Wisner 2018). Empirically, our study provides the first systematic analysis, to our knowledge, of client preferences for brokers. We hope to spark a research agenda on the determinants of client preferences for informal lead￾ers across varied national and local contexts. We also seek to contribute to our empirical understanding of distributive politics within urban slums and migrant communities, an understudied electorate that is prolif￾erating across much of the developing world (Thachil 2017).3 In this arena, we present evidence from the first large and representative survey of slum leaders ever conducted. CLIENT PREFERENCES MATTER Conventional models of clientelism afford little agency to poor voters in selecting the brokers they seek help from and follow. Influential studies assume the pres￾ence of brokers without probing the nature of their support (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008), or analyze how parties select brokers to include within their orga￾nizational networks (Camp 2015; Szwarcberg 2015; 3 See Post (2018) for a larger discussion on urban politics in the de￾veloping world. 776 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X